



THE JOURNAL OF CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

JANUARY 2017 • ISSUE 1 • VOLUME 3

STALKING THE OPTIMAL
LEARNING ENVIRONMENT

Dwight Stephens

A CIVILIAN CULTURAL
ADVISOR'S DIARY

David Matsuda

SPEAKING THE LANGUAGE OF
PEACE IN A WORLD OF CONFLICT

Joy Kreeft Peyton

RHODESIA: A STUDY OF
A CLASH OF CULTURES

Eric Thompson

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
LANGUAGE USE IN PEACEKEEPING
AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

Kurt E. Müller

THE JOURNAL OF CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

VOLUME 3, 1ST EDITION, FEBRUARY 2017

Editors

Dr. Robert Greene Sands
Darby Arakelian

Production Editor

Jessica DeVisser

Cover Art

Pieter DeVisser

Journal Point of Contact

Robert Greene Sands:

Robert.Sands@languaculture.org

About JCLIS

LanguaCulture publishes The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security (JCLIS) twice a year to share a comprehensive body of professional knowledge on research, the development of learning programs, and application of culture and language considered critical to the future of US military and other United States Government agencies strategy and missions. JCLIS undergirds this effort by providing a venue to reach a wide audience of those who are interested in promoting the advancement of understanding the significance of culture and language in the 21st century security arena. This web-based journal provides an opportunity for a wide range of academics, practitioners, and students to explore theories, share research, and discuss trends linking international security to bodies of knowledge in culture and language. The intended audience includes policy and decision makers, military and non-military academics, professionals and students, as well as others engaged in efforts to ensure a better understanding of the complex factors at play in a dynamic and uncertain global environment.

Journal Affiliation

The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security would like to acknowledge our partner association with [LanguaCulture Consulting, LLC](http://LanguaCultureConsulting.com).


Environmental and Ethical Policies

The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security is committed to bringing quality research to a wide and diverse audience.

JCLIS strives to protect the environment by remaining 100% electronic and encourages you do to the same. Instead of printing this document, where possible, spread its influence through electronic means.

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial- NoDerivatives 4.0 International License



Permissions

For information or to request permission to reproduce any part of this journal, please contact the editor, Dr. Robert Greene Sands: Robert.Sands@languaculture.org

Disclaimer

Statements of fact and opinion contained within the articles of The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security, made by the editor, the editorial board, the advisory panel or journal article authors are those of the respective authors and not of LanguaCulture Consulting, LLC. LanguaCulture does not make any representation, express or implied, in respect of the accuracy of material in this journal and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. The reader should make his/her own evaluation as to the appropriateness or otherwise of any information presented within these pages.

Journal Imagery

Some journal imagery, to include background images and article headline images were provided royalty and/or attribution free from various sources. Please direct any questions about copyright to Robert.Sands@languaculture.org.

Social Media Presence

The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security is pleased to enjoy a presence on Facebook, Twitter and Vimeo. JCLIS invites friendly and constructive feedback and discourse in these forums.

EDITORIAL BOARD

THE JOURNAL OF CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, VOL. 3, 1ST EDITION

ROBERT R. GREENE SANDS LANGUACULTURE CONSULTING, LLC

DARBY ARAKELIAN COMMAND STRATEGIES, LLC

PIETER R. DEVISSER LANGUACULTURE CONSULTING, LLC

ALLISON GREENE- SANDS SAPRO, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

THOMAS HAINES DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (RET)

SCOTT MCGINNIS DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON

JACKIE L. ELLER MIDDLE TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE JOURNAL OF CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, VOL. 3, 1ST EDITION

-1-

EDITORS' INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
ROBERT SANDS and **DARBY ARAKELIAN**

-3-

A CIVILIAN CULTURAL ADVISOR'S DIARY
DAVID MATSUDA

-12-

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LANGUAGE USE IN
PEACEKEEPING AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS
KURT E. MÜLLER

-24-

SPEAKING THE LANGUAGE OF PEACE IN A WORLD WITH CONFLICT
JOY KREEFT PEYTON

-38-

STALKING THE OPTIMAL LEARNING ENVIRONMENT:
COMPLEXITY AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION
DWIGHT STEPHENS

-49-

RHODESIA: A STUDY OF A CLASH OF CULTURES
ERIC THOMPSON

EDITORS' INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Welcome to the Winter 2017 issue of the *Journal of Culture, Language and International Security* (JCLIS). This issue emerges days before the change in the Executive Branch administration and the inauguration of the 45th President of the United States. One of the editors lives just downstream of the Potomac and in the shadows of the US Government, where one can witness the potential change to the US role in the world order: cozier relations with some nations and strained and / or severed with others. Traditional treaties may be at risk; globalization effects changing labor and natural resources across developed and developing nations, many whose workforce cannot keep pace with current technology. Terrorism continues to challenge nation-state security in several regions, many ripe with internal conflicts and weakened heads of state, while significant numbers of migrants seek sanctuary from its effects. With this high level of uncertainty in the world and the potential US involvement outside its borders, the need for language proficiency, an array of cross-cultural skill-based competencies and critical knowledge about how cultural systems operate has only intensified. As we enter this new era, the incoming administration's untested and unpredictable approach to national security and foreign relations drives language and cultural capability requirements even more.

JCLIS is a space where we dialogue freely on the aperture of the possibility in culture and language learning, and how best to apply this capability to ensure mission success for any government or non-government organization that deploys their personnel into risk-filled and uncertain cross-cultural complexity. We certainly believe in continuing to prop that aperture wide-open.

This issue's articles represent the importance of our "space" and mission. We feature five articles that cover the gamut of culture and language learning and application. Our first article by David "Doc" Matsuda is the first of a multi-article series capturing his reflections on approaching and engaging the ground-level intimacy of an Army cultural advisor in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Our second author, Kurt Muller, draws from his DOD career experiences to explore the benefits of bi- and multilingualism in peacekeeping and stability operations. Drawing on research in the language of "peace" and non-violence, Joy Peyton suggests the benefits of applying this linguistic and cultural frame to military organizations. In the fourth article, returning JCLIS author Dwight Stephens examines the evolutionary development of neural functions and its effect on language learning; the approach provides a fuller understanding how we can teach culture and language better. The last article is from our featured student, Eric Thompson. JCLIS strives to

give voice and authorship to students to offer their own perspectives on culture and language as they advance in their academic journey. Many of our past issues have included student articles written by members of Special Operations Forces (SOF) senior enlisted cadre enrolled in Bachelors' programs. Mr. Thompson utilizes anthropologist Michael Agar's perspective of cultural markers and rich points to re-examine the period in southern African history where Zimbabwe's independence was gained in conflict and finally supported by Great Britain from colonial Rhodesia.

We look forward to comment and thoughts from our readers. We continue to encourage the exploration of cultural and linguistic complexity and are always receptive to articles and essays that provide supporting theory in these areas.

Robert Greene Sands and Darby Arakelian
Editors

A CIVILIAN CULTURAL ADVISOR'S DIARY

BY DAVID MATSUDA

My name is Dr. Dave Matsuda; call me Doc. I am an academic anthropologist who served with our military as a civilian Cultural Advisor. Some in the military know the value-added of a Cultural Advisor and they realize that you can't kill your way out of everything. Yet, the term Cultural Advisor remains largely undefined. Its qualifications and duties are unspecified and the position needs endorsement by the military.

In this three-part series of articles entitled *A Civilian Cultural Advisors Diary* I draw on down range experience to clarify the: status and role of a Cultural Advisor; qualifications and duties of the position, and; to clarify the use of ethically driven social science tools in military 'areas of responsibility' (AOR). These articles are by no means authoritative, or definitive. They are a humble contemplation of the experiences, thoughts and reflections of a civilian Cultural Advisor in service to the US military.

As of this writing there are few career paths for Cultural Advisors in our armed forces. So a Cultural Advisor is brought into the military under corporate contract on an as

needed basis. For example, BAE Systems was the corporation that enabled my service "outside the continental United States" (OCONUS), and S4 Corporation made possible my service in the "continental United States" (CONUS).

On successive OCONUS deployments and special missions I served first at tactical level as a Human Terrain Team (HTT) Social Scientist Contractor and second I assumed the status and role of a hybrid Department of Defense-Civilian, Cultural Advisor at operational and strategic levels. I also served CONUS as a contracted Senior Cultural Advisor at United States Central Command (USCENTCOM).

On the whole, corporate defense contractors are reputable organizations, but there are exceptions. For instance, some Cultural Advisors were sent down range with no security clearance. Security clearances are to the military what background checks are to human resource's hiring specialists in the non-military civilian sector. Except the stakes are higher, because a security clearance means you are

vetted to serve and protect at the highest levels. Without a security clearance you will not be admitted to important meetings and you have no access to computers with the Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPR). Without a security clearance you cannot be trusted with secret information, and without a security clearance you will not be asked your opinion of ongoing secret operations. In short, without a security clearance there is no institutional basis for trust and you are of no use to military decision-makers. Some corporations knew better' but they still deployed civilian Cultural Advisors without security clearances.

In addition, a US CENTCOM Directorate with direct responsibility for messaging and outreach to Southwest Asia did not have an Afghanistan website. A representative of the corporation with the contract to provide website services said -this despite the fact they were getting paid-- that no website would be forthcoming until a decision was made as to whether or not they won the bid for the next contract.

As stated above, most defense contractors work tirelessly to fulfill deliverables. Others put profit before national security. Do your homework. Work for the reputable defense contractor.

This article is about the experiences of a civilian Cultural Advisor who learned through first hand experience to serve with the military. The backbone of this piece details work done down range during two deployments and several special missions. This article explores what a Cultural Advisor is and does.

The Basic Tool Kit

Bottom line, the duties of a Cultural Advisor involve at least three key components. First, you must understand other cultures; this includes the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine cultures within the US military. For example, if you do not know US Army culture, you, in all likelihood, will not get *outside the wire* to meet with, get to know and advise about local national (LN) peoples and cultures. For example, we social

scientists were given the pay grade/rank GS15; the equivalent in rank of a Colonel. Most of us knew not to take this designation too seriously, but one social scientist tried to pull rank. While on patrol in a hostile sector this particular social scientist said to the lower ranking patrol leader, 'I am a GS15, the equivalent of a Colonel, so whatever I say goes. If I issue orders you must follow them.' The Lieutenant radioed his Colonel who subsequently called the patrol back to base. The Colonel's solution, 'I will not put a social scientist without military experience outside the wire in a position to issue orders.' Needless to say, this particular civilian social scientist was, for the length of their deployment, not permitted outside the wire on patrol. The moral of the story, if you do not understand US military culture, and are deemed an ignorant security risk, you will likely not be escorted outside the wire to get to know LN peoples and cultures.

Second, a Cultural Advisor must understand how to conduct cross cultural comparison with analytical tools like cultural relativism, ethnocentrism and dialogue. There is, for instance, a misconception among some in our military that Cultural Advisors do not judge the peoples and cultures they study. I suspect that this mistaken impression occurs because Cultural Advisors use anthropological tools like cultural relativism to begin their work amongst LN. Cultural relativists believe that in your initial encounters with peoples of different cultures you should try to suspend unscientific judgmental reactions. In other words, do your best not to judge others on the basis of culture shock and your first fragmentary impressions of their lifeways and belief systems. That adage, 'we do not see others as they are, we see others as we are' helps explain the Cultural Advisor's dilemma.

Once a Cultural Advisor has had the opportunity to conduct what anthropologists call ethnographic participant-observation -- extended up close and personal observation and participation according to the dictates of the local culture and to the best of your holistic ability-- s/he are more able to accurately judge according to the internal standards of the people they study and not

according to their own biased external standards. In other words, once contact has been made and trust has been established a Cultural Advisor uses the analytical tools of anthropology like cultural relativism to see the world through the eyes of the people studied and, if necessary, to judge their culture according to the same culture specific internal standards that the people being studied use to judge themselves.

Let's explore the concept of cultural relativism further with a hypothetical example.

A Middle Eastern Dictator (MED) wakes up, stretches and shoots a couple people on his way to the computer. The MED sits and stares intently at the screen as he types an email message to his 'Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate' (WMDD) –a US government Three Letter Agency (TLA) electronically eavesdrops on the discussion.

MED writes, "Do you have the fissile material for my nuclear weapon?"

The WMD officer on duty at the Directorate types back, "Not yet supreme leader. It is moving slowly through secret channels and will be here tomorrow."

The WMD officer knows full well that his Directorate has no weapons grade nuclear material'. But fearing for his country's future, the officer invokes *Taqqiya*, or the belief that it is permissible to deceive for the good of Islam. Next day the MED wakes, stretches and shoots several more assistants on his way to the computer. Once again in front of his 'brain in a box' he types this message to the officer at the WMDD:

"Do you have my fissile material?"

The WMD officer replies, "Yes MED."

MED presses insistently "Is it yellow cake uranium like I asked for?"

The WMDD officer again replies, "Yes MED."

Because the TLA eavesdroppers did not understand the concept of *Taqqiya*, they endorse the email thread as proof positive

that the MED has the operable weapons of mass destruction necessary for nuclear terrorism.

On the basis of this information the TLA -- again hypothetically-- endorses regime change, and recommends the invasion and occupation of this rogue nation, and the ousting of its tyrannical dictator. No doubt this hypothetical history might have turned out differently had the eavesdroppers consulted a Cultural Advisor who: 1) Knew the political-military culture of their adversary; 2) How, in general, religion informs this particular country's military hierarchy, and; 3) How culture specific religious standards allow for purposeful dissimulation up and down the military chain of command.

In other words, the TLA should be prepped about how to use cultural relativism to understand the 'culture-general' interaction between leadership and the decision-making process, and the 'culture-specific' ways in which religion interacts with and unsettles the military chain of command.

The opposite of a cultural relativist is an ethnocentrist, or one who believes that their culture is the only standard by which all others are judged. By default, an ethnocentrist sees their own lifeways and belief systems as superior. For example, while traveling in another country an ethnocentrist complains that the language - -which s/he does not understand-- is inferior to his own. The ethnocentrist does not step back from the initial culture shock and does not try to develop the more mature, deeper contextual insights and reflections that come over time. Instead of trying to 'walk a mile in their shoes' the ethnocentrist says, in effect, unless you change your ways, unless you adopt my standards, you are inferior. That TE Lawrence knew to avoid the perils and pitfalls of ethnocentrism is evident in his quote that, and here again I paraphrase, 'Middle Eastern good enough is better than Western excellent.' A cautionary note, cultural relativism and ethnocentrism are not absolute concepts. There could be no cultural relativists at Auschwitz, while the

core of human rights, however noble, is the ethnocentric practice of judgmentally imposing one set of cultural assumptions about what is right, proper and natural on to others.

What follows is an example of ethnocentrism as it occurred on the battle space. Of note, the 'offensive LN custom' was triggered by the ethnocentric soldiers who condemned it.

A patrol enters the neighborhood at 11:00AM to conduct a 'cordon and knock mission. A defensive perimeter, or cordon, is set on a particular block around a particular dwelling. Coalition Force (CF) soldiers knock on the door. When the lady of the house answers, the male soldiers ask if they can enter her home and ask questions. Not knowing what to expect if she refuses, the mother of three acquiesces and is accompanied back inside her house by several male soldiers. She is now alone and out of sight with male strangers; An impropriety according to tribal custom. Later that day when the husband comes home from work relatives and friends tell him of his wife's breach of *aleadat wal'aeraf alqabalia*, or tribal custom. To restore family honor the husband was forced to beat his wife in such a way so that others could see and/or hear her punishment.

Next day when the patrol once again passed the same household they noticed the wife's black-eye. Several soldiers comment on the helplessness of Iraqi women and the savagery of Iraqi men. Having joined the mission for the first time I noticed a pattern of bumps, bruises, swelling or soreness on the faces and bodies of neighborhood women who lived where we had patrolled. But there was no evidence of spousal abuse where we had not done cordon and knock operations. I told the platoon leader what I had noticed and asked to suspend the mission while I investigated. He agreed.

At home, on his day off, the husband of the wife mentioned earlier pleaded, "Do not let the soldiers come when I am not at home as I am then bound by *aleadat wal'aeraf alqabalia*, or tribal custom, to punish my

wife for being alone with strange men. When this husband's account was verified by a cross section of the neighborhood's population, I met that with the company commander, platoon leader and their translator to plan a new door to door interview strategy.

Next morning when our patrol entered the neighborhood at 7:00AM soldiers went from door to door with bags of food and medicine, and politely informed the men of the household that they must remain home until the patrol completes its Cordon and Knock operations. When related males were not home the lady of the house entertained female HTT, LN or CF soldiers who were allowed by custom to enter the dwelling; also, according to tradition male HTT, LN and CF soldiers waited outside. Once CF conducted Cordon and Knock operations when related males were present, incidents of wife beating dropped to zero, and security cooperation improved. Formerly unsure community leaders emerged to hold negotiations, and day to day relations between LN and CF steadily improved.

When CF soldiers first noticed spousal abuse, they were quick to comment on and condemn the 'savagery and barbarism' of Iraqi men. The ethnocentrists credo, 'ours is to judge, and not to find out why.' Had they inquired as to why these beatings occurred the punishment of Iraqi women may have ended sooner. Were these same soldiers slower to ethnocentrically judge and quicker to ask why they might have realized the part we played in triggering the honor-shame complex related beatings.

Let's repeat for emphasis the human rights example mentioned before. The international community formulates human rights standards and then imposes them on violators. Is human rights correct? Yes. Is it ethnocentric to impose them on others? Yes. Is that wrong in this particular instance? No. In other words, ethnocentrism and by association cultural relativism, are not monolithic or absolute social science concepts.

Dialogue is another cross cultural, comparative tool worthy of consideration by Cultural Advisors. Dialogue is the concept that people learn from each other during cultural encounters. Unlike ethnocentrists who are closed minded about others, practitioners of dialogue are open minded about their interlocutors. There is, according to the tenants of dialogue, something to be learned about other cultures and about ourselves during cross cultural interactions. Most importantly, dialogue with its emphasis on **Mutual Respect Mutual Critique** can be used to resolve what might otherwise be intractable problems.

Let's use somewhat contrasting types of marriage to envision the kind of dialogue that leads, at least theoretically, to mutually beneficial understanding. In arranged marriage relatives and matchmakers chose who marries who. In tradition steeped arranged marriages strategic alliance between is more important than love, romance and matrimonial bliss. In other words, 'What's love got to do with it?' Some in unhappy arranged marriages speak out and say 'Love has got to have something to do with it.'

