THE JOURNAL OF CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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The Table 7 Edition



FRONT MATTER

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The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security is a publication of the Institute for the Study of Culture and Language (http://iscl.norwich.edu). Located at Norwich University, ISCL strives to promote the theory, doc- trine, and practices foundational to mission success in the human domain through the application of culture and language. One of the Institute's goals is to build and share a comprehensive body of professional knowledge on research, the development of learning programs and application of culture and language considered critical to the future of US military strategy and missions. The ISCL's journal, entitled The Journal of Culture, Language and International Security (JCLIS), will contribute to the ongoing development of that body of knowledge. JCLIS offers an opportunity for a wide audience of interested military and non- military academics, military professionals and operators, students of security concerns and interested colleagues - in an unofficial and unfettered vehicle - to debate and advance the theory and practice of promoting success in a very dynamic and uncertain international environment. JCLIS will be available to ISCL supporters and the wider audience interested in promoting the ad- vancement of culture and language in shaping the 21st century security mission.

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EDITORS' INTRO

THE JOURNAL OF CULTURE, LANGUAGE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

VOLUME 3, SPRING 2016

Welcome to this Spring issue of the Journal of Culture, Language, and International Security (JCLIS)! This issue continues one of the core missions of the Institute for the Study of Culture and Language in emphasizing the relevance of culture as woven into language and security educational programs and training. As our nation moves beyond the wars of the last decade – namely those in Iraq and Afghanistan – and embraces the new status quo of air power, narrow and focused strikes, coalition force reliance and alternative methods of enforcement and engagement, the need for and relevance of cultural knowledge and application of cross-cultural skills for best operational execution has never been greater.

Spring 2016 JCLIS takes a step back from the academic focus of studying culture and language from its various disciplines and looks instead at the extraction of life lessons taught from foreign encounters. Articles featured in this edition annotate multiple personal experiences in adjusting and applying cultural attributes to better completion of their missions.

The motivation for shaping this issue around personal experience narratives emerged from a conversation of language and culture educational experts who shared a table at Catherine Ingold's retirement ceremony. Dr. Ingold, former Director of the National Foreign Language Center, represented the type of evangelist those promoting the incorporation of culture into language programs so desperately need: a voice who supports meaningful language learning that also embraces culture as an important element in holistic language programs. So we dedicate this issue to the utilization and repurposing of experiences from a myriad of language and culture educational optics.

We begin with more background on the dialogue at Ms. Ingold's retirement ceremony with an article by Robert Greene Sands, titled "Table 7," the designated table where this eclectic group sat during this event. Sands walks us through the transitions of language and culture learning over the years, and how DOD has leveraged such in preparing its soldiers for missions and operations. Culture and language learning and successful operations are dependent on theoretically sound pedagogy, but just as critical is the ability to utilize experience to provide and continue learning outside of the education and training programs. Experience is also critical to being able to manage language and culture programs and adapt to changing mission need as well as innovating technology and methods.

Scott McGinnis was at Table 7 that day and writes how his many years of experience in language teaching and his decade of involvement with the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) could relate to the Table 7 metaphor.

Dwight Stephens provides a survey of some historical, cognitive, and cultural features of institutional—particularly government and military—language training, to examine and plot a faster and less effortful trip to proficiency. Stephens' thesis sees cultural and institutional barriers in organizations like the military that play a crucial role in the type and quality of language learning. In part, Stephens believes following recent studies that the pipeline model of western learning may inhibit language proficiency, while conversely, making certain what and when you teach language to students and providing it through identification of patterns can increase learning. Stephens then applies that premise to language learning in the military.

Caleb Slayton brings us his perspective of how US military partnerships can thrive and can fail with Sahelian countries led by dictators. He uses his experience from a 2015 joint military exercise conducted in Chad to mine valuable lessons of the importance of cultural knowledge for a successful outcome.

Our featured student author, Scott Fender, follows suit with a similar set of lessons learned from his Italy-based experiences and how being vested within cultural norms goes well beyond ensuring normal operations. Fender's approach and experience highlight a personal as well as professional intimacy with his social surroundings and cultural symbols that are meaningful for decoding behavior. His

personal ethnography reveals more generally the reliance on knowledge and skills not often part of military learning programs. From Fender's optic, it all begins with a cup of coffee.

Sean Johnson brings us his viewpoints of the importance of discerning behavior through cultural understanding developed over his fourteen year US Army career, which included multiple deployments to Afghanistan. Sean details one of these Eastern Afghanistan deployments from August 2010 – April 2011 and shares his lessons learned about formality, tribal customs, and his experiences in dealing with the Executive Shura of this area.

This Spring 2016 issue concludes with a summary by Robert Greene Sands of a recent workshop focused on the fundamentals of language, region and culture (LRC) learning held at the National Foreign Language Center. The workshop showcased presenters who shared their years of experience in learning delivery and research. This workshop provided an outlet for this experience and enabled the development of a concept, that being LRC. Even though experience is often used to illustrate concept, in this case, experience promoted the development of a concept. Why do we care? Because LRC can be a more meaningful way to approach learning in our efforts to better prepare our military and civilian personnel for overseas effective work.

We hope you find this installment of JCLIS significant. The authors in this issue found culture and language in all its various guises, meaningful and relevant to their missions.

The Editors

Robert Greene Sands

Darby Arakelian

TABLE 7

ROBERT GREENE SANDS

In June 2015, Catherine Ingold, former Director of the National Foreign Language Center (NFLC), retired from a long and storied career in supporting meaningful language learning at various institutions and organizations. NFLC was the last stop in that career.