Moreover, in romance marriages love reigns supreme. Indeed, love is the gatekeeper. A socially acceptable definition of romantic love and the responsibilities that go along with it and the gate to romance marriage opens. In addition, financially independent soon to be newlyweds can open the gate themselves by planning and paying for their own wedding. Some in unhappy romance marriages speak out saying 'romantic love had too much to do with it. We were too young and did not have the decision-making skills, common sense and experience to enter into a union that effects the rest of our lives. Note that when there is trouble in paradise, or after divorce many disillusioned romantics go to their parents to gain in-hindsight wisdom.

As such, in romance marriage love more so than parental advice determines who will be your spouse. The opposite is true in arranged marriage where parental advice

more so than love determines which male and female will seal the contractual deal between families. Let's open a dialogue between the two types of marriage. In arranged marriage the couple has the benefit of parental advice, while in romance marriage the pair has the benefit of love. Perhaps combing parental advice with romance marriage, and love with arranged marriage might solve more problems than it causes. In any case, Cultural Advisors use dialogue to develop the cross-cultural problem solving skills needed for conflict resolution.

For a Cultural Advisor to be considered "squared away" by their unit, they must be able to deliver the "ground truth" to decision-makers. Not a new concept, reference to something approximating the ground truth is not a new concept and can be found in the German proposition of Grundwahrheit; wherein direct experience (ground truth) reveals self-evident truths not readily available from indirect inference (the ivory tower, or the view from 100,000 feet). In the following example the difference between the map and the terrain reveals that 'What at first appears to be the short road climbs endlessly ... while what at first appears to be the long road has no such obstacle and gets you to your destination sooner.' The ground truth comes from being in boots on ground; sharing the risk, learning the cultural complexities and; bearing witness to conflict. To be a Cultural Advisor means delivering the ground truth cultural wisdom that aids your commanders decision-making process.

Ground truth means having been at the headwaters, or the source of the ever-changing pattern of social relations that make-up cultures. The lived wisdom generated by ground truth experiences -- like being on location, direct observation and interaction, and on site field checks of underlying social systems-- confer with them the ability and the authority to measure and to validate the indirect inferences found in cultural generalizations, intelligence reports and mission plans. The ground truth comes from bearing witness to

the human terrain – analogous to both the geographic and the human ecosystems--with its highs and lows, bridges and divides, and rain forests and parched deserts. The human terrain, aka social relations, also includes --but is not limited to-- the powerful and the marginalized, the peacemakers and the spoilers, and those who quench their thirst at the well of tranquility as well as those whose unquenchable thirst for power that leaves scorched human terrain in their wake.

Been There: Cultural Seams and Gaps

In military vernacular the terms “seam” (connections between units), and “gaps” (the areas not covered between units), refer to the positioning of forces across geographic terrain. These definitions omit cultural seams and gaps in the human terrain. The purpose of this article is to create an awareness of the ground truth behind cultural seams and gaps, and to offer suggestions as to how our forces can use these concepts to their advantage in COIN operations.

Until the formation of the Sons of Iraq (Sol) there was a significant gap in CF knowledge about local Sunni populations. Comings and goings, who was a former militia member and who is currently an insurgent fell into the gap between CF information requirements and LN knowledge. Sol checkpoints closed this gap and created a contiguous seam between LN knowledge and CF security concerns.

Sol manning checkpoints typically stopped unfamiliar pedestrians and motorists to ask who they were visiting. Once the guest's affiliations were identified s/he was taken to the host's house for verification of relationship and intentions. If the invitation and relationship were genuine the visitor was allowed to stay with the proviso that the host was responsible for their actions. Should the guest be unfamiliar to the host, s/he would be denied access and either escorted to the city limits or detained for questioning. The challenge in this case was to close the gaps and create the seams

between security units and the cultures within which they interact.

An example of a cultural gap occurred when the Government of Iraq (GoI) created Sheiks Support Councils (SSC) to empower traditional leaders and the tribes they represent. The sheiks lumped together by the GoI were no longer natural allies, and, as such, they have begun to disperse, reconfigure and petition to create new SSCs that are no longer based solely on tradition. Sheikhs have recognized the changing nature of Iraq and are no longer content to align solely according by locality or tribal affiliation. While tradition undoubtedly still plays a part in their decisions, individual interests, strategic alliances and new power-blocks now factor heavily into their alliances.

It is a ground truth that a cultural seam is the connection between individuals and groups across time and space. A seam could be communicative, ethnosectarian, political..., in nature. These connections exist both between and within populations. It is also a ground truth that a cultural gap is, on the other hand a new or preexisting disconnect between social relations. CF should make every effort to understand how cultural seams and gaps affect ongoing operations.

Job Description

There are not many in the military who know what a Cultural Advisor is, or does. As such, I had to write a job description for each deployment. The Constitution, Commander in Chief and the chain of command aside, the Cultural Advisors first responsibility is to aid the immediate commanders decision-making process. My job was to give the commander a non-kinetic, or non-lethal cultural option. The HTS did not have ethical guidelines during my deployments, so I used the American Anthropological Association (AAA) Code of Ethics when conducting ethnographic interviews. I used AAA ethical guidelines like ‘do no harm, full disclosure and just compensation’ to gain insight into and cultural awareness of ethnosectarian lifeways and belief systems. My job was not

to manipulate informants, but to hear LN questions, address their concerns and to help get for them the country they want for themselves. Once trust based relationships with LN's were established I used their ground truth voices to contribute to the formation of a common operating picture that informed my commander's decision-making process.

What follows is the job description I used during my deployments.

"In the broadest sense, it is the duty of the Cultural Advisor to aid the Commander's non-kinetic decision-making process. To do so effectively, the Cultural Advisor uses social science methods to provide: 1. Ethically informed cross cultural comparative ethnographic research and analysis of peoples and cultures; 2) A Common operating picture --based on in-person interviews and trust based relationships-- of the battle space that enables mutually beneficial understandings and alliances with diverse populations; 3) Non-kinetic operational cultural knowledge that prevents the misapplication, and/or unnecessary escalation of force; 4) The Commander and his/her leadership team with ground truth insight into cultural specific behavior and motivations, and; 5) To provide a thorough understanding of how *aleadat wal'aeraf alqabalia*, or tribal customs, enters into local, national and regional ethnosectarian decision-making processes."

Ethical Guidelines Statement: Name Changed to Protect the Innocent

When I was preparing for each of two deployments the HTS provided little in the way of fieldwork ethics training to the HTT members who prepared for deployment. The HTS values statement "*By developing an understanding of the societies and cultures in which we are engaged, HTS believes that the U.S. Military can reduce the need for, and negative repercussions of lethal force,*" is important, but no substitute for a well thought out, peer reviewed ethical guidelines statement. Because the HTS did not provide an ethical teaching tool, or a practical "down range" guide the first

deployed HTTs were on the ethical frontier of military ethnography.

Reports from the field indicate that for the most part there was an ethically defensible "do no harm" collaboration between the military and the first HTTs. There were however disturbing exceptions as a few leaders and members lost sight of HTS non-lethal, or white values and used operational cultural knowledge to provide targeting information for HTT black ops. HTS's Dr. Montgomery McFate called for the formation of an HTS, EGS. She appointed me to create an Ethical Guidelines Committee (EGC). EGC members were to formulate an HTS, EGS that integrated pre-existing social and behavioral science codes with the practical experience of HTT members. Despite the EGC's best efforts the EGS was never allowed out of committee. The following EGS represents the EGC's frustrated efforts to formulate and distribute a teaching tool, and practical down range guide to conflict zone ethnics. The EGS, now a time capsule of good intentions, remains, like the HTS, an unfinished and imperfect experiment in the application of social science on the battlefield.

Towards an HTS Ethical Guidelines (EGS) Statement

The HTS EGS is a common set of enduring principles and standards that illuminate the professional responsibilities of HTTs and their military, civilian and LN team members. As a *guideline* the EGS is not comprehensive or universally applicable, but is intended to cover common ethically challenging situations encountered by HTTs. Because this is not an all encompassing, one size fits all formula, HTT members must as individuals and/or teams still make carefully considered ethical choices.

As a *statement* the EGS is meant to inspire HTT members to uphold the highest ethical standards. It is intended to provide HTT members with the ability make educated ethical choices and to counter the influence of individuals and groups who would coerce them to compromise informant relationships based on ethics and trust, and to misuse

operational cultural knowledge collected through social science protocols.


As an EGS this work is meant to: 1. Unify hybrid military, civilian and LN teams (Comprised of individuals from diverse backgrounds with strongly held convictions borne of prior experience), under a common set of applied ethical freedoms and constraints; 2. Identify individuals who cannot separate personal conviction from ethical mission; 3. Provide the basis for an *Ethical Review Board* empowered to call to account those who recklessly disregard or remain willfully ignorant of the HTS EGS and, if necessary; 4. To dismiss those who fail to uphold its research protocols and ethical boundaries

This EGS is superseded by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) which stipulates in Section 802. Article 1, 2..., (And here for the sake of clarity I paraphrase and combine passages), that ... '[P]ersons serving with,

employed by, or accompanying the Armed forces outside the United States ... have submitted voluntarily to military authority ... and are subject depending of the severity of the transgression, to either non-judicial punishment (Restriction, confinement, corrections, forfeiture and reduction), or adjudication by Courts Martial.'

As of this writing HTT have not been granted formal confidentiality exceptions similar to those that protect the Press (Reporter-source), Psychologists (Patient-client) and Chaplains (Parishioner-confessor) relationships.

The next article on this series will cover ethics more in-depth.



Dr. David Matsuda is doctor of Anthropology, Social and Behavioral Sciences, and a passionate teacher. Dr. Matsuda, or Doc, has conducted extensive fieldwork in Latin America, the Middle East and SW Asia. A recipient of grants from the Pew Trust for Education, the Princeton Ford Foundation, California State University Doctoral Incentive Program and The Organization of American States, Doc brings to Norwich University a strong belief that social action research is about going to the source and getting the ground truth.

The Chief Cultural Officer of Cultural Advisory Services Doc advises on matters of national security, diversity, social networks, and organizational culture. Recently Doc's pioneering research on the link between toxic leadership and suicide in the Army was featured on National Public Radio.

Dr. Dave Matsuda recently returned to the United States from overseas deployments where he served as a civilian Cultural Advisor at tactical, operational and strategic levels. Doc resides in San Francisco with Kristi, his wife of 30 years, and his daughters Katie and Kimi who are, proudly, both fourth generation San Franciscans.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LANGUAGE USE IN PEACEKEEPING AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS

BY KURT E. MÜLLER

This essay will explore some unexpected (or at least unarticulated) benefits of bi- and multilingualism in conducting military operations. While applicable across a range of circumstances, I shall highlight peacekeeping and stabilization operations and draw heavily on personal experience and observations to do so. From the environments, I describe, I hypothesize a distinction between primary and secondary language uses, which for our discussion require some definition.

In the military, primary use of languages falls predominantly into two categories: intelligence and operations. The acquisition of information on adversary or enemy capabilities, plans, strategic intent, and ongoing operations is the business of the intelligence community. Among military advocates of acquiring or building foreign-language capacity, this segment of the national-security apparatus has been both the most articulate and the broadest ranging. The intelligence community extends across a number of agencies, and even those whose orientation is primarily domestic have elements that assess threats emanating from

abroad. On occasion in the U.S., even municipal or state law enforcement authorities may create joint task forces with federal agencies. When the intelligence community suffers a catastrophic failure, such as with the 9/11 attacks, we typically read of a sudden need for personnel with facility in one or another language.

When I started looking at military requirements for language capacity, I was surprised to discover the second category: operations. If I'd been a product of a society that was more aware of various language groups in its midst than the United States has been since the early 20th century, it would have been less surprising. A visitor to the battlefield cemeteries at Antietam and Gettysburg is struck by the number of memorials inscribed in German, reflecting the language of command in various Union Army units during the American Civil War. But the national narrative that held sway in the United States through most of the last century concentrated on an assimilationist message rather than one celebrating linguistic diversity.

Although supporters of multilingualism in the Anglophone world are pointedly aware of the consequences of attitudes suppressing minority languages, we are not alone in our experience of integrating linguistic minorities in armed forces. The military that is perhaps most notable for attempts to integrate linguistic minorities was the Austro-Hungarian. The Habsburg Empire required its officers to learn the languages of their subordinates, but its record on integrating linguistic minorities remains contentious and inconclusive. As some American historians of this experience saw it, the Austro-Hungarian High Command's derision of its Slavic units fighting in Serbia "gradually estranged" a substantial segment of its fighting force, weakening its military effectiveness (Engle, 2011; Schindler, 2002).

At an early conference the Center for Research and Documentation on World Language Problems sponsored, I detailed the difficulties and losses the United Nations Command experienced during the Korean War that were attributable to the challenges of integrating into a coalition the military forces of a diverse set of nations, only some of which were members of a common alliance (Müller, 1983). Some 18 nations participated in that UN Command.

In Cold War Europe, NATO and Warsaw Pact forces had lead-nation languages of command that reflected the two superpowers: English in the West, Russian in the East. With the numerical advantage the Warsaw Pact enjoyed, NATO faced a challenge it defined as needing to emphasize interoperability. One commander of U.S. Army forces in Europe (Blanchard, 1978) thought enough of the issue to publish a paper on "Language Interoperability" to address Alliance communications.

It would take until the 1991 Gulf War to next evaluate cross-cultural communication in wartime. In its final report to Congress on that

war, the U.S. Defense Department noted that the coalition opted against designating a Supreme Commander and instead created parallel commands, with senior commanders from France, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. DoD reported that a Coalition Coordination, Communication, and Integration Center (C³IC) ensured the successful coordination of operations, relying heavily on a combination of Arab military personnel with extensive U.S. experience and U.S. military personnel with qualifications in Arabic. The report (Department of Defense, 1992) noted as well the considerable shortage of qualified Arabic linguists in U.S. forces in general and specifically among U.S. special operators. Twenty-three nations contributed forces to eject Iraq from Kuwait, and the Army component of U.S. Central Command sent an average of 35 staff to each of two Saudi-led Joint Force Commands as staff members.

Mapping Conflicts in Blue, Red, and Green

Operations Orders follow a standard pattern in which the first paragraph discusses enemy and friendly forces. In accompanying maps, friendly forces are depicted in blue, enemy forces in red. In developing a standard plan, threat-based analyses drive the intelligence staff to identify the opponent's forces and capabilities as well as his likely objectives and approaches. The American approach to warfare has a history of ignoring the civilian environment in its pursuit of defeating the enemy. But the civil sector and non-state actors form a significant part of the operational environment. These factors can threaten the outcome of an otherwise successful victory over an opponent. In an article in *Parameters* (Müller, 1999), I provide examples such as the failure to prevent looting after U.S. interventions in Panama and Haiti. To this list, we should add delay in addressing the repercussions of removing Serbian police in Kosovo and failing to secure the Iraqi National Museum from looters although providing security to the Iraqi Oil Ministry (for the latter, see Bogdanos, 2005).

As the 2003 conflict in Iraq became protracted, some leaders in the intelligence community concluded that their staffs had been so focused on the Iraqi military that they missed the developing insurgency. But it was not just post-conflict opposition to occupation that could be under-appreciated; it was the entire human environment in societies that might be subject to outside intervention. A former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency noted that America's intelligence community lacks a strategic understanding of sociocultural analysis. He identified the need to understand societies and their politics well before tensions turn violent; as he and his collaborators (Flynn, Sisco, & Ellis, 2012) phrase it, "left of bang."

Threat analysis requires more than assessing an adversary's capabilities and likely objectives. The Conflict Assessment Framework – originally developed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and then adapted by inter-agency planners as well as for tactical civil-military environments – requires response planners to identify both societal vulnerabilities and windows of opportunity for achieving stability in fragile states. This framework addresses primarily peacekeeping and stability operations, including restoring stability to post-conflict environments. But the analysis does not fit the paradigm of red and blue capabilities. If these civil factors hit the radar, analysts are likely to designate them with the color green. Thus, the term "green on blue attacks" describes the participation of Afghan military or police – or insurgents dressed in their uniforms – in attacking members of the International Security Assistance Force (the coalition). Students of military practice should question the categorization of the various actors that have an impact on the outcome of an intervention, but for the moment we can accept that the designation of green actors usefully indicates that friendly (blue) forces are unsure of the impact of some actors. Undertaking such an analysis requires

cultural familiarity, the ability to understand written documents that support the analysis, and the capacity to elicit information orally from inhabitants of an area as well as from those in host-nation leadership.

Transitions and Ministerial Advisors

Considering that the key to reducing the presence of coalition military forces from Afghanistan and Iraq was the restoration of order under indigenous police and military, and one indicator of growing capacity to do so was the conduct of counterinsurgency operations often conducted by these local forces, communicating with them would place the language used in the realm of language of command. Their integration into the coalition fits the earlier description of "language interoperability," as General Blanchard called it. The transition strategy of building indigenous security forces is a local adaptation of a national-security tenet noticeable across a number of less-stable areas of the world that goes by the term "building partner capacity." One means of increasing a government's ability to field an effective security force is to provide training and equipment. But another, equally important, consideration requires creating conditions to develop various societal components that support security, from ensuring the forces we equip receive a training program that promotes service to their society (rather than enabling them to oppress the citizenry) to introducing ministries to the effective use of taxation to support a transparent system of accountable public administration. Two programs developed for Afghanistan deserve mention for their contribution to our understanding of developments in that society.

The Pentagon established the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program as an effort to introduce military personnel and Defense civilians to a deeper level of familiarity with the culture in the region and with language competence to enable direct communication with counterparts. Its

advocates expected those who entered the program to remain engaged with the region, deploying to it multiple times, and thereby reducing the churn in personnel widely regarded as undermining opportunities to develop expertise in the region. Repeated deployments to a single region, paired with continuing attention to it when not deployed, entails the career risk of opportunity cost, but it also offers managers a justification for extensive pre-deployment training, including language acquisition, which is typically absent from most military deployments. Of course, similar reasoning applies to civilian government agencies: the organization anticipates that some personnel need to communicate in a local language and defines a language-designated position. But in the absence of such designation, support for language acquisition is sporadic.