I had the opportunity to sit at Table 7 at Catherine's retirement ceremony, the last numbered table in the room where Catherine's colleagues and peers sat who were going to say a "few words" about their perspectives on her career and what it meant to the language community. Many of Table 7 occupants had worked with and alongside Catherine for many years. Their remarks painted a picture of Catherine's insight and lasting contributions to language learning but also included a trove of insight and commentary on how language learning had evolved in higher education and in the service of governmental support, through Department of Defense, Department of State, what is now Homeland Security and others. How much knowledge and insight sat around that table, how much personal investment was reflected in those brief but compelling messages of thanks, and how much experience of successful and perhaps at times not so successful programs and directional changes was sitting in those chairs that circled

Table 7? Roughly calculated, those sitting at Table 7 had over 300 years of knowledge of and experience about language learning. The fact that I was at the table as an interloper (an anthropologist no less) spoke volumes of Catherine's embrace of "culture" as an important element in language programs. It also signaled that culture was becoming an integral component of communicating across cultures just as language was an important aspect of interaction and meaning discovery. Make that 300+ years of language and experience and eight years of culture combined with some language experience.

The path of language pedagogy in the DoD and to a lesser extent across the USG leading into the 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (DLTR) was one paved with the traditional intent and methods of teaching and the narrow aperture of populations needs and the utility of language in missions and operations. The professional linguist was the end state of language instruction and language use was primarily one that was driven by intelligence activity. Listening and reading were critical modalities, not so much speaking; cold war languages made up most of instruction at DLI and other learning programs with other languages being worked in. Enter 9/11 and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi language instruction was almost non-existent. DoD engagement was through coalition partners, conflict was counterinsurgency, the people caught in the middle were the currency of success. For a while, nation-building was overtly the goal. Building partnerships were just as critical as killing the enemy, in fact, successful cross-cultural interaction and influence stopped enemies from forming, reducing conflict. Words, deeds, and intercultural skills / knowledge together were mightier than the sword. Indeed, as the title suggests, a transformation of language learning was necessary to meet the emerging array of missions and strategy. Speaking and listening became critical modalities to aid in building partnerships and influencing others. Knowing about the speaker became instrumental in understanding behavior, and understanding the cultural barriers to interaction that resided in all speakers, including the US military and civilian members, important to mission success. Deciphering the social and cultural context was essential to forming lasting relationships. Language, region and culture (LRC) were now all decisive in a majority of endeavors. The use of force does not forge good relationships but understanding, respecting and using cultural awareness does, often with greater rates of success – it is hard to shoot yourself to lasting and meaningful partnerships.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have fallen by the wayside, but the linguistic, social, and cultural skills and knowledge incubated during that time remain integral to sustaining national security. Yet, as we have discussed in past issues and has been cautioned by several respected figures in the language and culture community, maintaining attention to the development and delivery of language, region and culture programs remains vital. Attrition of attention and resources in this essential area has already started and a return to a parochialism within the differing language, region and culture communities mirrors a similar parochialism of requirements across the training landscape; the last to assume importance in training seems to be the first to fall out of favor.

Enter Table 7. Enter the vast amount of experience that was called upon to transform language pedagogy at the turn of the 21st century. Enter the important experience in program management, instruction, feeding the large organizational needs of language (and now region and culture), assessment and more. Enter the incredible richness of experience that could be captured to meet new demands and revise old practices. It is important to mine the many years of language and culture know-how in service personnel before they march into retirement or out of the picture. This experience can be captured in meaningful and useable formats that can be distilled and applied to building current requirements and attaching suitable learning efforts are necessary to keep Table 7 alive.

The US military refers to "lessons learned" as an important piece of shaping future preparedness. Likewise, psychologists refer to critical incidents based on experience of similar intent is important for shaping language, region and culture learning to meet future mission needs. After recently extolling the virtues of a good narrative (I am an anthropologist after all), a colleague told me that we don't need more "good stories and anecdotes, we have hundreds of them" when it comes to LRC learning development. The colleague went on to say we need good theatrical foundations to what we develop and teach. That colleague was partially right; everybody that was deployed over the last decade has stories, but everybody over the last decade doesn't mean those people will be around to continue to tell stories and just as important to engage in experiences that guarantee narrative useful for lessons to aid in building lessons and learning events. More and more the critical mass of experience will leech out of the DoD and all we will be left with are stories of the last decade and continuing stories formed around new missions, where only a few of the Total Force will be engaged in.

Obviously Table 7 is a metaphor. But Table 7 that day was also a real-time incubator where knowledge and experience was offered from those with similar experience over the decades but filtered through different perspective of function, organizational need and intent and personal and professional background. Drop a question of "what should the DoD do to build a better language, LRC, or culture program?" and you can literally see the conversation begin to march forward toward tapping into experience and relating through, that is right, stories. The language and culture community within the DoD, as it is for other agencies and government organizations is small, but on the whole, very passionate about advancing these critical skills. Organic language and culture experience doesn't fade away with retirements, like those at Table 7. It is still there, waiting for opportunities to help create and sustain suitable language and culture programmatic and learning environments. US military and civilians that deployed and served overseas carry a diversity of experience and understanding of how these sets of knowledge and skills work and what happens when they are not engaged critically and successfully. They too march toward the twilight of their careers with knowledge and experience so valuable that a price tag can't be put on it. And we are finding out that many soldiers have much to recount and say about the value of language and culture in missions and operations, and they may still be years away from retirement.

We are to the point that if language and culture learning hasn't been institutionalized, the knowledge and skills will fade away. Capturing experience is critical for the new generation of language and culture managers, designers, developers and instructors that are and will be promoting the value of language and culture to a generation of incoming military and civilian personnel that carries with them little or no DNA of the lessons learned from the long decade of war. On one hand, that is heartening, and signaling a dramatic decrease in battle rhythms and loss of lives and resources. Yet, on the other hand, it portends a race to utilize all of those who sit around Table 7 or are waiting for a seat at the table and their experience and knowledge to help chart an uncertain path of sustainment for what we all know either in our heads or hearts can't be lost.

Capturing voice and experience is just as important and just as transforming. In undergraduate anthropology courses, we were assigned "readers" that would primarily be first person accounts of fieldwork in foreign cultures. Of course that was back in the 1970s. Today, it is probable those readers will also contain fieldwork within and alongside the US borders. When I was at the Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC), Air University, at Maxwell AFB, we started the Cultural Studies Project as a means to collect narratives from the field and then offer it back out as learning aids, like that which was featured in those readers. One would hope there are ongoing efforts in language and culture across the Defense Department to be used in learning programs at the military academies and throughout professional military education institutions.

Military publications and journals offer voice to many military and civilian members to expound on their experience, as does this Journal. Conferences, seminars, and workshops also offer opportunities to present on the kinds of experience that can promote language and culture. I never grow weary of attending meetings and hearing a presenter start with a narrative about their experience with language and culture. I also never tire of listening to those voices – experts with decades of experience leading language or culture programs or teaching in them – as they consider the future of language and culture in the DoD. It may almost seem like evangelizing, but often there is valuable experience and narrative within and at the seams of presentations.

There are several examples of seminars, workshops and cross-organizational LRC planning across the DoD. To better illustrate the value of language, region and culture learning, a workshop on LRC learning was held at National Foreign Language Center on March 2, 2016 (see this issue for its Proceedings). Another such conference/workshop will be held at AFCLC in April 2016. The Defense Language Action Panel (DLAP), the Defense Language Steering Committee (DLSC) and other Service panels, such as the Navy Language Action Panel (NLAP) convene periodically to consider and promote LRC in their organization. The Intelligence Community's Culture Region Knowledge Expert Group (CRKEG) meets monthly to advise and coordinate region and culture learning and programs. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) brings its Command Language Managers together yearly to coordinate learning efforts and understand the state of language and culture learning development. The Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) is perhaps the best

example of bringing LRC together in a monthly meeting where committees, such as assessment, testing, training, and culture meet to discuss advances in their particular focus group and an ILR-wide plenary is presented on topics that advance LRC research, learning, and assessment.

The point of elaborating on these confluences is that the concept of Table 7 should live on in the various avenues of exchange. Programmatic, strategic and operational experience is a terrible thing to waste; it is especially important to capture and mine, not waste, this experience when attention and funding is waning. There are plenty of open seats at Table 7.

About the Author

ROBERT GREENE SANDS



Robert R. Greene Sands, PhD is the Director and Senior Fellow of the Institute for the Study of Culture and Language (ISCL) at Norwich University and President of RGSands, LLC, a full-service culture and language learning provider. Sands teaches in Norwich University's College of Graduate and Continuing Studies and is the founder and editor of the ISCL's online Journal of Culture, Language and International Security (JCLIS). From 2008 to 2011, Dr. Sands was Culture Chair and Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC) and Air University at Maxwell AFB, AL. Sands has supported Defense Intelligence Agency and the US Army, among other DoD organizations, in the development of culture and cross-cultural competence programs across the Department of Defense. He is an accomplished speaker and has presented to many DoD and other security organizations.

Robert Greene Sands is the author of seven books and numerous chapters and articles on topics such as cross-cultural competence, environmental security, building partnerships and sustainability, sport and culture, ethnographic theory, and the cognitive origins of religion. His seventh book (co-authored with Dr. Allison Greene-Sands) is Cross-Cultural Competence for a 21st Century Military Culture: the Flipside of COIN (2014, Lexington Books). Sands' monograph, Assessing SOF LRC Needs will be published by Joint Special Operations University later this spring. Dr. Sands holds a BA from Illinois State University, an MA from Iowa State University and a PhD from University of Illinois, all in anthropology.

A FIVE-CORNERED TABLE REFLECTION

SCOTT MCGINNIS

Among the people with whom I was fortunate enough to share Table 7 was Dick Brecht, who, at various times in my career, has served as a search committee member for my job interview at the University of Maryland, my former boss at the National Foreign Language Center (NFLC), and, for the better part of the last quarter century, a mentor and role model on so many fronts, from linguistic research and pedagogical design to (in the positive sense of this term) family values. But Dick's most important influence on my professional life came in the work that he did in the early 1990s with his colleague at the NFLC, the late Dr. Ron Walton. Coincidentally, the main reason I wanted to come for the job in College Park in the first place was for the opportunity to work with Ron in developing a master's degree program in Chinese that reflected many of the elements of combining language and culture competency with vocational expertise that are at the heart of The Language Flagship model – a program that we were sadly unable to establish due to the early and untimely death of Ron in 1996.

In any event, it was the collaborative work of Dick and Ron that has had an even greater impact on my professional life in helping provide me with a conceptual framework that has shaped my understanding – and equally

important, my **appreciation** – of the implicit infrastructure that underlies our national language capacity. Beginning with a still (in my mind, at least) seminal pair of articles in Volume 532 of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (1994), Dick and Ron outlined four national sectors that served to supply or produce expertise in the Less Commonly Taught Languages (LCTLs).