The second program of interest is the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program. The concept of sending advisors to coalition or allied military forces is nothing new and has been used successfully by various nations. The U.S. experience yields a few best practices for emulation and continuing development. During the Vietnam era, the U.S. Army sent a number of officers to advise South Vietnamese counterparts, and before doing so, it sent them through a Military Assistance Training Advisors (MATA) course. There was a language component to this course, and an early evaluation of the advisory effort (Fiks and McCrary, 1963, pp. 12-13) found that those “who attempted to speak Vietnamese more often were [...] more likely to receive [...] social invitations.” and that the longer an advisor held his position, the more likely he was to build rapport with allies. Learning a language useful to a specific campaign requires considerable focus on the job at hand. It also demonstrates commitment to a relationship with that society.

In a *Washington Post* column, Walter Pincus writes of a declassified oral-history interview in which former Director of Central

Intelligence Richard Helms noted that Westerners did not approach the Vietnamese with the humility of admitting they did not understand them well, and that when he attempted to introduce courses in Vietnamese language and culture, his subordinate managers would not permit their staff to attend (Pincus, 2015). Although the institutional reluctance to permit personnel to spend time in pre-deployment training in language and culture persists to the present, there are successful practices as well. A senior mentor to the MoDA training program, who had been a product of the MATA Course when he was a junior officer in the military, characterized the MoDA preparation as showing ten times the depth of the earlier course.

The MoDA program primarily prepares DoD civilians for assignments advising ministries of defense and interior. The rationale for sending civilian employees is that it is largely the defense ministry (as distinct from military units) that can benefit from attention to the governmental structure that supports training and fielding a nation's armed forces. Advisors should therefore have institutional experience in running a security bureaucracy. The pre-deployment training for this program emphasizes that advisors need to approach their tasks with humility, that the advisor should not attempt to bring the solutions to the challenges of building an effective and responsive security force, but should seek to understand a counterpart's institutional environment and offer relevant observations that host-nation counterparts can use productively. For senior personnel who have attained their positions through effective problem solving, the admonition of humility is countercultural.

Language Use at Various Proficiency Levels

Observations from the culminating phase of this pre-deployment training provide evidence of effective language instruction and its impact on rapport building. Several years ago the Department of State initiated a

pre-deployment training program primarily for civilians who would be working in Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The program included considerable exposure to Afghan expatriates playing roles of people these government personnel would be likely to encounter in Afghanistan. Moreover, it offered experience working with interpreters. Civilians from DoD's Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, those from any of the participating agencies in the Civilian Response Corps, and personnel that various federal agencies hired on term contracts attended this course, which DoD then incorporated into its MoDA training. I observed several MoDA students going through this exercise and noted the impact of language on students and role players. A caveat is in order: experience in pre-deployment training does not constitute evidence of effectiveness on the job in the deployment environment; such a determination would require a separate analysis. But to address that gap I shall also provide evidence from both a set of interviews and from experience on deployments.

One iteration of a training scenario I observed addressed a question of the possible misappropriation of health-care supplies. The trainees were three DoD employees (all women), who introduced themselves to Afghan role players in a simulated conference. Each one introduced herself in Dari. Though they had differing levels of proficiency and confidence in using the language, they all provided biographical information on their families and a description of their work sufficient to portray a commitment to communicating directly before turning to an interpreter to facilitate the remaining consultations. Their previous language training provided them with proficiency that did not exceed NATO level 2 (B, on the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages), a level below the standard target for diplomats and military personnel at the Foreign Service Institute and

the Defense Language Institute. The post-scenario review revealed a highly positive reaction on the part of the Afghan role players. The attempt to connect on Afghan terms was at least as important to the role players as was the actual communication.

This reaction is of course no surprise to language professionals. But it is also notable that some military leaders recognize its value as well. As long ago as 1960, Colonel William P. Jones related in an Army War College paper an experience with a Joint Brazil-U.S. Military Commission in which two U.S. officers were discussing business in Portuguese that elicited a reaction from a Brazilian colleague, who perceived this use of his language as an indication of the value they placed on Brazil.

Any effort to acquire information about a country in which one is operating or to communicate with its residents is welcome of course, but if it is not necessary to use a local language to complete a transaction, I tentatively categorize such use as secondary. Experience in NATO environments offers instructive anecdotes, for which I should like first to provide a theoretical construct. In a volume promoting the quasi-governmental, volunteer agency called the Peace Corps, Patricia Garamendi (1996) relates an early Peace Corps deployment in which the first group of 50 volunteers arrived in the then-new nation of Ghana and sang, in Twi, its national anthem. She reports that the performance "delighted the waiting delegation of Ghanaian dignitaries, who had never heard so many Americans speaking their language." She goes on to tell a story that Nelson Mandela learned Afrikaans while in prison and cites his reasoning: "If you talk to a man in a language he understands, that goes to his head. If you talk to him in his own language, that goes to his heart" (Garamendi, 1996, pp. v-vi). This apocryphal quote appears frequently among Mandela citations but is actually a conflation of two remarks. In his autobiography, Mandela (1994, p. 73) offers several observations on language, including

the perception that “Without language, one cannot talk to people and understand them; one cannot share their hopes and aspirations, grasp their history, appreciate their poetry or savour their songs.” In a conversation with his editors, Mandela remarked, “When you speak a language, English, well, many people understand you, including Afrikaners, but when you speak Afrikaans, you know you go straight to their hearts” (Hatang and Venter, 2011, p. 144).”

Although the conflated remark is a misquotation, its formulation provides a general hypothesis I should like to support with anecdotal evidence. In one of many NATO exercise deployments I participated in between 1988 and 1993, I had American officers come to me to complain that they were unable to exercise a particular feature of host-nation support (the provision of goods and services to a foreign military facilitated through the host nation, in this case, a member of NATO) because a German officer would simply refer them to printed procedures rather than provide personal facilitation. Although his argument was valid – i.e., if the American staff followed the procedures, they would receive the services they wanted – it presented a hurdle my interlocutors sought to overcome by having the German officer facilitate the transactions. And from the perspective of wanting to build a relationship with the German Territorial Army, the opportunity to interact through an allied officer offered additional dividends. I went to discuss the situation with this lieutenant colonel (the same rank I held at the time), and the discussion proceeded with the German speaking English and the American speaking German. While I had no need to speak his language, my intent in doing so was to achieve a subliminal emotional rapport of the type Jones and Mandela describe. Since the German officer agreed to connect the American logisticians with the services they wanted rather than insist on stepping back (because the

paperwork should have been adequate), I concluded the approach worked.

My second example comes not from an exercise but from the serious circumstance of peacekeeping. As Civil Affairs advisor to NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), for the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, I had the challenge of seeking NATO military support to the civil annexes of the General Framework Agreement. Although I had the full support of the chief strategic planner, a Dutch lieutenant general, I had difficulty getting the chief of his planning cell to provide copies of the campaign plan he was developing. I wanted to ensure that the guidance from SACEUR to the Implementation Force included facilitating the work of various civil-sector actors in achieving the goals of the Framework Agreement. But how to intrude on an established work flow from a new office that had yet to establish its relevance was a matter for which I had no guidance. The solution was serendipitous but understandable in retrospect. As a language professional, I was eager to work with my NATO counterparts. Because my second (and heritage) language is German, I sought opportunities to meet my German colleagues. The multinational military community at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), has a number of nation-specific features. To address potential personal and work conflicts among staff of different nationalities, for example, each member state has an office of the National Military Representative. Each nation’s delegation also provides links to home cultures. One of these links is that military chaplains conduct religious services for their flock in the home language. I attended German Protestant services and met the German National Military Representative, who then invited me (the only non-German) to a “hail and farewell,” a periodic social event at which a command bids farewell to members about to leave and welcomes newcomers. Within the next few days, I was

no longer an outsider from an office unconnected to the one I sought to influence.

A similar use of host-nation language underlies the integration of language training in the MoDA course. Its developers nested the MoDA program under a larger DoD initiative, the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW). In the four years 2009–2013, CEW deployed about 6,000 DoD employees, both career civil servants and persons hired specifically for a term assignment, typically one year. A colleague and I conducted 58 interviews of individuals who had an association with this program. Although the broader CEW program did not integrate language as an essential component, as MoDA did, a standard question we asked concerned the use of other languages while deployed. Those we interviewed had jobs that ranged from supporting only U.S. personnel and not coming into contact with the local populace to some who worked extensively with allied and coalition personnel to those who had significant interaction with higher-level host-nation personnel (most of our interviews concerned Afghanistan).

Those who had learned Dari used their skill for a number of purposes. Some used it to gain knowledge of the operational environment: simply walking around markets and engaging in shuras. Discussing local issues with businessmen, farmers, and political figures helped increase their knowledge of a local area for some who would not otherwise engage in such discussions because their job did not demand it of them. The utility of host-nation language facility is not limited to those with substantial knowledge (e.g., the presumed NATO level 2/ CEFR level B that describes MoDA training). Survival skills also helped. One interviewee credited his “Tarzan Turkish,” learned from his Turkish wife, as comprehensible to Afghans he met.

Unrecognized Languages and Unintentional Sights

Just as military organizations often deploy personnel with limited exposure to the languages in use and cultures prevailing at their destination, relief organizations may deploy staff without such proficiency. The larger organizations will likely have regional offices with staff conversant in regional languages and will almost certainly employ locals to deliver their services. Non-governmental organizations that address specific functions may promote their work without connections to specific geographic regions. Their initial attempts at language sensitivity can go awry. Thus they may err in language choice, in ways reminiscent of the U.S. Korean-War era use of military personnel trained in Japanese to interact with Koreans, on the basis that Japanese was widely understood in Korea. It was, of course, because Japan had occupied Korea for a half century, but that made its use undesirable, particularly at higher, political levels. At a 2015 conference to mark International Mother Language Day, a participant offered an unexpected observation illustrating this issue. In an audience comment responding to a presentation, he spoke of an NGO offering a seminar to facilitate peacebuilding at which the NGO attempted to reach its audience by providing language services in a regional language. Unfortunately, the NGO recognized only the locally dominant language, not that of minority-language participants.

Lingua Franca as Secondary Use

Language facility can make additional contributions that seldom attract attention, probably because they do not cause catastrophic failure when they are absent. This situation is akin to seeking language advocacy among organizational leaders: if they are aware of it, they appreciate it; if they have reached high levels of their careers without it, they do not necessarily see the contributions language facility offers.

First among potential categories of such use is probably languages present in the culture of coalition members, in military parlance,

“troop contributing nations.” Although the language of command may have sufficient status as *lingua franca* with few difficulties across echelons in understanding guiding documents and commands, relying on a “language that speaks to the head” does little to develop relationships, build a team, and consolidate a coalition. For such an effort, one needs to speak to the heart.

As we were assembling the Implementation Force for Bosnia, SHAPE developed a validation process to certify a unit as capable of integrating with coalition forces. The Supreme Commander asked his staff to ensure that troop-contributing nations – particularly those with small contingents – be partnered with larger contributors with whom they shared military culture, language, professional-education relationships, and the like.

These relationships matter in numerous ways. Many nations have extensive professional-education systems for their military personnel. For nations that promote officers through a meritocratic process, rather than through familial or clan networks, these curricula qualify officers for higher-level responsibilities in their nations. But they also have a feature that most in the education sector do not recognize. They have an extensive international-education component. Many foreign officers have attended U.S. military institutions, usually in grades from captain to colonel, and we send a good number of our officers to comparable institutions in other countries. These experiences do more than just leave the academic environment with foreign perspectives. They also provide venues for sharing values, and they create alumni networks that reap dividends when crises erupt and when diplomats seek to field multilateral forces.

Of course to attend these schools, the officers need proficiency in the language of instruction. Thus, the example of relying on

Saudi officers with fluency in English to facilitate coordination in the first Gulf War is not unusual, even though such capabilities are in short supply. The Gulf example is a primary-language use because Arabic and English were needed to exercise command and coordination. In allied and coalition environments, which typify peacekeeping and stabilization, the language of command may be sufficiently widespread, but staff may use another *lingua franca*. I hypothesize such use as secondary and offer a few instances for consideration.

One example comes from a multinational military club in Sarajevo during my second deployment to deal with peacekeeping in Bosnia. In an after-hours social environment, four officers from four different countries are discussing the progress in achieving the goals of the peace-agreement framework. As I recall, the nationalities were American, Belgian, French, and Italian. A German officer walks by while bringing drinks to his friends, does a double-take, delivers the drinks, and returns to the conversation. To his surprise, the conversation was in German, a language not usually associated with the other countries represented in this example. This case illustrates an opportunity for team building, informally discussing the goals of the international community behind the peace accords using a language other than the official one.

In my earlier deployment to address issues in the Balkans, I had two direct superiors, who alternated in one position and thereby kept up with their normal responsibilities while alternating supervision of the staff overseeing the Implementation Force in Bosnia from NATO's military headquarters in Belgium. One was French, the other Norwegian. France at this point was not in the integrated NATO military structure, nor was Spain, but both France and Spain filled staff positions at SHAPE in such a fashion that an observer would not suspect they were anything but full members of the team. The French general

would occasionally reach a point in a discussion at which his English proved insufficient, but he was ably assisted by a quadrilingual Dutch colonel who could easily step in to facilitate communication. This unexpected benefit is another candidate for designation as secondary language use.

Our interviews of CEW volunteers uncovered similar, unexpected language dividends. One relatively senior woman working on rule-of-law issues found herself working with NATO allies, using French and German to establish a bond with various office partners and with her NATO deputies. This facility enabled her to successfully embed with several non-U.S. Special Operations task forces, which was necessary to further her commander's objectives. Another volunteer noted using German to socialize with allies on base.

Although these examples illustrate an unanticipated use of a language, an acknowledgment of the composition of the force would certainly lead a staff planner to predict that skill in the languages of the troop-contributing nations could pay dividends. But we even uncovered instances of secondary language use that would have required a deeper level of prognostication. One volunteer who served in Djibouti found his background in Hindi was helpful in communicating with third-country nationals working there. Another surprise came in a report that a volunteer in Afghanistan found his fluency in Russian was "a big hit" in dealing with Afghans because so many of them had learned Russian during the decade after 1979. A volunteer in Iraq responded to our question about language use, not with a language example, but with a comment that a background in cultural anthropology facilitated her engaging both Iraqis and Eastern Europeans.

Conclusion


International environments offer far more opportunities to exploit language capabilities than are immediately evident by simply

identifying where events take place and who one's adversaries may be. Multilingual forces of one nation have recognized the issues of integrating linguistic minorities to greater or lesser degree. Because the NATO alliance has long recognized challenges in the direction of armed forces at its disposal, senior leaders developed opportunities to increase team building among constituent member states. In contemporary interventions, multilateralism is a deliberate feature of negotiations determining participation in peacekeeping and stabilization as well as in hostilities themselves. Consequently, communicating in the language(s) of coalition partners contributes to the efficiency of the force. But relationship building does not end with the recognition of a *lingua franca* designated as the language of command. Not only does a deployed military force need to communicate with the inhabitants of an area in which it operates, it will inevitably find actors from third countries whose contribution to coalition objectives may be valuable, and it may find the experience of others offers yet more languages as means of communication. Speaking to the heart goes far in building rapport, achieving consensus, and attaining common goals.

REFERENCES

- Blanchard, G. S. (1978). Language interoperability—A key for increased effectiveness in NATO. *Military Review* 58 (10), 598–63.
- Bogdanos, M. (2005). The casualties of war: The truth about the Iraq museum. *American Journal of Archaeology* 109 (3), 477–526.
- Department of Defense. (1992). *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final report to Congress*. Washington, DC: Author.
- Engle, J. C. (2011, March 3–5). The ties that bind? Ethnic, cultural, and political diversity and the Austro-Hungarian Army, 1914–1918. Paper presented at the Missouri Valley History Conference, Omaha, Nebraska.
- Fiks, A. I., & McCrary, J. W. (1963). *Some Language Aspects of the U.S. Advisory Role in South Vietnam*. Alexandria, VA: Human Resources Research Organization.
- Flynn, M., Sisco, J. & Ellis, D. C. (2012). “Left of Bang”: The value of sociocultural analysis in today’s environment.” *Prism*, 3 (4), 13–21.
- de Fourestier, J. (2010). Official languages in the armed forces of multilingual countries. *European Journal of Language Policy*, 2 (1): 91–110.
- Garamendi, P. W. (1996). Peace Corps ... More than you can imagine. In *At home in the world: The Peace Corps story* (pp. v–vi). Washington, DC: Peace Corps.
- Hatang, W., & Venter, S. (Eds). (2011). *Nelson Mandela by Himself: The authorised book of quotations*. Johannesburg: Pan Macmillan.
- Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff (1949). *Training history of the Military Intelligence Service Language School*. Typescript 2-2B/AA. Washington, DC: Chief of Military History.
- Jones, W. P. (1960). Language training for the officer corps (Unpublished manuscript). US Army War College.
- Kelly, M., and Baker, C. (2013). *Interpreting the peace: Peace operations, conflict and language in Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mandela, N. (1994). *Long walk to freedom: The autobiography of Nelson Mandela*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- McNaughton, J. C. (2006). *Nisei linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II*. Washington, DC: Department of the Arm.
- Müller, K. E. (1999). Toward a concept of strategic civil affairs. *Parameters*, 28 (4), 80–98.
- Müller, K. E. (1986). *Language competence: Implications for national security*. New York: Praeger.

- Müller, K. E. (1983). Language problems during multinational military operations in Korea. In Tonkin and . Edwards, (Eds.), *Language behavior in international organizations* (pp. 81-99). New York: Center for Research and Documentation on World Language Problems.
- Pincus, W. (2015, Dec. 9). Hearing the voices and heeding the lessons of history. *Washington Post*, A17.
- Schindler, J. R. (2011). Disaster on the Drina: The Austro-Hungarian Army in Serbia, 1914. *War in History* 9 (2), 159-195.
- Tozzi, C. (2012). One army, many languages: Foreign troops and linguistic diversity in the eighteenth-century French military. In Hilary Footitt and Michael Kelly, (Eds.), *Languages and the military: Alliances, occupation, and peace building* (pp. 12-24). Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.



Kurt E. Müller (Ph.D., Rutgers University; COL, USA-ret.) has been a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Complex Operations at the National Defense University since 2013. As a civil affairs (CA) officer, he was Chief of the CA support team deployed to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, to assist SACEUR in implementing the Dayton Peace Accords. He returned to SHAPE as C/J-9 for a subsequent rotation in civil-military operations. After completing military service, he became a defense contractor in the Futures Directorate of US Special Operations Command until taking a position with the Civilian Response Corps in the Department of State. A long-time language advocate, he has had faculty appointments at several institutions of higher education, as well as military and heritage language schools. He was commandant of a language school for the CA community and a command language program manager. Earlier in his civilian career, he was executive vice president of the National Council on Foreign Language and International Studies for much of its existence. For the 2004 National Language Conference, which the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness sponsored, he was the principal investigator for academic contributions to the conference.

His publications address interagency operations, language in multilateral operations, and education in languages and international studies. He is also an alumnus of the City College of New York, the US Army Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. He claims proficiency only in German and French (in addition to English), but after exposure to additional languages during four military deployments and two for the State Department, has DLPT scores at or above ILR 2 in four additional (related) languages.

SPEAKING THE LANGUAGE OF PEACE IN A WORLD WITH CONFLICT

BY JOY KREEFT PEYTON

All violence is the result of people tricking themselves into believing that their pain derives from other people and that, consequently, those people deserve to be punished.

~Marshall B. Rosenberg, *Nonviolent Communication: A Language of Life*

Peace requires something far more difficult than revenge or merely turning the other cheek; it requires empathizing with the fears and unmet needs that provide the impetus for people to attack each other. Being aware of these feelings and needs, people lose their desire to attack back, because they can see the human [needs] leading to these attacks. Instead, their goal becomes providing the empathic connection and education that will enable them to transcend their violence and engage in cooperative relationships. Marshall B. Rosenberg, *Speak Peace in a World of Conflict: What You Say Next Will Change Your World*

A Desire to Live in Peace

Individuals and organizations in the United States and around the world have a desire to live in peace. Living peacefully (with ourselves and others) is a strong theme in discussions of and publications about being an effective professional, mastering education and career paths, and interacting with others successfully, in many areas of life and work:

In the Workforce

- *Are You Fully Charged?* (Rath, 2015)
- *Triggers: Creating Behavior That Lasts* (Goldsmith, 2015)
- *What Got You Here Won't Get You There: How Successful People Become Even More Successful!* (Goldsmith, 2013)

In International Development

- *Conflict, Language Rights, and Education: Building Peace by Solving Language Problems in Southeast Asia* (Lo Bianco, 2016)

- *Healing the Heart of Conflict: 8 Crucial Steps to Making Peace with Yourself and Others* (Gopin, 2004)

In Education

As schools, school districts, and universities struggle with a number of challenging issues including use of terms, there have recently been many articles with an education focus about the desire to, and the difficulties of, speaking peacefully:

- "Saying What You Mean Without Being Mean" (Reilly, 2015).
- "The Art of Getting Opponents to 'We'" (Bornstein, 2015).
- "To Reach Struggling Students, Schools Need to Be More 'Trauma-Sensitive'" (McNeil, 2016).
- "To Avert the Next Generation of Violent Conflict, Replace Fear with Curiosity" (Soetoro-Ng & Milofsky, 2016).
- "Creating Harmony on Campus" (Terra Dotta, 2016).
- "Supporting Controversial Issues Discussion in the Charged Classroom" (Pace, July 18, 2016).
- "Toxic Rain in Class: Classroom Interpersonal Microaggressions" (Suárez-Orozco, Casanova, Martin, Katsiaficas, Cuella, Smith, & Dias, 2015).

We often talk about seeking peaceful engagement in our families, communities, schools, within our country, and around the world, and recent books focus specifically on ways to communicate with others to promote peace. For example, in *The Language of Peace: Communicating to Create Harmony*, (Oxford, 2013) describes six principles related to the language of peace and ways that these can be put into practice in different contexts, for the following purposes:

- Deepening inner peace
- Fostering interpersonal peace
- Enhancing intergroup peace

- Strengthening international peace and transnational human rights
- Creating intercultural peace
- Building ecological peace

The U.S. federal government is putting considerable time and attention into promoting peaceful language and cultural encounters as U.S.-trained personnel engage around the world. As described by Sands (2013, 2014) and Sands and DeVisser (2015), the strategic efforts by the Department of Defense (DoD) articulate the vision to meet current and projected mission and operational needs around the world by preparing globally competent personnel who have the language, regional, and cultural capabilities needed for effective engagement in the 21st century (U.S. DoD, 2011), and the associated implementation plan outlines specific actions needed to develop the capabilities outlined in the strategic plan (U.S. DoD, 2014). These capabilities include cross-cultural competence; cultural capability (both culture-general and culture-specific knowledge to be successful in culturally complex environments); and language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities (knowledge of a *particular* cultural group in a *specific* location). As Sands (2013) points out, it is clear and commendable that the DoD and the military recognize the imperative to better understand, interact with, and ultimately influence a host of cultural groups and of the need to prepare personnel to operate effectively in diverse and challenging domains.

These publications and initiatives all focus (at least to some extent) on the importance of positive intentions and use of language that does not promote conflict, and these topics are definitely worth reading and talking about. At the same time, they often do not give *specifics* about ways to speak that will promote peace and connection rather than conflict and division, and we often find ourselves in situations where we do not experience peace at all.

Using Peaceful Language in *All* of Our Thoughts and Encounters

Understanding and implementation of ways to live in peace often remain abstract, and the language that we observe (and that we often use ourselves) in politics, the media, our work places, our communities, and our families is often filled with judgments, labels, critique, and blame. We increasingly see misunderstandings and division across, and even within, the groups that we care about and seek to engage with.

In this context, it is worthwhile to focus specifically on our language and our use of words to bring damage and division or connection and life and to find ways to integrate this focus into all of our efforts to train linguistically and culturally competent personnel – in the workplace, in schools, and in federal government initiatives.

One person who developed this focus for many years is Marshall B. Rosenberg, formerly a clinical psychologist who studied under Carl Rogers and founder of the Center for Nonviolent Communication (www.cnvc.org). After many years of observing himself and others interacting in families, schools, and communities around the world, Rosenberg laid out a blueprint for ways to express ourselves effectively and hear others, even under trying conditions -- nonviolent communication (NVC). He argued (Rosenberg, 2005a),

“Instead of being habitual, automatic reactions, our words become conscious responses based firmly on an awareness of what we are perceiving, feeling, and wanting. We are led to express ourselves with honesty and clarity, while simultaneously paying others a respectful and empathic attention ... The form is simple, yet powerfully transformative” (p. 3).

He applied these principles in his work with federally-funded school integration projects in the 1960s and in many different countries, including with warring tribes in Nigeria, and concluded that the ways we talk, our learned

“patterns of defending, withdrawing, or attacking in the face of judgment and criticism” (p. 3), can be “violent” and “life-alienating” (p. 15). (See Rosenberg, 2005b, for descriptions of the diverse contexts in which he has worked.) Other thought leaders have also understood the incredible power of language. For example, Arun Gandhi, grandson of Mahatma Gandhi and Founder and President of the M.K. Gandhi Institute for Nonviolence, stated, “This world is what we have made of it. If it is ruthless today, it is because we have made it ruthless by our attitudes. If we change ourselves we can change the world, and *changing ourselves begins with changing our language and methods of communication*” (Gandhi in Rosenberg, 2005a, p. xvii, emphasis added).

The principles of NVC are not new; they have been apparent for centuries. They also might seem overly simple and possibly not even worth mentioning or focusing on, especially when hugely demanding situations continue to arise around the world. However, it is important to realize that we have grown up in and continue to be surrounded by language that does not reflect these principles, and this reality continues to cause damage (and even violence) in our work and relationships. Therefore, it is worth taking them seriously and ensuring that they are integrated into our all aspects of curricula and training, along with other focal language skills and cultural capabilities.

The four basic components of NVC are observations, feelings, needs, and requests (OFNR). Each of these, and some additional considerations related to NVC and to applying NVC principles in international settings, are described in this article.¹

While ability to implement these principles is important for all of us, it is essential for those who operate within uncertain and risk-filled environments of cultural complexity, such as those faced by staff and consultants working

¹ These brief descriptions do not explore the full depth of NVC practice, which is being lived, developed, and articulated by diverse professionals and communities around the world. See Rosenberg’s publications and

the resources at the Center for Nonviolent Communication, <https://www.cnvc.org>, for much more depth.

with the DoD, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) NGOs working in international development, and others. The DoD recognizes that building relationships and lasting partnerships with a host of different stakeholders (including diverse ethnic, tribal, and cultural groups) is critical to security both within the United States and in regions of the world that are prone to instability. The Department also recognizes that the ability to prevent conflicts and breakdowns in security includes understanding of social, cultural, and psychological behavior and of ways to act appropriately in response to diverse behaviors in all of these areas.

It is the position of this paper that the principles of NVC, and the behaviors that it embodies, can be easily articulated with DoD Language, Region, and Culture (LRC) programs, such as those that Sands and DeVisser (2015) describe. Therefore, this paper describes the basic components of NVC and concludes with some areas that need to be considered further in order for this articulation to be effective.

Components of Nonviolent Communication Making Observations

As mentioned above, our language is often filled with judgments, labels, blame, criticisms, insults, and comparisons, and we can become trapped in a world of ideas about rightness and wrongness (what's wrong with others for speaking or behaving the ways they do; what's wrong with me for not understanding or responding as I would like). It is easy to find instances of this in our current discourse and media. For example, simply looking at a few articles published recently about current issues, we see a number of examples of labels and blame.

- "Cranks on Top: The illusions of the G.O.P. elite may be no better than those of the leading candidate" (Krugman, 2/22/16).
- "Locating blame in the opioid epidemic. (Washington Post, 2016, Oct. 31).
- "Clinton blames FBI's Comey for her defeat in call with donors" (Lopez and Lopez, 2016).

Edward W. Said (2001), weeks after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center, referring to a document published by Samuel Huntington (1993), pointed out in a powerful article in *The Nation* the ways in which names and labels that we assign to ourselves and to others do not bring clarity, but rather cause the kinds of divisions that led to the attack:

How finally inadequate are the labels, generalizations, and cultural assertions. At some level, for instance, primitive passions and sophisticated know-how converge in ways that give the lie to a fortified boundary not only between "West" and "Islam" but also between past and present, us and them, to say nothing of the very concepts of identity and nationality about which there is unending disagreement and debate. A unilateral decision made to draw lines in the sand, to undertake crusades, to oppose their evil with our good, to extirpate terrorism and, in Paul Wolfowitz's nihilistic vocabulary, to end nations entirely, doesn't make the supposed entities any easier to see; rather, it speaks to how much simpler it is to make bellicose statements for the purpose of mobilizing collective passions than to reflect, examine, and sort out what it is we are dealing with in reality, the interconnectedness of innumerable lives, "ours" as well as "theirs." Even Said, in his desire to point out the divisions that language can cause, uses his own vague judgments in referring to Paul Wolfowitz's "nihilistic" vocabulary and "bellicose" statements.)

The first component of NVC involves making observations rather than evaluations and moralistic judgments. It is important to note that Rosenberg differentiates between "value judgments" and "moralistic judgments." We make value judgments about qualities we value in life -- such as honesty, freedom, peace -- which reflect our beliefs about how life can best be served and, as we will see later in this article, are held by others, even those with whom, on the surface, we might disagree. In contrast, "moralistic judgments" ("People who do ____ are evil.") do not support our own values but rather point with blame at others.

Rather than using “unedifying labels” like “Islam” and “The West,” Rosenberg argues that we benefit from observing what actually occurred (or is occurring) and what we and others are actually saying and doing, which we would all see if we were watching it transpire before us or on a television or movie screen. This approach is not as easy as we might think because our well-cultivated habit is often to judge, label, or blame, particularly if we feel pain as a result of what has just happened. Here is a very simple example from an office setting, which is carried through the components of NVC in this article: A staff member has been a half hour late for the past two team meetings at the office (on September 8 and 15) and said both times that the traffic was horrible, and he was sorry for holding up the group. (This is an observation.) At the second meeting when this happened, another staff member (before the late staff member arrived) described the situation like this: “He is completely uncaring and unreliable. He’s always late for meetings and then lies about why.” (This is an example of judgment and labeling.) While this example has nowhere near the strength of the September 11 attacks or other tragic events that are happening currently around the world, it demonstrates language that can bring significant damage to work teams, and it is worth recognizing its power.)

Rosenberg argues that positive evaluations can be as unhelpful as negative ones. For example, saying something like, “That was wonderful,” “You are amazing,” or “You did a good job with that report” to someone after they have just said or done something is not nearly as helpful and life giving as describing *specifically* what they said or did that met your or another person’s or the group’s needs. (e.g., “When you led our group in writing and submitting the report last week, it was very helpful, because the report was clear, concise, and delivered on time, and the team wasn’t stressed out.”)

Expressing Feelings

After we have made a clear observation of concrete actions or statements (or of our own thoughts), we consider how we feel in relation to what we are observing. Again, this can be

more difficult than it appears, as our habit is often to focus on the other person’s faults or wrongdoings (often expressed as, “You made me feel ____ when you did ____.”) Rosenberg (2005a) argues that “*Our repertoire of words for calling people names is often larger than our vocabulary of words that allow us to clearly describe our emotional states*” (p. 37, emphasis added). One reason for this is that we often have grown up, and now function, in contexts where feelings are not considered important or even worth talking about. We also sometimes confuse our own feelings with opinions about others and make statements about what we think they are doing, expressed as a feeling (e.g., “I feel ignored,” misunderstood, abandoned, let down, unsupported). There is a long list of such words that we use, from “abandoned” to “used”. We use the word “feel” so frequently that we become accustomed to describing our thoughts and opinions with “feel” (e.g., “I feel that this position is difficult to support.” “We feel that it will be effective to pursue this strategy.”), when we are really describing what we think.

In our office example, with the colleague who has arrived a half hour late to our team meetings two times in the past month, I might say, if asked how I feel about that, “I feel that he is being irresponsible and disrespectful,” expressing an *opinion* about the person rather than my own *feelings*; or “I am feeling inadequate as a team leader,” expressing an opinion about myself. These types of expressions rarely result in an understanding of our own perspectives or the behavior that we are looking for.

Instead, we would benefit from recognizing what we actually are feeling: possibly frustrated, disappointed, or uncomfortable. We can build a vocabulary of words to express how we feel when our needs *are* being met (happy, peaceful, relaxed, hopeful) and when our needs *are not* being met (afraid, annoyed,

bewildered, confused, concerned).² Rosenberg (2005a) argues, “By developing a vocabulary of feelings that allows us to clearly and specifically name or identify our emotions, we can connect more easily with one another. Allowing ourselves to be vulnerable by expressing our feelings can help resolve conflicts” (p. 46).

At times (or, depending on the context we are in, often) we might hear a message that we don't enjoy hearing. We might decide that this message is the cause of our feelings (“He was so rude, and it made me furious.”), when it is actually the stimulus for our feelings (“When he said that to her, I was furious.”) When we hear a negative message, we have four options:

- Blame ourselves: “I should be more responsible and careful. If I were, he wouldn't come to meetings late.”
- Blame others: “He is so self-centered and scattered, he doesn't even know when our meetings start.”
- Sense our own feelings and needs: “When he arrived late for the past two meetings, I was frustrated, because I need clarity and stability.”
- Sense the other person's feelings and needs: “Are you frustrated because our team meetings start at 8:30 AM and it's hard to get to the office by that time?” (We recognize that these are always guesses that can be checked with the other person.)

We empower ourselves and others when we sense and accept responsibility for our own feelings and needs and sense the other person's possible feelings and needs rather than blaming others or ourselves for events and statements that affect us.

Understanding Needs

We also empower ourselves and others when we move beyond strategies and delve more deeply into the *needs* (values and desires)

that underlie our feelings and understand that they have the same values and desires. Conflicts are often the result of the use of different strategies. We may disagree with and even find harmful and destructive specific strategies that others use, but we may actually be trying to meet the same needs. In fact, Rosenberg and others believe that we all experience universal needs that include appreciation, acceptance, honesty, security, and meaning.³

Marshall Rosenberg describes a time when he was asked to meet with a group of Israelis and Palestinians who wanted to establish mutual trust and bring peace to their homelands. He opened the session with this question:

“What is it that you are needing, and what would you like to request from one another in relation to those needs?” Instead of directly stating his needs, a Palestinian mukhtar (similar to a village mayor) answered, “You people are acting like a bunch of Nazis.” Almost immediately, an Israeli woman jumped up and countered, “Mukhtar, that was a totally insensitive thing for you to say!” Here were people who had come together to build trust and harmony, but after only one interchange, matters were worse than before they began. This happens when people are used to analyzing and blaming one another rather than clearly expressing what they need. In this case, the woman could have responded to the mukhtar in terms of her own needs and requests by saying, for example, “I am needing respect in our dialogue. Instead of telling us how you think we are acting, would you tell us what it is we are doing that you find disturbing?” (Rosenberg, 2005a, pp. 53-54)

Rosenberg concludes, “At the core of all of our anger is a need that is not being fulfilled.” “Every criticism, judgment, diagnosis, and expression of anger is the tragic expression of an unmet need.” When we begin talking about what we need rather than what's wrong with one another, the possibility of

² There is a long list of words to describe feelings in different situations; see https://www.cnvc.org/sites/default/files/feelings_inventory_0.pdf.

³ See an inventory of these needs at <https://www.cnvc.org/Training/needs-inventory>.

finding ways to meet everyone's needs is greatly increased (pp. 50-52).

Expressing our needs can be challenging at times, and we risk being criticized for focusing on something that is considered by others to peripheral or for focusing on ourselves rather than on the situation. However, recognizing our own and the other person's needs can release us from the prison of blame and judgment. To return to our example from the office, we might change a statement like "You have disrespected and irritated all of us by being late for our meetings." to "I was disappointed when you were late for our last two meetings. I know that we all value collaboration and support, and I am wondering what we might do so that our meeting times work for everyone."