- **Federal** – e.g., Foreign Service Institute (FSI), Defense Language Institute (DLI)
- **Private** – including proprietary schools, corporate language-training programs, and language services (e.g., AT&T Language Line)
- **Academic** – both traditional classroom-based instruction at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels, as well as non-traditional courses (e.g., extension, self-study, distance learning)
- **Domestic ethnic language preservation** – in the years since Brecht and Walton's original analysis, now more simply dubbed "Heritage," referring to both recent immigrants as well as American-born speakers of languages other than English

Later refinements of the model expanded to include a distinctive fifth sector for overseas components, most commonly referring to study abroad programs, but in the case of some languages, referring as well to governmental and non-governmental organizations and entities (e.g., the Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (NOTCFL), generally referred to as the *Hanban*).

I consider myself extremely fortunate that in the course of my language learning and teaching life of the past nearly four decades, I have had the opportunity to at least interact with – and in most cases, either study or work within – each of these five sectors. For the past 14 years, my position at the Washington Office of Defense Language Institute (DLI-W) has entailed interactions both within the federal sector -- my employer, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) -- and with the private sector, represented by the five commercial schools in northern Virginia and the District with which we contract to provide language instruction for our DLI-W students. Reflecting what seems to be the circular nature of life, it was out in Monterey at DLIFLC that I began my Chinese language learning in 1978.

In contrast, the first quarter-century of my career as either a student or teacher of Chinese was primarily in the academic sector, with two extended periods in an overseas setting on both mainland China and in Taiwan. Additionally, I have frequently worked with or conducted research on the Chinese heritage language sector throughout the United States – and continue to do so today.

I have had as well the remarkable opportunity over the past decade to work with another organization that brings together all five of these sectors for at least several hours ten times a year – the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR). While the ILR initially was constituted as a highly exclusive group limited to employees of United States Government (USG) agencies, departments and institutions, over the past two decades it has evolved into a gathering of representatives (official or otherwise) of the federal, private, academic, heritage and overseas sectors. Additionally, there has developed a quantitative as well as qualitative balance between the USG and non-USG elements of

the ILR. Such a balance is manifested in the presenters at the monthly plenaries; over the past decade, nearly half (and in some cases, over half) of the presenters for a given "ILR year" (i.e., the monthly meetings between September and June) were representatives of non-government organizations (NGOs) or academic institutions, including on at least two occasions community colleges. Over that same span of years, this balance has also been reflected in the membership of the various *ad hoc* committees that have worked to create four new sets of ILR Skill Level Descriptions (SLDs), most recently for Competence in Intercultural Communication (ICC), and proficiency self-assessments for three of the four language modalities (speaking, listening and reading). Of the ten members of the ICC SLDs working committee, four were non-USG personnel. In these and other collaborations, I believe we see in the ILR a more accurate reflection of our national (and international) language capacity than we can see by merely narrowing our focus to the USG.

Accordingly, I believe in that how it can and does bring together representatives of what are arguably very different vocational or avocational "cultures" – from the highly hierarchical worlds of the USG and academe, to the much more arguably atomized or unorganized exemplars from the proprietary and heritage sectors – the ILR can and does provide compelling proof that no single sector can meet our national language needs. Only by working in collaboration, through either formal or informal structural mechanisms, can we meet them.

About the Author

SCOTT MCGINNIS

Dr. Scott McGinnis (Ph.D., Ohio State University, 1990) is the Academic Advisor for the Washington Office of the Defense Language Institute (DLI). He also holds the academic rank of tenured full professor at DLI. Between 1999 and 2003, he served as the first Executive Director of the National Council of Less Commonly Taught Languages at the National Foreign Language Center (NFLC) in College Park, Maryland. In over three decades in the language teaching profession, he has held positions at institutions including the University of Pennsylvania and Middlebury College, and has a decade of experience as supervisor of the Chinese language programs at the University of Oregon and the University of Maryland. Dr. McGinnis has authored or edited five books and over 50 book chapters, journal articles and reviews on language pedagogy and linguistics for the less commonly taught languages (LCTL) in general, and Chinese and Japanese in particular.

Within the LCTL profession, Dr. McGinnis has worked to bring about greater interaction and cooperation among the five principal settings within which LCTL learning and teaching are carried out; namely, academic, government, heritage, proprietary, and overseas. He has twice served as president of the Chinese Language Teachers Association (CLTA), and has regularly been an invited participant for major projects on standards, articulation, teacher training, and materials development sponsored or funded by the Modern Language Association (MLA), the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), and the United States Department of Education (USEd). Dr. McGinnis is the former chair of The College Board Chinese Language Test Development Committee for the Educational Testing Service. His current professional responsibilities include serving as Coordinator for the Interagency Language Roundtable (ILR) for the United States Government.

THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: SOME REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE AND CULTURE INSTRUCTION

DWIGHT STEPHENS

"Funny… I never saw anybody play the game sitting down."

~Yogi Berra, circa 1965, when approached by a salesman wanting to sell the newly invented Nautilus weight machines to the Yankees.

This article is a survey of some historical, cognitive, and cultural features of institutional—particularly government and military—language training, to examine and plot a faster and less effortful trip to proficiency.

A few years ago I supervised an immersion event which was the culminating exercise of an intensive, pre-deployment course in the Dari dialect of Persian. One of the scenarios involved a vehicle stop and checkpoint inspection. We had a number of cars lined up with role-players in them, and the students took turns conducting the checks under the watchful eyes of instructors, Afghan advisors, and the recording crew. As each car came through, each student in turn rattled off the commands in Dari: "Stop the vehicle, turn off the motor, open the hood, get out of the vehicle…" The role-players performed as expected, smooth as clockwork—a perfect immersion.

I watched all this with the uneasy feeling that something was not right. It was too perfect. Everyone was behaving according to the script. I took one of the drivers aside and told him on the next time through to get upset, complain, and not comply with the commands. When his turn came, he rolled up, stopped the car, and the student gave the command

ز موتر پاین شو!

The role player at the wheel began talking in rapid and idiomatic Dari, with a little Pashto thrown in. The student repeated the command. The driver complained louder. Again, same reaction. The soldier's mind raced to comprehend what was happening. *Did I give the right command? Did I mispronounce it? My teacher always understood it when I said it in class. Why isn't he complying? What is he saying? Why is he yelling? What did I do wrong?* After a long internal struggle, he took a step back with his right foot, flexed his knees slightly, raised his weapon about 20 degrees and—with great conviction—shouted the command in Dari. The shocked role-player driver, genuinely taken aback, complied instantly. The cameramen, staff, role-player extras and on-lookers burst into applause. It was a true ah-ha moment: something real had happened. Though the command had been practiced hundreds of times in class—in the soft, studious, and thoughtful tone of voice typical of the classroom—and had always been understood (because classroom behavior is scripted to reach understanding), in the field the "command" had lacked the dimension of conviction, the intonation of authority.

The Problem Restated

Every ten years or so, there is a renewed outcry at the state of foreign language learning in America and the dearth of proficient analysts and speakers of a shifting range of critical languages. Each proclamation is followed by legislative and administrative assignments of manpower and money to the reparation of the problem. Technology leads the charge; machines are enlisted: computers, smart phones, smart boards, games, and simulations. Institutions build new courses, new materials, new textbooks, and new websites. Academics in the teaching profession uncover a theory or method which was forgotten ten or twenty years earlier and re-publish it. Resident experts and new contractors are asked to re-train the staff, and the corps of instructors is subjected to yet another PowerPoint Presentation on the history of second-language acquisition methods (Grammar-Translation, Natural, Audio-lingual, Total Physical Response, Suggestopedia, Silent Method, Communicative, etc.). Every government contract and every instructor's résumé proclaims: "communicative approach, task-based, learner-centric." Finally, in a kind of bureaucratic desperation, the assessment standards are raised. But because culture rules, the local teaching practice of each institution adheres to the anecdotal, community-approved, tried-and-true, "way we do it here," and the rhythmic regularity of the language crises continues.

Why is second language learning so hard for adults? The usual reasons cited are that the window of relatively effortless language acquisition is assumed to close after adolescence (Pinker, 1994). General brain plasticity is thought to decrease with age (Rakic, 2002). Some are assumed to have inherited a terminal inability to learn foreign languages. Even among those who can learn, motivation—beyond the professional incentives of pay, promotion, and team respect—may be lacking. There may be a cultural stigma or taboo connected to the particular language, its culture, its clothing, and its gestures. Finally, even those students who are able and willing to learn may not have good study habits or accurate information about how to learn, and who among our administrators and teachers has the ability to help them?

My thesis is that our own cultural and institutional climates play a crucial role in what our students can learn and who they can become. Our institutionalized culture—the way it determines our perception of the world, our group, and its members—may be more responsible for our training results than are the imagined and projected limitations of our students. Assuming that culture is responsible for most of the mental furniture and interior decorating of individual minds, let's look at the historical background of military language instruction for clues about its development.

American military training is widely considered the best in the world. A glance at the principles of training outlined in FM 25-100 (Training the Force, 1988) shows why:

1. TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT. Demand realism in training. Seize every opportunity to move soldiers out of the classroom into the field.

2. USE PERFORMANCE ORIENTED TRAINING. Units become proficient in the performance of critical tasks and missions by practicing the tasks and missions. Soldiers learn best by doing, using a hands-on approach. All training assets and resources, to include simulators, simulations, and training devices, must be included in the strategy.

3. TRAIN TO CHALLENGE. Tough, realistic, and intellectually and physically challenging training. Challenging training inspires excellence by fostering initiative, enthusiasm, and eagerness to learn.

The *Training the Force* Field Manual put the emphasis on skill acquisition rather than on knowledge. A quick tour of our language classrooms shows to what extent its training principles are observed. How often do our language students get out of the classroom and into the field? When do students have contact with speakers other than their instructor? In what respects do classrooms replicate the environments in which our students will be using their languages? How do the lessons and activities challenge and evoke a desire to survive and win? How often do students practice language tasks sitting in a chair looking at a textbook rather than in situations and physical environments which actually reproduce the authenticity, the emotion, and the urgency of mission situations?

The Academic Model of Learning – the Pipeline

The military inherited its approach to language instruction from secondary and higher education schools and colleges. Academic culture has served—and still serves—as the principal model for how learning should take place, how teaching should be conducted, how courses should be designed, how textbooks should be written, what the physical layout of a classroom should be, what the relationship between the instructor and the student should be, and what form assessment should take. What follows is a sweeping inventory of some pedagogical stances produced by that culture.

The main feature of Western scholastic culture adopted into military language training is the *transmission fallacy*, the assumption that knowledge is like a material substance—a 'body of knowledge', a 'subject matter'—which can be exported by one person, delivered, and deposited into another person. This implies a host vessel (a brain), a delivery vehicle, which presumably must be language, and a reception vessel (a second brain). It implies a particular physical structure

created in one brain which will somehow retain its form in space as it travels between brains and arrives in the second brain intact and identical to its departure state. Brains don't work like this, and foreign language learning cannot work like this. What has taken a native speaker considerable time and effort to construct cannot be transferred as a commodity to a learner, no more than one can learn to play the violin by going to concerts. Still, this is why most school classrooms have a podium at the front facing rows of seats, and why students are expected to learn sitting down.