Making Requests

Finally, *requests* (rather than demands, of ourselves and others) describe the concrete actions that we would like to see from ourselves or others that will enrich our lives and theirs. In order to be successful, our requests have the following features:

- Positive rather than negative: We say what we want rather than what we don't want. That is, rather than, "Don't show up late for meetings in the future," we might say, "Our meetings begin at 8:30 AM. Is it possible for you to arrive at the office so you'll be ready for meetings at this time?"
- Clear and doable rather than vague: Rather than saying, "Please show some respect for our group," we might say, "Is it possible for you to arrive at 8:30 AM for each of our meetings?"
- Are actually a request rather than a demand: Requests are received as demands when the hearer believes that they will be blamed or punished if they do not comply or if the speaker criticizes or judges after hearing the response to the request. Rather than saying, "If you are late for a meeting one more time, there will be significant consequences," we might say, "We have agreed together on this time for our meetings. Can we confirm that agreement together, or

would we like to set a different time that works for everyone?"

Summary

We can connect with ourselves, other people, and groups by sensing what we and they are observing, feeling, and needing and then seeking to discover what would enrich their lives and ours by receiving their request or making our own. "As we keep our attention focused on these areas, and help others to do likewise, we establish a flow of communication, back and forth, until compassion manifests itself naturally: what I am observing, feeling, and needing; what I am requesting to enrich my life; what you are observing, feeling, and needing; what you are requesting to enrich your life" (Rosenberg, 2005a, p. 7).

Some Considerations

The key components of NVC have been described here. There are additional factors to consider that haven't been discussed but are worth noting. One is the care that is needed when rather than observations, we make comparisons, weighing the value of one person, group, or country against that of another. Comparisons are needed and valuable in some contexts, such as sports or other competitions, elections, the Oscars. At the same time, they can entrap us and result in misery for many, and they are not always helpful or life giving. Rosenberg cites Dan Greenberg, who in his book, *How to Make Yourself Miserable*, describes through a series of humorous examples the power that comparative thinking can exert over us. He suggests that, if we want to feel really miserable, we can compare ourselves to other people (or compare groups that we are part of to other groups). In a real-life example, a group of studies published in *Psychological Science* (Rogers & Feller described in Sparks, 2016) found that students in an online course were not inspired by their classmates' work, shown to them as a model, but rather discouraged. Students who reviewed the essays presented to them as the best ones had significantly lower final grades and were less likely to finish the course than those who did not see those essays. A professor of public policy, commenting on the study, remarked,

“One of the surprising, negative consequences of the approach is when students are exposed to truly exceptional work, they use it as a reference point and realize that they are not capable of such exceptional quality. It can lead to decreased motivation and eventually quitting if you believe the exceptional work is actually typical” (*Education Week*, 2/15/16).

The language of observations, feelings, needs, and requests (“When you arrived late to two of our meetings, I was frustrated, because I value collaboration and support. Are you willing to talk about what would make it possible for you to arrive at 8:30 for our meetings?”) is not a set formula. Rather, it provides guidance for our thoughts and language, but the expression is adjusted to our understanding of ourselves, the other person, and the context. In international contexts, where we may not know the people, their cultural dispositions, and their preferred uses of specific language, we want to use a great deal of care. We want to scope out the situation and the other person or group and determine ways that what we say can be heard and welcomed. In fact, sometimes words are not necessary at all. *“The essence of NVC [can be] found in our consciousness of these four components, not in the actual words that are exchanged”* (Rosenberg, 2005a, p. 8, emphasis added). This approach to applying these four components across cultures is similar to the approach of using culture-general and cross-cultural competence as foundational knowledge and skill-based competencies to promote the use of effective communication no matter what specific culture or region we have traveled to.

Responding with love and a sense of connection and peace can be extremely challenging when we hear messages that we find painful to hear. Marshall Rosenberg tells about a time when he was invited to speak in a mosque at Deheisha Refugee Camp in Bethlehem to about 170 Palestinian Moslem men (described in Rosenberg, 2005a, pp. 12-14; 2005b, pp. 88-91). Attitudes toward Americans were not favorable at the time, and when he stood up in front of the

assembled group and the interpreter announced that he was an American citizen, one of them jumped up and yelled, “Murderer!” Another jumped up and shouted, “Child killer!” and another, “Assassin!” He notes, “I was glad I knew Nonviolent Communication that day. It enabled me to see the beauty behind their messages, to see what was alive in them.” He describes the interaction that followed, with him asking questions about what the people were feeling and trying to understand their needs, to show that he cared about what was alive in them. At the end of the interaction, the people asked him to go ahead and say what he came to the camp to say, and at the end of the evening, the man who had called him “Murderer!” invited him to his home for a Ramadan dinner. They then worked together to establish a school in the camp. He concludes with an important point: “This [connection] doesn’t require that we agree with the other person. It doesn’t mean we have to like what they’re saying. It means that we give them this precious gift of our presence, to be present at this moment to what’s alive in them, that we are sincerely interested in that. We don’t do it as a psychological technique but because we want to connect with the beauty in the person at this moment” (pp. 91).

Finally, it may be that all four components do not need to be expressed aloud in all contexts. It seems that if we want our messages to be heard now, in the media at least, we need to use powerful adjectives and even judgments and blame. But ... We can always ask ourselves, in the context in which we are communicating, when we believe we have something to say: Is this language or message needed? Will it help? What might we all gain if I use peaceful language that includes the four components described here? From what I know, what would be the best ways to express these components, in this place, at this time, with these people?

Possible Applications in DoD Initiatives

In addition to the approaches to preparation of U.S. personnel for service in this country and around the world described by Sands (2014, 2015), Sands and Haines (2013), Sands

and DeVisser (2015), and the U.S. DoD (2011, 2014), training opportunities might include a specific focus on use of language that creates connection and brings life to a situation -- any situation, no matter how difficult -- rather than language that brings division, pain, and possibly verbal or physical violence. Trainings might include reading about the principles of NVC described here and about possible applications of NVC described in the list of additional resources below, practicing them, and considering ways that they can be applied in a range of diverse contexts, with different individuals and groups that the trainees are preparing to work with or have worked with. Participants might conduct role plays using these principles, taking first their own position and then the other person's or group's position, and then discussing together effective and non-effective features of the communication that just occurred.

Since communication in any context, and particularly in contexts where we don't know the individuals or their beliefs and customs well, can be very challenging, the many forms that those challenges might take, with strategies for addressing them, might be reviewed, discussed, and practiced. In this regard, it is helpful to read the examples that Marshall Rosenberg gives of his own interactions in mediations that he has conducted with people in conflict-ridden situations in Croatia, Israel, Palestine, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere (described in depth in Rosenberg 2005a, 2005b). Since NVC is predicated on some of the same competencies that are at the heart of the DoD's focus on language skills, cultural capability, and cross-cultural competence, and since pursuing peace is at the center of both efforts, there is a powerful match that is worth pursuing.

Sands (2014, 2015), Sands and Haines (2013), and Sands and DeVisser (2015) argue that it

is time to move beyond broad generalizations about countries, cultures, and groups and to focus on specifics: the ability to understand one's own behavior and that of others and to use language in ways that are effective. Said (2001) wrote, "These are tense times, but it is better to think in terms of ... universal principles of justice and injustice, then to wander off in search of vast abstractions that may give momentary satisfaction but little self-knowledge or informed analysis" (Said in Sands, 2015, p. 30). Integrating the principles of NVC into this vision would bring specific focus and practice into peacemaking efforts that are underway.

Conclusion

"Worldwide, NVC now serves as a valuable resource for communities facing violent conflicts and severe ethnic, religious, or political tensions" (Rosenberg, 2005a, p. 11). Rosenberg argues that we can use NVC in our interactions -- with ourselves, another person, or in a group -- at all levels of communication and in highly diverse situations: intimate relationships, families, schools, organizations and institutions, therapy and counseling, diplomatic and business negotiations, and disputes and conflicts of any nature. They could also be applied as part of the resources and trainings provided for U.S. personnel working in the United States and other countries. The components of NVC are not complicated, and applying them in interactions is doable although at times challenging. Considerable understanding and practice are required, and many proponents of NVC in the United States and around the world spend time reading about and practicing it. The reference list and Additional Resources below provide a strong set of resources that can be used for understanding the process, putting it into practice, and applying it in diverse situations.

REFERENCES

- Board of Editors. (2016, October 31). Locating blame in the opioid epidemic. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/is-the-dea-partly-to-blame-for-the-opioid-epidemic/2016/10/30/2fd5dc30-9c78-11e6-b3c9-f662adaa0048_story.html?utm_term=.7d1d68f4c9c4
- Bornstein, D. (2015, November 3). The art of getting opponents to “we.” *The New York Times*. Retrieved from: http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/the-art-of-getting-opponents-to-we/?_r=0
- Creating harmony on campus. (2016, January). *Terra Dotta*. Retrieved from: <http://www.terradotta.com/articles/article-TerraDotta-Creating-Harmony-On-Campus-01-16.pdf>
- Goldsmith, M. (2013). *What got you here won't get you there: How successful people become even more successful!* London: Profile Books.
- Goldsmith, M. (2015). *Triggers: Creating behavior that lasts: Becoming the person you want to be*. New York: Crown Publishing Group.
- Copin, M. (2004). *Healing the heart of conflict: 8 crucial steps to making peace with yourself and others*. Emmaus, PA: Rodale.
- Greenburg, D. (1976). *How to make yourself miserable: A vital training plan*. New York, NY: Random House Trade Paperbacks.
- Huntington, S.P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1993-06-01/clash-civilizations>
- Krugman, P. (2015, Feb. 22). Cranks on top. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/opinion/cranks-on-top.html?emc=eta1&_r=0
- Lo Bianco, J. (2016). *Conflict, language rights, and education: Building peace by solving language problems in Southeast Asia*. Washington, DC: Center for Applied Linguistics. Retrieved from: <http://www.cal.org/lpren/pdfs/briefs/conflict-language-rights-and-education.pdf>
- Lopez, L. & Gibson, G. (2016, Nov. 13). Clinton blames FBI's Comey for her defeat in call with donors. Reuters. Retrieved from: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-idUSKBN1370LC>
- McNeil, E. (2016, February 17). To reach struggling students, schools need to be more 'trauma sensitive'. *Education Week*. Retrieved from: <http://www.edweek.org/tm/articles/2016/02/17/author-to-reach-struggling-students-schools-need.html>
- Maslow, H.S. (1943). A theory of human motivation. *Psychological Review*, 50(4), 370-396. Retrieved from: <http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Maslow/motivation.htm>
- Oxford, R.L. (2013). *The language of peace: Communicating to create harmony*. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

- Pace, J.L. (2016, July 18). Supporting controversial issues discussion in the charged classroom. *Teachers College Record*. Retrieved from: <http://www.tcrecord.org/Content.asp?ContentID=21471>
- Pincus, W. (2014, December 8). Hearing the voices and heeding the lessons of history. *Washington Post*. Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/hearing-the-voices-and-heeding-the-lessons-of-history/2014/12/08/d0100820-7ccb-11e4-b821-503cc7efed9e_story.html?utm_term=.ad64f04d9a05
- Rath, T. (2015). *Are you fully charged? The 3 keys to energizing your work and life*. Silicon Guild: Missionday.
- Reilly, M. (2015). Saying what you mean without being mean. *Educational Leadership*, 73(4), 36-40. Retrieved from: <http://www.ascd.org/publications/educational-leadership/dec15/vol73/num04/Saying-What-You-Mean-Without-Being-Mean.aspx>
- Rogers, T. & Feller, A. (2016). Discouraged by peer excellence: Exposure to exemplary peer performance causes quitting. *Psychological Science*, 27(3), 365-374. Retrieved from: <http://pss.sagepub.com/content/27/3/365>
- Rosenberg, M.B. (2005a). *Nonviolent communication: A language of life*. Encinitas, CA: Puddle Dancer Press.
- Rosenberg, M.B. (2005b). *Speak peace in a world of conflict: What you say next will change your world*. Encinitas, CA: Puddle Dancer Press.
- Said, E.W. (2001, October 4). The clash of ignorance. *The Nation*. Retrieved from: <http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance/>
- Sands, R.G. (2013, March 8). Language and culture in the Department of Defense: Synergizing complimentary instruction and building LREC competency. *Small Wars Journal*. Retrieved from: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/print/13859>
- _____ (2014). Finding a common thread: Implications for the future of culture and language programs in support of international security. *The Journal of Culture, Language, and International Security*, 1(1), 3-21. Retrieved from: <http://iscl.norwich.edu/jclis-summer-2014>
- _____ (2015). The class of cultures. *The Journal of Culture, Language, and International Security*, 2(1), 23-31. Retrieved from: <http://iscl.norwich.edu/jclis-summer-2015>
- Sands, R.G. & DeVisser, P.R. (2015). Narrowing the LREC assessment focus by opening the aperture: A critical look at the status of LREC assessment design & development in the Department of Defense. *The Journal of Culture, Language, and International Security*, 2 (2), Special Issue. Retrieved from: <http://iscl.norwich.edu/special-issue>
- Sands, R.G., & Haines, T. (2013, April 25). "Promoting Cross-Cultural Competence in Intelligence Professionals: A new perspective on alternative analysis and the intelligence process." *Small Wars Journal*. Retrieved from, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/promoting-cross-cultural-competence-in-intelligence-professionals>

Soetoro-Ng, M., & Milofsky, A. (2016, March 23). To avert the next generation of violent conflict, replace fear with curiosity. *Education Week*. Retrieved from:

<http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/03/23/the-urgent-call-to-replace-fear-with.html?r=1015014765&cmp=eml-enl-eu-news1-RM>

Sparks, S. D. (2016, February 16). Study: Showing students standout work can backfire: Struggling learners put off by exemplars. *Education Week*. Retrieved from:

<http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/02/17/study-showing-students-standout-work-can-backfire.html>

Suárez-Orozco, C., Casanova, S., Martin, M., Katsiaficas, D., Cuellar, V., Smith, N. A., & Dias. (2015). Toxic rain in class: Classroom interpersonal microaggressions. *Educational Researcher*, 44(3), 151-160.

U.S. Department of Defense. (2011, February). Strategic plan for language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities, 2011-2016. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Defense Language and National Security Education Office. Retrieved from:

<http://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/RFM/Readiness/DLNSEO/files/STRAT%20PLAN.pdf>

U.S. Department of Defense. (2014, January). Implementation plan for language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. Defense Language and National Security Education Office.

Additional Resources

These books describe specific processes, skills, and activities for practicing NVC and creating environments in which everyone thrives – in education settings (schools and universities) and other contexts.

Connor, J.M., & Killian, D. (2012). *Connecting across differences: Finding common ground with anyone, anywhere, anytime*. Encinitas, CA: PuddleDancer Press.

Hart, S., & Kodson, V. K. (2004). *The compassionate classroom: Relationship-based teaching and learning*. Encinitas, CA: PuddleDancer Press.

Hart, S., & Kodson, V.K. (2008). *The no-fault classroom: Tools to resolve conflict and foster relationship establishment*. Encinitas, CA: PuddleDancer Press.

Jennings, P. S. (2015). *Mindfulness for teachers: Simple skills for peace and productivity in the classroom*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Rosenberg, M.B. (2003). *Life-enriching education: Nonviolent communications helps schools improve performance, reduce conflict, and enhance relationships*. Encinitas, CA: PuddleDancer Press.



Joy Kreeft Peyton (Ph.D.) is a consultant working on issues of language and culture in education and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Applied Linguistics, in Washington, DC. She has over 35 years of experience in the field of languages, linguistics, and culture in education. She has worked with teachers and teacher trainers in K-12 and adult education programs across the United States and in other countries to improve their instructional practice. Her work includes providing workshops for teachers on developing the academic language and literacy of students learning English as a second language; developing professional development opportunities for teachers working with children and adults learning English; and working in other countries, including the Philippines and Thailand on preparing refugees for life and education in the United States, and in Ethiopia and Nepal on developing curriculum and materials for teaching students in their mother tongue and the national language. She serves on a number of project and editorial advisory boards focused on improving education and outcomes for students learning a second language.

She has worked extensively with teachers and administrators to improve literacy instruction for students who speak and sign languages other than English in early elementary to adult education and who often have limited literacy and interrupted education. This work includes 1) conducting literature reviews for practitioners (teachers and program administrators) focused on specific topics related to literacy development; 2) writing research-based papers that are accessible to practitioners; 3) collaborating with teachers and administrators to develop and implement administrative and instructional plans to meet the needs of students; 4) evaluating the outcomes of this work; 5) and developing sustainability plans for professional development so that teachers continue to receive information and support.

She is an active participant in Capital NVC (Nonviolent Communication in the Metro Washington DC area, <http://capitalnvc.org>) and a co-editor of the Capital NVC monthly newsletter.

STALKING THE OPTIMAL LEARNING ENVIRONMENT: COMPLEXITY AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION

BY DWIGHT STEPHENS

This paper treats the question of why pinups are more seductive when partially clothed than when completely naked. The premise of its investigation is that the brain is the product of a particular evolutionary history. Its properties and propensities are traceable to the history of the challenges which it encountered and the survival strategies which it developed in response to those challenges. Those strategies are genetically encoded and reproduced in its modern behavior. Many brain functions are therefore best understood from an evolutionary vantage point, and the optimization of learning hinges in part on understanding the neural mechanisms which evolved to govern four basic behaviors, recalled by the mnemonic The Four F's: fighting, fleeing, feeding, and sex.

The optimal learning environment is the set of external physical and internal mental conditions which will produce the fastest, most effortless, most complete, and most durable adaptation to the state envisaged by the proposed training, while at the same time developing and refining the cognitive abilities of the learner. Those conditions include:

- ✓ the physical training environment (classroom, range, street, jungle, etc.)
- ✓ the people involved in the training (the learners and instructor)
- ✓ the internal mental state and cognitive history of the learners and instructor

- ✓ the social and institutional culture in which the learner must function when he is not training.

Much of the wide range of conditions which affect learning is ignored or neglected by some instructors, learners, and administrators because of a widely held intuitive assumption that the learning process is a simple transfer of some stuff called "knowledge" (Stephens, 2016). Improving the effectiveness of language and culture training is not just a matter of improving scope & sequence, the tactics of presentation, the sophistication of the technology, the "authenticity" of the material, or even time on task. It is a matter of improving the instructors' and students' understanding of the process, and increasing their engagement in the process.