A number of our institutionalized learning practices and the organization of those institutions flow logically from the transmission assumption. The first is the *pipeline*, the curricular model of most schools. According to this model, we acquire knowledge as if it were delivered piece by piece. A student takes one subject after another, one course after another, and at the end of the process the graduate emerges from the pipe as a finished product—an integrated being. At the end of the Special Forces Qualification Course pipeline, for example, what is supposed to emerge is the Whole Man, the full and organic integration of core military and technical skills, tactical combat skills, Military Occupational Specialty training, language, regional expertise, cultural competence, and Unconventional Warfare practicum (Robin Sage). The pipeline is an example of serial processing. The problem with serial processing is that items which are learned in segmented sequence do not integrate at the end of the tube. The pieces don't magically fuse into a whole. Remember our Dari student at the vehicle checkpoint. His command, learned in the classroom context, had not fused with the other elements needed to make it effective. It did not have the quality, the character, the authority, or the conviction of a command. The student's military skills were intact; his language skills were intact; but, the final product was fractured. In the pipeline model, the immersion experience tacked onto the end of the learning series is intended to integrate all the skills, but it cannot fuse all the required components. The immersion experience must be an integral part of *every* training session. Integrated learning occurs by parallel processing, where each element of the desired outcome is present at the time of learning and is integrated in an organic structure, where all the parts connect.

Thinking of linguistic knowledge as some kind of substance which can be analyzed and packaged for transmission produces a preoccupation with the *formal, structural features* of language (vocabulary, grammar, and syntax). The analytical approach is appealing to both teachers and learners for several reasons: a) it seems scientific, b) it gives the teacher presence on stage as a Subject Matter Expert, c) it's easier for both the teacher and the student. The focus on form instead of content results in a predominant use of metalanguage—descriptive theoretical talk *about* the language—instead of language use in real communication. The academic classroom is scripted: the questions, the responses, the lesson plan, the relations, the reactions of the instructor, all predictable. Real life lies at that critical juncture where the script is violated. In our classrooms we tend to strip down the perceptual bandwidth of real life —dumb it down, if you will—to the formal study of grammar, and disregard the critical intelligence riding on other frequencies, embedded in human behavior.

Communication is a domain much larger than language. The ability to decode signals of personal space, gaze, facial expressions, body

language, gestures, and ritualistic behavior is critical to grasping the meanings and guessing the intentions of others. The ability to produce the coded passwords of a culture is critical to understanding and acceptance. The pipeline curricular model allows us to assume that language might be studied separately from culture, or that culture might be studied separately from language and tacked on in a separate five-week course in English. The product is a speaker who can make sounds, but who may not be believed, trusted, or obeyed, one whose eyes and body don't say the same thing as his words.

Another corollary of the transmission fallacy and the preoccupation with metalanguage is the tendency to favor *explicit* instruction to the neglect of *implicit* process development—i.e., talking about the process rather than allowing time and practice for its internalization as a procedural, neuro-motor skill. The result is declarative knowledge, rather than procedural knowledge.

The archival of explicit theoretical knowledge in libraries has led to a reliance on written text as the principal model of instruction. Despite the historical and evolutionary priority of spoken language, in recent human history written text has become our civilization's default standard medium of transfer, medium of storage, means of study, and memorization tool, the neglect of phonology. The prioritization of reading has in turn favored the development of textbooks and learning materials based on written text, which themselves become the default methodology, closing the circle and reinforcing the emphasis on the formal aspects of language.

At the university, the transmission of theoretical knowledge *via* a pipeline is epitomized by the institutionalization of the formal degree as a certification of teaching ability. Other than the degree, there is generally no formal training for university faculty in how to teach, no training in educational psychology or cognitive science, and no training in learning theory, teaching practice, or classroom and course management. The transmission fallacy would have us think that in order to be a teacher, one needs merely to have acquired the subject matter, and all that remains is to transfer it.

In the absence of training for teachers in the psychology of learning, our materials become our method. Although Programs of Instruction (POI) outline the scope and sequence of the progression to an envisaged proficiency, materials at the lesson-plan level are produced by instructors who are often untrained in principles of learning. Many are left to their own devices regarding method, and the default for them is the one by which they themselves studied language in school, namely, lectures on grammar. Written textbooks continue the trend of modeling by written text and perpetuate the pipeline paradigm of development.

New technologies employ the transmission idea and change only the media of delivery. PowerPoint is just a way of distributing colored handouts. Video instruction produces more lecturers who are reduced to talking heads. Electronic flash cards are flash cards. Most of the benefits of technology relate to artificial storage and rapid delivery. There is also a tendency for new technologies to follow the cultural precedent of pushing written text as the standard medium of study. This has led to PowerPoints crammed with as many words

("knowledge, facts") as possible, and little audio. True to our mechanistic, assembly line conception of learning, this is the technological tail (i.e., the market) wagging the pedagogical dog. The new programs don't necessarily concord with the brain's natural and most efficient way of learning; they do not enhance the brain's capacity to construct patterns. The assembly line, mechanistic, model of education—the cultural icon of Western philosophy—neglects information about how the brain works.

Neural Aspects of Learning – Constructivism

The elephant in the room, the uninvited and unacknowledged guest, that large gray matter in the classroom which is often ignored and seldom utilized to its fullest potential, is the human brain. Cognitive science and its growing body of research are beginning to provide a rational framework for the conduct of learning activities, and the practical application of these discoveries in classrooms is overturning some scholastic misconceptions based on Western cultural traditions. Learning does not happen by some kind of transmission, but rather in the multi-staged process of an individual's private construction of mental patterns, i.e., brain pathways. In the case of foreign language learning, these pathways include complex neuro-motor activities and diverse dimensions of perception, coordinated from different brain regions, which must be integrated into the skill. The integration, coordination, and construction of these patterns cannot happen through transferal.

The image to the right is famous in the literature of psychology. Look at the black and white spots and see if you can identify something you recognize.

Hundreds of thousands of people have viewed this image (Carraher & Thurston, 1966). Those who are familiar with Dalmatian dogs see the Dalmatian; those who are not do not. This is famously called an optical illusion. It is not an optical illusion; it does not show you a false reality. It shows you exactly what you have in your brain. If you have a pattern in your brain for this arrangement of dots, you will "see" a Dalmatian; if you don't, you won't. What this says about the brain and learning is this:

1. *The dog is not in the picture; the dog is in the brain.*
2. *You can only perceive that for which you have a pre-existing pattern in the brain.*

3. *You cannot transmit the dog, the perception of the dog, or the knowledge of the dog, by showing the picture. The learner must first construct the brain pattern for the dog; then he will see it.*

Nothing can be transmitted. What can happen as a result of external stimulus is that certain pre-existing brain patterns and pathways can be stimulated to fire. Then they can be gradually edited and altered. Nor can we give a student a completed pattern or structure. We give him pieces and he constructs the patterns himself or adapts his existing patterns to the new parts. Imagine that we wanted to teach a native of Africa what a Dalmatian was, would this picture be a good model? Walk out into the night with your child, point at the sky and say "There's Cassiopeia." She will say "Where?" The stars in the bright night sky are not pre-organized into constellations. Knowledge about patterns such as Dalmatians and constellations cannot be transmitted.

If learning is then, as we contend, a process of construction, it follows that the choice of the pieces which we give to the student, and the order in which we give them, matters. As Hammerly (1986) economically puts it, "Since a structured learning task is easier to accomplish than an unstructured one, careful structuring of second-language input can give the second-language learner a marked advantage over acquisitional situations." "The order in which material is presented can strongly influence what is learned, how fast performance increases, and sometimes even whether the material is learned at all." (Ritter, 2007) Pattern formation in the brain requires sequencing presentations in class which will permit the construction of patterns at successively higher mental levels. Note, however, that the sequencing which we are discussing here is not the sequencing of tasks and topics, but the sequencing of the *presentation of the smallest units required for the building of structures at the given level*.

The pipeline model gives the illusion of learning as being a trip from point A to point B—from page 1 to page 100—which can be covered in a straight line. In fact, the journey is circuitous; it is more like the movement of a Labrador Retriever on a walk through the woods. There is a constant circling back to make eye contact with the hunter, a constant review and update, a constant revision and refinement of the patterns under construction. The pipeline concept gives the wrong impression that a given topic is engaged, learned, and then filed away. What is filed away is often incomplete and unconnected to all the other pieces of the context. The A-to-B, point-to-point, illusion of the pipeline also creates an unreasonably fast pace for the student, reinforcing his tendency to memorize without full assimilation. The pace creates cognitive overload, which necessitates the stripping down of the material to a form more familiar to the learner's brain, a form which can be recognized, a form which can be remembered. Memorization without the acquisition of deep procedural knowledge leaves the learner with an internalized representation of the other linguistic world which is flat and unidimensional, and the student is left with no conceptual infrastructure for rising to the higher levels or acquiring new dimensions.

We usually put assessments at the ends of our pipelines. When a student or teacher looks through the pipeline tube and sees a critical final assessment, then the pipeline becomes a telescope which creates an object fixation: the assessment becomes the goal. On day one, students arrive in language class and learn that their final assessment

will be an OPI. On day two, they learn that the principal topics of the OPI, taken in series, will be Family, Occupation, Recreation, Travel, and Education. On day three they begin memorizing. This is, as Alfie Cohn (2004) put it, the tail of assessment wagging the educational dog. The pipeline curriculum is a serial process. Our books have numbered pages, which we turn one by one to get to the end, and the successive turning of the pages becomes the process. The linear sequence of the grammatical topics and situations means that they are rarely revisited at higher or deeper levels, leaving the student in a unidimensional world where patterns cannot develop in vertical complexity.

The brain constructs knowledge, however, via parallel processing, which coordinates and integrates all relevant contextual units into an organic structure. Connections are formed and relationships are made among many elements which are all going on at the same time, and they are combined into a whole pattern. The technical formulation of this is called Hebb's Synapse (Hebb, 1949): "When an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and repeatedly or persistently takes part in firing it, some growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells such that A's efficiency, as one of the cells firing B, is increased." The brain's ability to learn—its ability to coordinate, recognize, create, reproduce, store, and modify patterns—is due to the fact that connections between neurons are strengthened when they are simultaneously activated, often summarized as *neurons that fire together wire together.* Hebb's principle means that elements which are clear and present in the learning exercise may be incorporated into the resulting pattern (knowledge, skill, ability). Elements which are not present will not be integrated. The bound elements create a strong pattern, and the pattern itself strengthens each individual element. What this implies for our classes is that anything which we want to be involved in the final skill outcome must be present at the moment of training. This is just what the *Training the Force* manual prescribes. More and more complex structures and processes are gradually formed by the repeated manipulation or assembly of parts in an environment.