To give a quick characterization of the background of this issue, the brain has essentially two different ways of thinking. Jerome Bruner (1986) calls them the narrative system and the paradigmatic (or logico-scientific) system. Carl Rogers (1996) calls them experiential and behavioristic learning. Daniel Kahneman in his more recent book, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, calls them automatic, intuitive System 1 and deliberate, effortful System 2: "System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control. System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations. The

operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration." (2011, p. 20-21) The two systems operate differently and more or less independently of each other because they evolved at different periods in the evolutionary development of the brain.

In higher education, we are still subject to a persistent illusion that we can produce foreign language proficiency using a methodology invented by our own paradigmatic System 2, based on structural analysis of language and appealing explicitly to the System 2 of the student. But the logic of our more recently evolved prefrontal cortex cannot even begin to compete with our much older and more experienced intuitive system in producing curiosity, engagement, and effortless learning. Paradoxically, we do allow the older system to work during infancy and preschool education. Then, for the remainder of formal education, motivation and curiosity are largely shut down and learning is stifled as the student is force-fed on a serial-processing assembly line. Even money does not help. In our state-of-the-art classrooms, with Smartboards, smartphones, computers, tablets, and video conferencing (we've blown billions of dollars on sophisticated classroom technology for nothing), advanced students are stranded on the rocks of too much structure, and weaker students are lost in the confusion of too little structure, because traditional classroom procedure and natural brain process are not in sync. "In the vast majority of our schools, at all educational levels, we are locked into a conventional and traditional approach which makes significant learning improbable, if not impossible. When we put together in one scheme such elements as a prescribed curriculum, similar assignments for all students, lecturing as almost the only mode of instruction, standard tests by which students are externally evaluated and instructor-chosen grades as the measure of learning, then we can almost guarantee that meaningful learning will be at an absolute minimum" (Rogers, 1969, p. 5). The logical System 2 cannot learn as fast and as

completely as the biologically more experienced System 1. Nor is System 1 constrained by the cognitive capacity limitations that characterize System 2 working memory. Finally though, the real issue of learning is knowing what to notice. Machine computers are very good at logic and very fast; they can beat humans at chess; but a human—even a human baby—is better at knowing what to pay attention to. As teachers, unless we have a desperate need to demonstrate how clever we are, we would do better to rely on the student's brain for guidance. Learning cannot be dictated or forced; it must be allowed to emerge.

Evolutionary Basis of Pattern Recognition

Visual pattern recognition — and other kinds of pattern recognition such as hearing, touch, taste, and smell, as well as the more abstract ones which followed — evolved for survival, specifically for discovering and identifying objects and defeating camouflage, i.e., for allowing the quick recognition of things beneficial to survival and things threatening to survival. To put it in the simplest terms, any organism with a fairly well developed nervous system unites a range of visual stimuli into a basic pattern, which then becomes its background (reference gestalt). (Without this background field of reference, all perception would be chaos.) Then other patterns superimposed on that background may represent new, useful information, e.g., opportunities or threats. For example, what the frog's eye tells the frog's brain is whether anything new is happening on a stable and orderly background, such as a tasty insect flying by, or the looming shadow of a large predator. These two events are the most interesting things — if not the only interesting things — in the daily life of the frog. Likewise, in humans, neural pattern formation evolved to tell us whether that face in the foliage was friend or foe, and whether, come evening, we would be diner or dinner. In the jungle, yellow splotches in the green background, transmitted to the visual centers of our ancestor's brain, resulted in an A-ha judgment, or in an Uh-oh judgment, and appropriate signals were


sent to the limbic centers to produce arousal to different kinds of action, usually one of the Four F's.

As the human brain grew larger and its processing became more refined, it was drawn to more and more sophisticated patterns. The field of stimuli which it could recognize and find intriguing expanded and focused down to very subtle facial and body features, attitudes, and postures, to patterns of sound, to lights, colors, and textures. Those patterns and the mechanisms for recognizing them remained relevant to survival and the process of pattern formation always remained connected to the emotional regions of the brain, at whatever level of abstraction the patterns were forming. The brain as we know it now has become a mechanism obsessed with pattern recognition. For evolutionary reasons, pattern search and recognition is brain candy. We are fascinated by patterns of all kinds: crossword puzzles, Sudoku, video games, sports, politics, fads, fashions, the stock market, the weather, physics, mathematics, ballistics, and especially people. And not just momentarily; the hard-wired connection between the sense organs and the emotional centers assures that the very act of looking for patterns is pleasurable, and not just the final success. This pleasure connection is what drove millions of years of would-be scientists not to stop after the first prototype or model — and still drives them. Ramachandran (2004) suggests that all aesthetics and the human appreciation of beauty derives from the brain's hyper-developed tendency to discover, notice, and attend to ever subtler nuances of differences in patterns, even when such exploration provided no direct adaptive purpose. Cultured, refined, and sublimated as they may be, what we may now call aesthetic sensibilities and scientific proclivities — in fact, all of culture and human behavior — hark back to the ancestral preoccupation with the Four F's.

Complexity

"Information is a difference that makes a difference." ~ Gregory Bateson

"Complexity," as used here, does not mean difficulty. In physics and information theory, life is viewed as pockets of organization — or rather of fragile organizing and reorganizing — in a sea of randomness, a dynamically shifting balance between order and chaos. Complexity is the critical middle band between order and chaos, the zone in which patterns are forming, structures are emerging and organization is happening. It does not have distinct boundaries; it is defined rather by its lack of precise boundaries. It is a dynamic function of the degree of interplay of structure and randomness present in the patterns within a given perceptual field. Complexity concerns the emergence of neural organization, or pattern formation. In fact, "pattern recognition" is as good a definition as any of "intelligence." The left side of the image below represents complete order; the right side complete chaos; complexity is the narrow zone in the middle.



Living creatures make calculations based on pattern recognition in order to survive and reproduce. Natural selection favors the survival of individuals who learn (adapt) better, i.e., the ones who possess neural systems which identify relationships and make new patterns more easily. All brains evolved to do this, but brains are awakened only by complexity. They seem to be most efficient when operating in the narrow zone of complexity, between the Scylla of order and the Charybdis of chaos, where their ability to perceive patterns and process information is maximal. "Complex systems that can evolve will always be near the edge of chaos, poised for that creative step into

emergent novelty that is the essence of the evolutionary process" (Goodwin, 1994, p. 175). The same biological principle holds true for all physical learning processes, each one of which is governed by pathway and pattern formation in the brain. This includes the training of what we think of as "hard" physical skills, which at the cerebral level are no different from "soft" learning, like language. Powerlifters and bodybuilders have long known the significant benefits of periodic "muscle confusion," now known as "cross training."

Complexity is also found in pattern violation. If the process of forming new patterns is what the brain finds intriguing, and complexity is that zone where new patterns are sought and formed, then it follows that events which disturb the status quo will elicit attention. For our frog above, a shadow of a certain size flitting across his optic horizon signals Tasty Insect Snack. A larger descending shadow signals Painful Death by Osprey. Both signals are a kind of pattern violation, a disruption of the continuity of the frog's visual horizon, causing noticing. From peek-a-boo, to jack-in-the-box, to slipping on banana peels, to scary movies, we are awakened and engaged by surprise, which causes us to question a model and maybe come up with a new pattern.

Humor, another symptom of complexity, results from neural pattern violation. Its roots can be traced to the doubtful encounters which our ancestors had with potential friends and enemies. Ramachandran (2004) says that the recipe for laughter, humor, tickling, etc., is the false alarm: one part of the brain signals a potential danger but in the very next instant another part (the anterior cingulate) doesn't get a confirming signal. The result is an explosion of relief. Even the smile is complex because of its ambiguous evolutionary references. The origin of canine display in non-human primates is threat demonstration. (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998) The smile evokes attentiveness for, while hinting at amiability, it also conveys the veiled threat of teeth. Two smilers are saying to each other: "I think you

pose no threat, and I'm smiling, too, but notice my canines."

Faced with ever subtler situations of simulation and dissimulation, the brain grew in size and sophistication to meet the need to detect deceit and danger. The sophisticated brain of Homo sapiens developed the ability to spot the difference between the sincere smile and the one veiling other intentions. Most everyone can see the difference between a genuine smile and a fake one. The deliberate one, which we call up when we pose for a picture, is almost a grimace. The neural choreographies of the two are located in two different brain regions and use different pathways. The spontaneous smile uses an 'extrapyramidal' pathway that connects subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia, anterior cingulate cortex, and amygdala (Frank, 1996). The real smile is evolutionarily much older. This is why a smile is so intriguing to us. It floats between the possibility of shared pleasure and possible danger. In complexity, the brain is poised for A-ha and Uh-oh.

Poetry violates rules in order to attract attention, get the reader into the zone of complexity, and break up old thought patterns in order to permit new perceptions of reality. Take this famous poem by E. E. Cummings, for example, which seems to have syntactic errors, as well as errors of spacing and punctuation.

Spring is like a perhaps hand
(which comes carefully
out of Nowhere) arranging
a window,into which people look(while
people stare
arranging and changing placing
carefully there a strange
thing and a known thing here) and

changing everything carefully

spring is like a perhaps
Hand in a window
(carefully to
and fro moving New and
Old things,while

people stare carefully
 moving a perhaps
 fraction of flower here placing
 an inch of air there) and

without breaking anything.

(Cummings, 1954, p. 100)

Look only at the first line. Spring is like a perhaps hand. Of the six possible places in the sentence where the word "perhaps" might go, this is the only one which is not "correct." This poem, like the painting of Fujiyama by Hokusai, and any other complex sculpture, painting, or music, is a pure representation of complexity. The to-and-fro, the old and new, the careful, delicate, and not obvious rearrangement of an existing pattern, making new connections, without breaking anything. Other worlds are just a metaphor away. Roman Jakobson called this "making it strange" (1981). The artist, as creator of new information, introduces "organized disorder" into a perception in order to increase its information capacity (Eco, 1989).

The genius of the Impressionist, Post-Impressionist, Cubist, and Surrealist painters was that they applied complexity and pattern violation to visual art. Knowing intuitively that no knowledge pattern could be transmitted from brain to brain, but had to be constructed in each individual brain, they allowed the viewer to do the construction himself. They gave the public dabs of paint, splotches, impossibly dissected and juxtaposed pieces of a face or body, and allowed the individual brains to do the assembly, launching them into complexity with partial patterns.

Great music, too, is characterized by flights into the unexpected via an unforeseen modulation, an altered chord, a change of tempo, a sudden crescendo, or a sudden hush. The entire history of music is the history of breaking rules. A good jazz soloist, for example, will play his theme twice, then the bridge, then the theme one final time, in good poetic AABA fashion. Then he will begin his improvisation. During his solo, he

will alter the theme progressively, pushing it to the edge of unrecognizability. He will carry his listener all the way to the edge of randomness, almost lose him there, and then pull him back safely onto the solid ground of the remembered theme, only to carry him over again to the edge of chaos and atonality, then back to the safety of the theme. Each time the listener returns to the theme with the tingle of an altered perception; each time into the chaos with more confidence and a new feeling for the depth of the theme. Playing the same notes over and over for thirty minutes would cause the audience to walk out. Playing completely random notes unconnected by a unifying pattern would cause the same response. Too far into the area of order is boring and tedious; too far into chaos is threatening and anxiety producing.

Flow

That middle zone of complexity, however, where the brain is happily engaged in connecting new patterns, has been described as flow. Subjects describe feelings of relaxed wakefulness, heightened ability to perform, enhanced learning ability, intense concentration and immersion in a task, just the right blend of detachment, clarity, engagement, power, even euphoria. Athletes know it as "the zone," where there is no effort, no pain, no time, no limit, just joy. Psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1990) catalogued the subjective experience of subjects in the state of flow and came up with eight essential qualities of that psychic state:

1. Clarity of goals and involvement
2. Focused concentration
3. Balance of difficulty and ability
4. Heightened feeling of empowerment and control
5. Effortlessness
6. A feeling of timelessness
8. Intrinsic reward

Most of these qualities overlap, and they could be reduced or expanded in number, but they all relate to a clearly delineated brain state, a sweet spot of rapt attention

and effortless learning. Furthermore, it appears that:

1. A brain state different from the usual one is active, and a brain mechanism is operating which is under less direct conscious control.
2. The learning mechanism is more natural, self-powered, and extensive than typical conscious, explicit, intentional, declarative learning, and it connects and synchronizes many diverse brain regions.
3. It is practically automatic and it has been refined over hundreds of thousands of years to an intuitive level.

What we have here is a brain operating in the zone of complexity, and largely using Kahneman's easy intuitive System 1.

Complex skills require the cooperation of brain regions which are remote from each other, and those skills are produced only by the binding of different systems in parallel processing. As Ramachandran (2004, p. 125) says, "The mind isn't one 'thing' - it involves the parallel activity of many quasi-independent modules." The sight of a speeding red sports car, for example, is not a unitary perception but a parallel neural process which binds perceptions of distance, motion, size, shape, and color from different brain regions. System 1 induces flow (also referred to as high coherence) by activating and coordinating remote brain regions. Strong alpha wave activity concomitant with the synchronization of these regions releases endorphins and produces euphoria. In contrast, a brain in normal (beta) state displays lots of activity but little coherence and little synchronization of hemispheres. The result is impaired learning and reduced efficacy in thought and action. The limbic (emotional) system of the brain supports motivation and deep learning because of its old evolutionary connection to System 1. (As we all know from experience, the connection between the logical System 2 and the emotions is tenuous, at best.) System 1 evokes emotion, and emotion engages System 1, mutually.

The wide influence of emotional arousal results in many brain systems being activated simultaneously, many more than if one is engaged in quiet cognitive activity, like lying back musing about something, or even when vigorously thinking about the solution to a problem. And because more brain systems are typically active during emotional than during non-emotional states, and the intensity of arousal is greater, the opportunity for coordinated learning across brain systems is greater during emotional states. By coordinating parallel plasticity throughout the brain, emotional states promote the development and unification of the self. (LeDoux, 2002, p. 322)

Using System 2 (the effortful and deliberate one) to achieve deep and rapid learning is like trying to tickle oneself. It's like trying to produce a smile for a posed camera shot. One simply does not have access to the multiple pathways and the disparate brain regions or the ability to synchronize them, and what results is a grotesque grimace. The real smile cannot be accessed logically; the rational tail cannot wag the emotional dog. The brain, however, performs this and many other tasks effortlessly, when given a suitable environment. The way to engage the right muscles for the real smile is to engage System 1 and recall the corresponding emotion.

The Zone of Proximal Development

Traditional education requires the collaboration of a mentor. An education is a social education, the building of not only a knower, but a member of a community, and the teacher and community of others are the co-builders of that new self. In addition, from the learner's point of view, the need of human contact, personal interaction, and social success is his primordial motivation to notice and learn. On this premise, i.e., that "Human learning presupposes a specific social nature and a process by which children grow into the intellectual life of those around them," the Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1978, p. 86) posited a model which would express

learning as a functional relationship between two potentials: that of the learner alone and that of the learner assisted by his mentor. He called it the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD).

“The ZPD is the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers.”

Vygotsky was one of the earliest to challenge the use of the more explicit methods of System 2 instruction, which he himself would have called behavioristic. “Consciousness and control appear only at a late stage in the development of a function, after it has been used and practiced unconsciously and spontaneously. In order to subject a function to intellectual control, we must first possess it.” (1962, p. 90)

It is well known that one-on-one tutoring produces better results than classroom work. Why? Probably because the teacher in that situation is free to skip the traditional formal process and create a zone of complexity by engaging directly and personally the curiosity of the learner. The Khan Academy and other similar education experiments are based on the search for flow in the classroom. The Khan method flips classwork and home work, so that modeling (presentation and lecturing) is relegated to homework and manipulation is done in class, where all the brain’s natural resources of curiosity (which would be extinguished by the usual traditional classroom procedure) can be engaged. (Khan, 2016)

Sugata Mitra, winner of the 2013 TED Prize, showed that powerful learning takes place without traditionally guided and orchestrated instruction. His “Hole in the Wall” experiment, in which he and his colleagues dug a hole in a stone wall in a New Delhi slum, installed an Internet-connected PC, and left it there like the alien monolith in *2001: A Space Odyssey* (with a

hidden camera filming the area), showed that illiterate children could learn practically anything without traditional teachers or formal instruction. (Mitra, 2007) These experiences indicate that the brain’s natural structure and function enable it to learn merely by being in a particular kind of environment. Does this mean that learning can happen without the traditional intervention of a teacher? Jerome Bruner, who wrote the preface to the first (1962) English translation of Vygotsky’s *Thought and Language*, noted the paradox in Vygotsky’s ZPD: “How can the competent adult ‘lend’ consciousness to a child who does not ‘have’ it on his own?” (Bruner, 1986) Even when there is no human mentor present, there is a goal pattern, a potential pattern. The ZPD as Vygotsky defined it is a zone of interaction, a meeting of minds. But a meeting of minds is just a meeting place of patterns which can intersect, lodge, take root, and entwine. If the ZPD is considered as the degree of similarity/difference between an existing pattern in the student’s brain and the idealized pattern (scaffolding) envisaged by the teacher-mentor-guide, which is the goal of the learning process, then the ZPD is none other than complexity itself.

Orchestrating a complex learning environment

“It is in fact nothing short of a miracle that the modern methods of instruction have not yet entirely strangled the holy curiosity of inquiry” -Albert Einstein

Now we know the evolutionary background of effective learning, and we know some of the qualities of the state of flow. All that remains is to articulate a protocol for constructing an optimal learning environment. How do we create flow? Following the trail of brain candy (pattern violation, mystery, enigma, puzzle, humor, emotion, personal relations, drama, pathos, and the deepest evolutionary cues), steer the class through the narrow strait of complexity by tasking artfully between order and chaos, between brain hemispheres, and between modes of thinking.

The creation of a learning process, whether it be an activity, a lesson, a course, or a curriculum, should follow the following principle: Design from the top down; build from the bottom up; teach from side to side. "Design from the top down" is the architectural view, the conceptualization of plans, patterns, and pathways to the goal. "Build from the bottom up" is the concrete application of the process. (This is roughly synonymous with "think globally, act locally.") Teaching from side to side is how the environment of flow is sustained. Picture again the image of complexity with order on one side and chaos on the other. The zone is a tacking back and forth between the shores of known and unknown, between patterned and unpatterned, which creates an optimal stability (repeated return to order), and optimal stimulation (repeated return to the edge of chaos), and a maximal amount of time in the zone of flow and a maximal progress forward. This is how one learns to swim: not by hanging onto the edge of the pool, and not by being tossed into the deep water, but by moving back and forth repeatedly between the two. Regarding the alternation of modes of thought, there is no strict recipe other than that the artful instructor should move back and forth between polar modes of treatment such as Old vs New, Theme vs Variation, Text vs Task, Oral vs Written, Competence vs Performance, Teacher-centered vs Learner-centered, Group work vs Solitary work, Explicit vs Implicit, Form vs Content, Serial Process vs Parallel Process, Active vs Reflective, Deductive vs Inductive, Concrete vs Abstract, Personal vs Social, Focused vs Diffuse, Local vs Global, Linear vs Non-linear, Intervention vs Non-intervention, etc.

Some of these features and attitudes are recognized in current second-language acquisition theory, but their application is often not balanced for the production of complexity or flow. For example, it is currently a trend – if not a requirement – to produce courses which are "communicative," "task-based," and "learner-centric," based on "collaborative learning,"

using "authentic materials" with "focus on form," and encouraging "inductive learning." (Doughty & Long, 2003) And literal-minded instructors do indeed produce them, to the neglect of the equally important, counterbalancing, antipodal components which would enable flow. Some government programs, for example, will not allow instructors to conduct exercises and activities for the development of phonemic, syntactic, semantic, or socio-cultural and pragmatic infrastructure because they are "not task related." Strict adherence to any single compass heading would have our ship and its students mired in the doldrums or going off the edge of the earth. It is the balanced alternation between text (in the linguistic sense) and task, between form and content, between learner and mentor, between reflection and action, between inductive and deductive, etc., which produces the dynamic stability of flow. Much work remains to be done in the creation of practical classroom activities which can achieve the mental switching described above, but the principle is clear.

To return briefly to Kahneman's System 1 and System 2, we should remember that the power of System 1 to distinguish surprising from normal events in a fraction of a second, to give rapid and unequivocal feedback about the correctness of reactions, to generate instant associations and make parallel connections to related and diverse experiences and emotions, and to produce intuitive expertise is unsurpassed. System 1 is the master of skill development. It is responsible for most of what we do right, but it's also responsible for some of what we do wrong. (Kahneman, 2011) The evolutionary age of System 1 will cause it to make false assumptions, and its usage must be tempered by the switch alternation suggested above, using System 1 and System 2 as gas and clutch, or as sail and rudder.

What should the teacher do? That which the student cannot do, and only that which the student cannot do. The teacher functions as an alternate, empathic consciousness for the student, nudging him, waking him up,

surprising him, orchestrating the appearance on stage of the appropriate pieces, moving new pieces into position to allow the timely connections which will make new patterns, scheduling the abrupt collisions of worlds which will introduce complexity at precisely the right moment and at precisely the right angle of incidence for a ray of light to illuminate the emerging structure and plunge the mind into curiosity. Richard Dawkins (2003) provides a good anecdote from his own education:

Some 35 years after Sanderson's death, I recall a lesson about Hydra, a small denizen of still fresh water. Mr. Thomas asked one of us, "What animal eats Hydra?" The boy made a guess. Non-committally, Mr. Thomas turned to the next boy, asking him the same question. He went right round the entire class, with increasing excitement asking each one of us by name, "What animal eats Hydra? What animal eats Hydra?" And one by one we guessed. By the time he had reached the last boy, we were agog for the true answer. "Sir, sir, what animal does eat Hydra?" Mr. Thomas waited until there was a pin-dropping silence. Then he spoke, slowly and distinctly, pausing between each word.

"I don't know... (crescendo) I don't know... (molto crescendo). And I don't think Mr. Coulson knows either. (fortissimo) Mr. Coulson! Mr. Coulson!"


He flung open the door to the next classroom and dramatically interrupted his senior colleague's lesson, bringing him into our room. "Mr. Coulson, do you know what animal eats Hydra?" Whether some wink passed between them I don't know,

but Mr. Coulson played his part well: he didn't know. Again, the fatherly shade of Sanderson chuckled in the corner, and none of us will have forgotten that lesson. What matters is not the facts but how you discover and think about them: education in the true sense, very different from today's assessment-mad exam culture (pp. 69-70)

The evolutionary history of the brain's physiological development guarantees that complexity will produce the most powerful incitements to attention, to motivation, and to rapid implicit learning. The creation of a learning environment which automatically engages relevant brain systems in synchronized collaboration – systems which have hundreds of thousands of years of experience and practice in learning, systems which are deeply connected to biological, sociological, and emotional motivations – is as close as we can get to intervention at the neural level. The environment described here as optimal is characterized by complexity and flow. By orchestrating contexts in which attention is entrained (using topical "brain candy") alternately between the opposite poles of order and randomness (between what is, for the learner, structure and absence of structure), and by alternating opposing types of analysis (modes of thought) and opposing treatments of material, an instructor can produce full and continual collaborative engagement of otherwise inaccessible systems of learners' brains and synchronized activity in both hemispheres. The activation of more brain systems, with greater intensity of attention and concomitant emotional arousal, results in faster learning across more systems, deeper synthesis of skills, and greater holistic development of the learner.

REFERENCES

- Bruner, J. (1986). *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Cummings, E. E. (1954). *Poems: 1923-1954*. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co.
- Dawkins, R. (2003). *A Devil's Chaplain*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Doughty, C.J. & Long, M.H. (2003). Optimal Psycholinguistic Environments for Distance Learning. *Language Learning & Technology*, 7 (3), pp. 50-80. Retrieved from: <http://lt.msu.edu/vol7num3/doughty/>
- Eco, U. (1989). *The Open Work, (Opera aperta)* (translated by Anna Cancogni). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Frank, M.G. & Ekman, P. (1996, December 10). "Physiologic Effects of the Smile" *Directions in Psychiatry*, 16 (25).
- Goodwin, B. (1994). *How the Leopard Changed Its Spots*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Jakobson, R. (1981). Linguistics and Poetics. In S. Rudy & W. de Gruyter (Eds). *Selected Writings*, Vol. 3. The Hague: Mouton.
- Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking, Fast and Slow*, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
- Khan, S.A. (2016). *Khan Academy*. Retrieved from <https://www.khanacademy.org/>
- LeDoux, J. (2002). *Synaptic Self: How our brains become who we are*, New York: Viking.
- Mitra, S. (2007). TED Talk. Retrieved from https://www.ted.com/talks/sugata_mitra_shows_how_kids_teach_themselveshttps://www.ted.com/talks/sugata_mitra_shows_how_kids_teach_themselves
- Ramachandran, V. S. (2004). *A Brief Tour of Human Consciousness*, New York: Pi Press.
- Ramachandran, V.S. & Blakeslee, S. (1998). *Phantoms in the Brain*, New York: William Morrow.
- Rogers, C.R. (1969). *Freedom to Learn*, Columbus: Charles E. Merrill.
- Stephens, D. (2016). "The Elephant in the Room: Some observations on language and culture training," *Journal of Culture, Language, and International Security*, 3, p. , 2016. Retrieved from <http://iscl.norwich.edu/spring2016http://iscl.norwich.edu/spring2016>
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1962). *Thought and language*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). *Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.



Dwight Stephens is a linguist, professor, researcher and a specialist in second-language acquisition, cognitive science, and complexity and scientific modeling. Dr. Stephens has taught foreign languages at numerous major universities; created and administered large military language and culture training programs; trained foreign language instructors; and developed foreign language materials, methods, and online courses. He is currently the President of Bibliotech, Inc. and Director of its Integrated Learning Research Initiative. bibliotech@nc.rr.com

RHODESIA: A STUDY OF A CLASH OF CULTURES

BY ERIC THOMPSON

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the aspects of culture in relation to the colonial period of Rhodesia (1890-1914) that shaped its identity. This analysis will be used to demonstrate how aspects of culture can be applied to societal shifts and apply those to modern day issues.

There are volumes of books written on Rhodesia and its eventual collapse and transition into Zimbabwe, the bulk of which oversimplify the case by focusing on the political and racial issues that surround the whole affair. This over simplification of Rhodesia is very similar to Samuel Huntington's over simplifications in "Clash of Civilizations." According to Robert Greene Sands, the article by Huntington "thrust into academic and public discourse his notion of the West versus Islam" (Sands, 2015, p.24). In the article "Clash of Cultures" Sands identifies this over simplification by stating "one of the primary problems with Clash of Civilizations is that Huntington called his fault lines "cultural" and defaulted to the tried notions of religion and the economy promoting yawning divides that starkly separate out huge chunks of people" (p. 24). This is no different than saying politics and race are the "cultural" fault lines that were the cause of everything that went wrong in Rhodesia. An excerpt from Sands "Clash of Cultures" while being written in the modern context of Islam vs the West, if taken in the abstract could very easily be talking about Rhodesia:

"Where groups align based on local beliefs and features like kinship, land, or shifting alliances based on cultivation or herding of lands that do have antiquity. Or, perhaps their alliance is based on religion that is a mix of local ritual and belief, whereas connections to any ideal monotheism may be in name only. These are the variables that define cultures, and clashes do erupt and run the gamut - from violence to negotiations"(p.25).

Here we see that there are no true mega civilizations clashing but rather cultures in those civilizations that clash. By studying and understanding how cultures clashed concerning Rhodesia at the height of British colonialism in the world, similarities can be drawn and lessons learned can be applied as cultures clash now at the height of globalization in the world.

Background

In 1890, Cecil Rhodes, used the British South Africa Company to lead a group of pioneers to Mashonaland, eventually establishing Fort Salisbury, what would become the capital of Rhodesia. After nearly ninety years of turmoil and strife the British colony of Rhodesia collapsed and the newly independent nation of Zimbabwe was formed. Understanding the term "culture" will be key in understanding what happened in Rhodesia and applicable in understanding current conflicts and relations in the modern, globalized world. In the book "*Culture*," Alfred Kroeber and Clyde

Kluckhohn, devised what became the standardized definition of culture for the field of anthropology:

Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior, acquired and transmitted by symbols constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action" (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, p.357).

This concept of culture is no longer considered relevant and in fact may never have been a true reflection of culture. Culture is not fixed, but rather "It is an artificial construction built to enable translation between them and us, between source and target. It is intersubjective" (Agar 2006, p.6). Culture is based on groupings of markers such as generation, gender, religion, region, language, and occupation. The list of markers can go on and on, and groups of markers could even be considered micro-cultures that when mixed together and given a certain stimulus, create a specific response. Culture is not a static system, but instead "open dynamic systems co-evolving in their environment, complex systems on the edge of chaos, as the jargon sums it up, a lot of them all at once" (Agar, p.10.)

The idea of culture as dynamic and fluid seem to make it impossible to define cultural differences when they intersect. On the contrary, understanding that cultures are dynamic will help to identify and narrow down where the differences in culture come from. These differences are referred to by Michael Agar as "rich points" and are just as often subtle and nuanced as they are obvious. The key to identifying the rich points as part of a culture is identifying patterned variations. One instance of an event is nothing and does not constitute a cultural norm, but multiple instances of the

same event in similar scenarios is important and worth noting.

All of the cultural markers, the ways they blend together, and the rich points they create are seemingly endless, yet there has to be a way to make research possible and meaningful. In Agar's 2006 "Culture: Can You Take It Anywhere" article he identifies six areas of interaction: hegemony, coupling, density, attitude, integration, and volatility. Each of these has a specific relation in regards to culture and how it can lead to or affect rich points. They can also be viewed in the personal or group identity. Hegemony is how dominant a specific cultural marker is. Coupling is described as what other things does a specific marker pull in if it is a key factor. Density describes how pervasive a marker is. Attitude is how a person or group feels about a particular cultural marker. Integration is in reference to how well a person or group has been able to merge multiple markers into single product that they can put forth as their "cultural identity." Volatility is the concept of trying to determine if one of the cultural markers in the blend is undergoing radical change. With the understanding that culture is dynamic, patterned variations can be observed in an effort to better understand the rich points between cultures. By studying the rise and fall of Rhodesia, a place where multiple cultures from around the world "clashed" on a finite timeline in recent history, similarities in patterned variations might be found as cultures clash today in the era of globalization.

Colonial Era Settlers

To comprehend why Rhodesia is such a complex example of clashing cultures, it is necessary to start with colonization and look at how Rhodesia was different from other British colonies. One key factor that separates Rhodesia from other British colonies is how it was governed. "As a primarily trade-driven empire, Britain's colonial policy usually followed the inexpensive "indirect rule" model of administering through local elites, making settler colonialism, particularly settler rule, very rare" (Bonello 2010, 341). Instead, in 1890, Cecil Rhodes assembled a "pioneer"

group that would exercise settler rule for his British South Africa Company. This initial group of pioneers was comprised of many young men who were British born or British South African born. These young men were from prominent families in the Cape Colony areas of South Africa. South Africa at the time, having been previously controlled by the Dutch East India Company, had only been a British colony since 1806. Leading an expedition with young men whose prominent families were willing to support them was one way Rhodes planned to ensure that his expedition would have support, both physical and political, from the South African colonies should difficulties arise. In addition to these young men, "the group comprised a range of professions as well, such as doctors, lawyers, clergymen, bakers, and butchers so that the founding settlement at Fort Salisbury was a self-contained community" (Bonello, 345).

With just this small description of the initial pioneers, we can identify a number of different cultural markers in the colonists. There are multiple occupations (and subsequently different social statuses), at least two distinct regions, the list could go on. Match these cultural markers with the six areas for intermingling and there certainly must have been many rich points to be found of this group of men. Possible couplings may have begun as lawyers and doctors may have had fewer rich points between them based on higher education levels and possibly a small generation gap as they might have been older having spent more years at university. The bakers and butchers may have understood each other better as both are more working class.

These types of divisions based on the hegemony, coupling, and density seemed to have a large impact on the early settlers. In the first ten years, due to mineral prospects and the potential for mining, groups of people like prospectors, investors, and military officers looking to establish themselves with land for political purposes began to move into Rhodesia. Those fleeing the Anglo-Boer wars in South Africa also arrived in Rhodesia. Possibilities for rich

points abound in Rhodesia at this time. The Afrikaners were of Dutch descent and had been moving away from the Cape Colony because they had no desire to be ruled by the British. The Anglo-Boer war was essentially the British government forcing their will on the Afrikaner people who had moved inland in South Africa. Rhodesia at that time would have that very farmer living in relative close proximity and competing for the same resources as a British military officer. Those two would not even have spoken the same language since most of the Afrikaner farmers spoke primarily Afrikaans, a Dutch derivative. Yet somehow these minority white settlers were able to overcome all of these cultural rich points and intermingle to become the dominating force both militarily and politically in Rhodesia in a span of 24 years.

The various groups that formed the settlers in Rhodesia had to have some commonalities that bonded them together. These commonalities had to have the right levels of the six components of interaction in order to overcome the multiple rich points that their differences created. The integration factor of the components of interaction had to be very strong. This ability to integrate multiple cultural markers is the way that a specific identity is formed. This formed identity then becomes the basis for mobilization if the identity of the group becomes threatened. In the Rhodesian colonists, there are several different cultural markers that needed to be overcome. There were three main regions represented. These were the British born, the British South African born, and the Afrikaners. The hegemony, density, and attitude of the two British regions are all closely tied. The fact that they were British was one of the dominant cultural factors. Their Britishness was evident in their everyday lives and there was no *laissez faire* attitude towards it. This idea of being British also coupled the cultural markers of language and religion. There was a distinct effort made by the English-speaking people of Rhodesia to keep the language as pure to the Victorian era English language as possible unlike many other colonies of the United Kingdom

that developed their own variants of the English language. They were all British and they were proud of it. They strove to preserve their identity and the early Rhodesian society developed into a hierarchical society that mirrored that of the rest of the United Kingdom. The Afrikaners on the other hand had no desire to share this concept. Here is a large obvious rich point. Two distinct regions, each with their own language, each with their own homelands version of rule of law, each with its own variants of religion from the protestant reformation. The Afrikaners cultural markers of region and language were very volatile in terms of the components of interaction. Everywhere they had lived in South Africa and where they were trying to escape to was controlled by the British. Their land and the number of Afrikaans speaking people were dwindling and losing control both physically and politically.

These two separate identities grew together to form a Rhodesian identity. This identity grew from race and the distinction of having been a pioneer in austere conditions. In the first ten years of Rhodesia's existence the settlers, aided by the well-armed British South Africa Company's police force, fought to maintain the power they had gained during three major native uprisings. This shared struggle had a profound impact on the integration component of interaction. "The struggle mentality that came from 'taming' the country's land and its black inhabitants formed the basis of a powerful shared history of heroism and sacrifice that was perpetuated through inspirational writings and commemorative rituals and invested Rhodesian immigrants emotionally in their adopted country" (Bonello, p.352).

Race was the other cultural marker that factored heavily in all of the components of interaction to help solidify the Rhodesian identity. While a segregator in terms of separating the colonists from the native peoples, it was able to pull in other markers and integrate the colonists into a succinct identity, and it was volatile. That volatility was based on fear. The fear that at any moment the native black Africans would

rise up and kill them simply because they were white.

The mindset at that point in history was that European colonialism was bringing civilization to indigenous people around the world. The small numbers of settlers were not enough to work the land and mines so they relied on a native workforce and forced a shift from a trade based society to a cash based society. "In 1894 a hut tax was enacted. In an effort to force compliance, crops of indigenous people were burned and their cattle were seized. The natives were then forced into labor to pay off their debts" (Bonello, p.347). Increasingly, laws and regulations were passed by the British South Africa Company that forced more and more segregation, ultimately benefitting the settlers and pushing the image that the natives were unfit to govern themselves. Forcing the belief that whites were superior in every way by creating laws and regulations to widen the segregation gap was done out of fear to create unity among the settlers. "In a land where most everything else was unfamiliar, whites clung tenaciously to notions of themselves as culturally superior, which were also very important for creating unity within the dispersed settler communities" (Bonello, 349). This idea of racial superiority does not however fully explain the rise to power of the white minority in Rhodesia. Settler attitude toward the British homeland government and the white South African government helped to solidify the unique sense of being Rhodesian as well.

While possessing a sense of being overwhelmingly British the settlers also felt a sense of being different than the citizenry in the homeland. There was an "opposing feeling of neglect that created another layer of insecurity in early white identity as Rhodesia struggled for political and economic recognition within the empire, causing the settlers to see themselves as different from being truly British" (Bonello, 354). One issue that forced this feeling was the British government's differing views from that of the locals on how to handle native African issues. Rhodesian settlers in

general felt that the British government was too slow to act in providing support during the First (1893-94) and Second (1896-97) Matabele wars. Even as the settler government jumped at every chance to prove that the new colony was prosperous, dealings with the home government in London show that the home governments attitude was that Rhodesia was "beset with a host of contentious issues related to trade, infrastructure, governance, and 'native affairs'" (Bonello, 356). The physical distance and the feelings of isolation and neglect began to solidify the identity of being Rhodesian and began to change the cultural markers components of interaction. The attitude of being British was being tested, the coupling began to pull in these ideas of settler heroics and togetherness in struggle, and the isolation began to make the sense of being Rhodesian more pervasive. These interactions would continue to grow and define Rhodesia as separate from the British government later in Rhodesia's history.

Even though many of the Rhodesian settlers came from eminent families in South Africa and union with South Africa was a long-term goal for Cecil Rhodes, the growing settler feelings of a separate Rhodesian identity was widening the rich point between Rhodesia and South Africa. "As political, social, and economic issues in the region evolved, certain South African topics then took on greater significance in the context of union, when settlers identified them as markers of difference from the 'Rhodesian Way'" (Bonello, 361). Here is the essence of cultural markers being identified in the context of union. This idea of union with South Africa is the two cultures clashing. The components of interaction were leaning towards the "Rhodesian Way" being the dominant, pervasive attitude that pulls in the other markers to integrate them into an identity that is extremely volatile because it is still forming. This Rhodesian identity had become strong enough that, in 1910, when South Africa's four provinces united and formed their own dominion, Rhodesia declined to be the fifth state (but did ask for a provision that they might be

able to join the union at a later date). For the majority of the Afrikaner population, the cultural marker of region was more dominant than the cultural marker of language. There was some question as to where the Afrikaner loyalties would lie at the outbreak of war, but by this time, a Rhodesian identity had been forged as evidenced by a line in a newspaper from a Rhodesian Afrikaner in response to Afrikaner loyalty, "Let us be united and forget that we are English or Dutch. Let us be Rhodesians, true to ourselves and the flag which sways over us" (Bonello, 364).

In just under twenty-five years, the new Rhodesian identity had been formed. Obvious rich points like language differences, regional differences, occupational differences, and religious differences of the early settlers were able to be identified and overcome. The patterned variations that united the white Rhodesians in their political, social, and economic development were race, isolationism, and home nation neglect. Racially, the Rhodesians believed they were superior to the native black Africans. Due to their isolation on the African frontier they began to see differences between themselves, South Africa, and the British homeland. Great Britain and British South Africa's slow response to native uprisings, their ideas of how to handle native issues, and an insistence on making both English and Afrikaans official languages without considering settler views are the patterned variations of rich points with outsiders that the settlers used to overcome their own internal culture clashes and develop a new national identity. This identity became the dominant cultural marker and was always in volatile state that threatened its existence.

Colonial Era Native Peoples

There were obviously already people living in what the settlers would call Rhodesia. The native black Africans were one of the driving forces for white settlers banding together. How though did these few settlers force their ideology on the natives, survive at least three uprisings in the early years of Rhodesia, and establish a white ruling society? What were the cultural marker differences that allowed this to happen?

Obviously, there were rich points between the settlers and the natives. These rich points include cultural markers like race, religion, language, region, political structure, social structure, and economic structure. That explains the differences between settlers and natives, but does not address why an overwhelming number of natives could not overthrow the settlers.

The native people were not just different from the settlers, but from each other being divided into a tribal and clan society. This same type of society has been defeated in other places, most notably the Scottish clans and the Native American tribes. It is worthwhile too look at the patterned variations that seem to be the relevant factors of a native peoples' inability to overcome settlement. The two main groups in Rhodesia during the colonization period were the Shona and the Ndebele tribes. The two tribes have many rich points both between themselves and within themselves. In actuality, the use of the term tribe may be a misnomer. There is at least one study that suggests that the early missionaries, in an attempt to identify a common language in specific areas, may have inadvertently invented a European understanding of the tribes in a way that did not actually exist in precolonial Africa.

The Shona, who had been in the region for centuries, were more of a loose conglomeration of independent tribes that all spoke some variant of the same language. Early "Europeans failed to understand or appreciate the existing political and state structures of the numerous Shona chiefdoms... they also failed to understand that an incohesive collection of internally strong chieftaincies could exist within a common language and culture with each and every one of them retaining its political independence" (Chimhundu, p. 88). This loose confederacy of chieftaincies easily lends itself to rich points and internal culture clashes. These internal clashes made the Shona susceptible to invaders. The predominant Shona speaking group in the region that would become Rhodesia were the Kalanga.

Another cultural marker that this confederacy of tribes shared was religion. The Shona belief system was built on ancestor worship as well as beliefs in spirits throughout the world and religious life was dominated by the Mwari cult. The Mwari spoke to a priest or "Mambo" through everyday objects and the mambo advised the head of the Changamire Rozvi dynasty. The rich points come in the political and economic areas of the Shona life. The Zambezian southwestern plateau, inhabited by the Kalanga, had a dry climate that made cattle herding profitable for the Kalanga. The Changamire Rozvi dynasty mined gold in the area for trade with Portuguese traders on the Zambezi river outposts. Cattle herding and gold mining were the two main areas that had established an economy for the Changamire Rozvi dynasty. Other chieftaincies in the dynasty, while not being in the cattle herding and mining areas, controlled key access routes to the Zambezi river. Region, which dictated where a chiefdom was in the economic ladder of the Shona dynasty, was dominant in a chiefdoms cultural markers. Each chiefdom quite possibly wanted more of what other chiefdoms had. Even though the Changamire Rozvi were the ruling group each chiefdom retained its own internal political system. This is another area that caused rich points. Each Chief needed his people to believe that he was in control and powerful enough to protect his people's interests. This need to exert some level of dominance led to in fighting among the chiefdoms and the Changamire Rozvi state had become weakened due to internal politics. Drought and civil wars between local chieftains and even divisions in the Rozvi royal line of succession led to infighting. Additional conflict between the Rozvi dynasty and the Mwari cult further weakened the Changamire Rozvi state.

The dynamic cultural markers that made up the loose confederation of Shona tribes are not only what gave them their power but also what ultimately caused their defeat. Again, there is a dominant regional identity. This time it belongs to each small chiefdom rather than to the entire society. Each of

these smaller chiefdom identities were in a constant state of volatility. At any given time, a chiefdom could be taken over and cease to exist. This caused the clash of internal cultures for the Shona. Inside of just this one section of the Rhodesian problem we see the conflict created by rich points and how cultures within a civilization can clash. Robert Greene Sands sums it up in "Clash of Cultures";

consider just how intricate and messy the relations are between families and lineages, between villages, between communities and essentially everywhere. Now consider the various identities that form around ethnic and tribal affiliations, history, and yes, even religion. They are not mutually exclusive, but are drivers of behavior when engaged, such as when these identities interface with kinship. Then consider the various mechanisms of social control that define local behavior, and consider how family, religion and gender, for example, also are factored into social control. This is just a start to trying to untangle and tease out the meaning of culture groups; not touched were notions of conflict, honor, shame, a sense of what is family, and myriad other elements" (Sands, p.27).

The Shona, according to the British South Africa Company, were not even the dominant tribe in Rhodesia at the time. This claim that the Shona were not the ruling tribe was the basis for Cecil Rhodes' claim to more territory.

The Ndebele, of Nguni origin arrived during the mfecane (migration). The Ndebele believed that their military prowess would give them the advantage over non-Nguni people to the north (the Shona) and allow them to establish their own kingdom. The Ndebele were a militarized people and their entire society was built around the organization and structure of its military regiments. Their route to escape Shaka Zulu and establish their own kingdom helped define who they were, "Like the early white settlers in America, Canada, South Africa, and Rhodesia, they were forced to cope with

problems of migration, conquest, settlement, and rapid incorporation and assimilation of indigenous peoples. Also, like the settlers, the Ndebele had to restructure some of the institutions of their parent Zulu culture to meet the challenges of their new environment. As a fragment people, they had to institute new formulae for self-identity, self-determination, and nationalism. (Chanaiwa, p 49)" They settled into the western territory and began to grow and consolidate their power by developing economic trade with different chiefdoms in the Changamire Rozvi dynasty. Using these trade relations, the Ndebele began exploiting the Changamire Rozvi dynasty's divisions and weakened rule. The Ndebele did raid Shona villages, but accounts from Kalanga people suggest that they were not as ruthless as previous Nguni raiders and were more interested in grain. As the Kalanga began to pay tribute in grains, raiding grew less. Unfortunately, the Ndebele needed people to help support their raids and work their lands. The Ndebele would trade cattle with Shona tribes in the still Rozvi dynasty dominated areas in exchange for young men. This built a deep seated resentment of the Ndebele by the Shona tribes. The Ndebele at this time were also going through a struggle with the line of succession.

The tribal differences, all bear the cultural markers of religion, region, generations, and language and seemed to be insurmountable in the terms of the components of interaction. The differences not only between themselves but within themselves are what kept any of the early rebellions from really gaining momentum. The Shona, who had been subjugated by several different dynasties, were more comfortable with "going with the flow" until the time suited them. This is not to say that they were completely passive. They did resist and fight the Ndebele at times and even conducted raids of their own but "the Shona tribal system lacked the vigour of the Ndebele, due to there being no central authority...If a chief were of strong character, intent upon improving and maintaining discipline, he would most likely have been forsaken by

those of his people who desired a more congenial life" (Kaarsholm, p.251). The tribal systems were different. The Ndebele were able to integrate captured or given in tribute people into their military as part of their caste system as well as incorporate elements of the Mwari cult into their own religion, but this was not enough to bridge the tribal gaps. Here again we see that the Ndebele dominant cultural marker was that of being Ndebele. This was also a very volatile cultural marker. Whether it was in danger from Shaka Zulu or the Changamire Rozvi empire of the Shona, the dominant marker of identity being extremely volatile lead to culture clashes.

These differences were exploited by the British South Africa Company, which used the excuse of defending the Shona people from the Ndebele raiders to "secure" cattle and crops from Ndebele tribes in order to pay their taxes. In 1893 during the first uprising, differences of opinion between Ndebele military commanders, and the British use of maxim machine guns, led to defeat and the ultimate breaking of Ndebele power and the end of the First Matabele war. Much like the Ndebele used differences in the weakening Rozvi dynasty to eventually establish dominance in the area, the settler government exploited the rich points of cultural marker differences keeping the native people from being able to find cultural patterned variations against the settlers and integrate those into a coherent anti-settler identity that could be used to mobilize the masses.

Rich points abound throughout the early history of Rhodesia. Whether it is internal to the settlers or a specific native tribe, between settlers and native tribes, or between the settlers and outside governments there were more differences than can be highlighted in a short time frame. The key to Rhodesia being formed differently than many other British colonies was the settler's ability to identify rich points and patterned variations. They most likely did not sit down and analyze the situation in cultural terms but the newly forming government highlighted the variations of

outsiders to help create a sense of Rhodesian identity that led them to quickly integrate and assume power.

Universal Truth

There seems to be a key link in all of the cultures that created the Rhodesian problem. That key link is between the hegemony and volatility components of interaction for cultural markers. When the dominant cultural marker is threatened with extinction it forces action from the culture to preserve its identity. The struggle mentality seems to be driven from this volatility and those who can key in on that struggle can have the greatest impact by creating an identity and mobilizing those associated with that identity. It would seem that fear is a much stronger cultural motivator than trust. The Shona tribes, with their loose confederation, were more fearful of losing each individual chiefdoms identity rather than consolidating and creating a single Shona identity. The Ndebele and the white settlers both had a struggle mentality born from forging through unknown lands with hostile people and establishing their own unique kingdom or colony. What seems to be a universal truth is that if the dominant cultural marker is based on regional identity and is threatened with radical change, there is no other real option outside of the mobilization of those who share that culture to clash with the culture or cultures that it perceives as the threat.

Syria and Modern Application

The Shona, Ndebele, and white settlers all had cultures clashing not only within themselves, but with their parent culture, and against each other. How can we apply the issues of these three distinct groups that fought within themselves, against each other, and against outside influences to modern globalization issues? The first that comes to mind is the unrest in the Middle East. Syria is deep in a civil war with multiple factions vying for control. At least one of the rebel groups is al-Qaida backed, multiple others are backed by the coalition forces. The Assad regime is backed by Russia and Iran, the Kurds are seeking autonomy, and in the middle of it all is the Islamic State of

Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This was clearly a Nation State that has devolved. Nowhere in this conflict can Huntington's Islam vs the West or his "Clash of Civilizations" be seen. This is clearly more relatable to Robert Greene Sands "Clash of Cultures." Likewise, the actors in the Syrian conflict match up nicely to the Rhodesian model, where multiple cultures were clashing.

The rebel factions and the Kurds are very similar to the Shona of the Changamire Rozvi dynasty. They are a loose confederation of resistance, each with their own leaders and agendas. These agendas all have specific regional impacts for post conflict. Much like the Shona, shifting allegiances and in fighting have kept them from putting together a cohesive sustainable fighting force. The same hegemonic cultural marker of region is extremely volatile for all of these groups so they seek to bolster their own regional security out of fear for losing control of their regional identity.

The Assad regime can be likened to the Ndebele. The Assad family belongs to the Alawite sect, a secretive sect of Shia Islam. The rest of Syria is predominantly Sunni with some Christian pockets throughout the country. Here we have the first rich point with the rebels and Kurds. Being Alawite is a dominant cultural marker for this group much like being Ndebele was a dominant cultural marker. After WWI (when Syria was under the French Mandate), the Alawites formed a majority of the military. The French recruited them to keep the balance from the Sunni majority who they feared would rise up against them. After Syrian independence and multiple coups that both installed and deposed Ba'athist leadership, Hafez Al-Assad, an Alawite and Air Force General, gained power in 1970. Like the Ndebele, this was a society that based its power on military dominance. Both were formerly under control of another powerful leader, both sought to be the leaders of their own kingdoms and made moves to become so. The Alawites have the same rich points with the rebels that the Ndebele have with the Shona. In the end,

fear of losing control of the land and fear of losing their identity is why the Alawites continue to use their military power to forcefully keep the majority of the population subjugated.

ISIS, which has taken over much of the Euphrates River Valley is the Rhodesian colonial settlers of the Syrian conflict. ISIS, much like the pioneers, have laid claim to the territory they now own by negotiating deals with local tribes and then using those claims to expand its territory rapidly. ISIS was initially established by al-Qaida in Iraq, and was subordinate to the overall heads of al-Qaida. This is very much like the Rhodesian colonists, who were part of the British South Africa Company, who were acting on behalf of the British government. Both groups solidified their own identity through the shared struggle of its members. The only major difference between the two groups is that the colonialists centered their identity around race and ISIS centers its identity around religion. Both groups enacted laws in their respective regions to maintain their identity and dominance. Again, we see the pattern where the most dominant cultural marker is also the most volatile.

The current Syrian civil war seems to be nearly a reenactment of the Rhodesian Bush wars. As more and more international involvement takes place in the means of sanctions, arming and training, and direct military assistance it is only a matter of time before Syria collapses much like Rhodesia did. If Syria plays out the same way as Rhodesia, ISIS will be defeated and will cease to exist much like the UDI government. The Assad regime will no longer be in power and the minority Alawites will be marginalized in the new government. And finally, a leader from the rebel factions, someone who will be seen as the primary figure in unifying the rebel factions, will emerge as the head of a new Syrian government. Most likely this unification will be through coercion and force much like the rebel factions of Rhodesia were. Should events transpire this way, the best that can be hoped for is that

this new leader does not enact a cold war era, communist style dictatorship like the one Robert Mugabe has in place in Zimbabwe.

Conclusion

The rise of colonial Rhodesia provides an excellent teaching tool for understanding culture. Using Agar's description of cultural markers, rich points, components of interaction, and looking for patterned variations coupled with Sands' ideas of a "Clash of Culture" there is a universal truth that can be identified and applied throughout history and into modern issues

and conflicts. When a group's regional identity is the hegemonic cultural marker and it is also the most volatile there is inevitably going to be a "Clash of Cultures." These clashes may be negotiations, votes, or violence, but they will be clashes none-the-less. If leaders around the world would keep this in mind when dealing with not only other leaders, but also when talking to those they represent, a concerted effort can be made to keep regional identity as minimally volatile as possible, thereby reducing the possibility for conflict.

REFERENCES

- Agar, M. (2006). Culture: Can you take it anywhere? *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 5(2), Article xx. Retrieved [date] from http://www.ualberta.ca/~iiqm/backissues/5_2/pdf/agar.pdf
- Bonello, J. (2010). The Development of Early Settler Identity in Southern Rhodesia: 1890-1914. *The International Journal Of African Historical Studies*, 43(2), 341-IV.
- Chanaiwa, D. (1976). The Army and Politics in Pre-Industrial Africa: The Ndebele Nation, 1822-1893. *African Studies Review*, 19(2), 49-67.
- Chimhundu, H. (1992). Early Missionaries and the Ethnolinguistic Factor during the 'Invention of Tribalism' in Zimbabwe. *The Journal of African History*, 33(1), 87-109. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/182276>
- Kaarsholm, P. (1997). Inventions, Imaginings, Codifications: Authorising Versions of Ndebele Cultural Tradition. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 23(2), 243-258. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2637620>
- Kroeber, A.L., and Kluckhohn, C. (1952). Culture: A critical review of concepts and definitions. *Harvard University Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology Papers* 47.
- Sands, R. G. (n.d.). The Clash of Cultures. *The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security*, 2(1), summer 2015, 23-31.



Eric Thompson is actively serving in the United States Army as a Civil Affairs specialist and a Special Operations Combat Medic. With over 23 years of service Eric's deployments include Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Jordan, and Qatar. As a Civil Affairs specialist he has conducted Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan, served as the Senior Enlisted Advisor for a Civil Military Support Element in Jordan, and served as a Civil Affairs Planner for the Combined Joint Inter-agency Task Force - Syria. A native of Pekin, Illinois, Eric has called the greater Fort Bragg area home since 1994, where he resides with his wife and children. Moving towards retirement, Eric is not quite sure what the next adventure after the Army will be, but sincerely hopes that there will be rugby involved!