The well-intentioned efforts of instructors to get material transferred into students' brains through lectures, grammar, and explicit instruction—as if the students were buckets to be filled—comes from an uncertainty about how knowledge is constructed in the other mind. In the absence of information about how it works, and assuming that something must be *delivered*—that, in fact, *a lot* must be delivered, and delivered *fast*—the instructor must act. The urgency leaves no time for implicit process development, i.e., the gradual internalization, automatization, rendering unconscious, of a given complex procedure, and we settle for explicit knowledge about the language and little implicit, functional, skill. The result is a pile, rather than a structure—a pile of metal parts, instead of a weapon, a heap of bricks, rather than a pyramid. While explicit instruction does serve to organize the learner's practice and structure his study time, the main work of internalizing and rendering automatic his procedural neuro-motor skills is something which must be allowed to become implicit. "Acquiring language is no more than acquiring the ability to process language. There is no separate representation of the abstract structure of the language (e.g., a grammar) distinct from the mechanisms of language production and comprehension; instead there are simply procedures for language processing… Learning to respond to input involves learning a skill, rather than developing a theory." (Chater, McCauley, & Christiansen).

Learning to Function

The functional skills sought by the *Training the Force* manual—moving, shooting, communicating, etc.—must be internalized, unconscious, and automatic. In other words, they must be embedded in procedural memory—often called implicit memory—and not simply declarative or explicit memory, the access to which is slower and requires conscious application. A quick experiment will demonstrate the difficulty of explicit recall. Try counting to twenty by alternating between two languages. This is declarative memory, slow and laborious, because conscious control is required. The development of true skill (automaticity) requires training beyond explicit instruction; it requires the gradual and progressive creation of procedural ability through structured rehearsal. We do apply structured rehearsal when training athletic, shooting, and fighting skills, but in the language classroom such practice has been short-circuited by the transmission tradition.

In sports performance, research on human physiology and psychology is universally accepted and applied at all levels of competition. A gymnast's learning of a complicated new stunt is never entrusted to a classroom lecture. The move is segmented (beginning with the smallest elements), practiced in slow motion segment by segment until mastered at that speed, joined to other segments in slow practice, then accelerated gradually, and finally strung together in sequence until the entire flow is internalized at an automatic, intuitive, procedural level. *Slow is smooth, and smooth is fast*. The gymnast and the war fighter operate in environments which demand what is referred to in psychology as "premature closure." They are required to come up with almost instant correct action—which they usually do at an unconscious level—before hard information is available, before research can be done, before explicit thought and conscious analysis. The ability to do this is the hallmark of the intuitive expert. More time doing explicit learning is not going to produce the intuitive expert; it hampers the internalization of the procedure.

Learning is eminently and intimately a function of memory, its features, its processes, and its limitations. And memory is limited by processing speed. The limitations of short-term memory were defined by Georges Miller (1956), who found that what the learner can retain in the less-than-ten-second period of his working memory is seven units, plus or minus two. Nothing can proceed to long-term memory which has not repeatedly passed through the bottleneck of short-term memory. As the scientists (Chater, McCauley, & Christiansen) put it, "Memory is fleeting: unless information is recoded and/or used rapidly, it is subject to severe interference from an onslaught of new material." As we will see shortly, the brain adapted to handle this deficiency.

First, as an illustration, let's say that a Chinese instructor is giving her Novice Chinese students a new sentence to learn, a sentence with only seven syllables, supposedly within the cognitive range.

皇帝没有穿衣服。

[*huáng dì méi yǒu chuān yī fú*]

This sequence may indeed be only 7 units and well within the grasp of working memory for a native speaker of Chinese. For the learner, however, there are over 21 new units here—counting the tones and foreign phonemes—which are alien to his maternal linguistic system.

In this state of cognitive overload he will strip the sequence down to an amount of information which his brain can handle, removing any features which his native linguistic system finds superfluous or not fitting his English patterns. You can try this for yourself: you will be able to remember and repeat the seven syllables, but without the tones.

Last year, I viewed some field trips taken by some of our soldiers studying Chinese. The students, who were at ILR 2, Advanced-Mid level, were taken to a local Buddhist temple for the day to meet, and chat with, some native speakers. Our students committed a number of sexual gaffes, to the total bewilderment or embarrassed hilarity of the native speakers, by not pronouncing correct tones. For example,

我可以问你吗? Can I ask you a question? [*wǒ kě yǐ wèn nǐ ma*]

我可以吻你吗? Can I kiss you? [*wǒ kě yǐ wěn nǐ ma*]

A gross indiscretion lies in whether the voice pitch rises on the wen syllable. The instructors had always understood what the students were saying because they knew what they were trying to say. The teachers were, in effect, supplying the correct tones in their minds, just as the OPI testers had done when the students were awarded their ILR 2. The total strangers, who did not know the students' intent, were not able to understand much that they said, except by guessing from the context. Why had the students not acquired the correct tones in the first place? Cognitive overload: they had stripped off, in their haste to converse, whatever had seemed irrelevant. The phenomenon is ubiquitous in second-language learning. Consider a short sequence of Russian syllables containing information which to the Anglophone is superfluous and irrelevant: palatalized consonants alternating with non-palatalized ones, tonic stress, vowel reduction, case, etc. The student cannot notice, much less reproduce, these features in a state of cognitive overload.

Chunking

The brain's evolutionary solution to the limitations of short-term memory is chunking. Chunking—possibly the basis of all learning—is essentially the packaging of several units as one patterned structure, which can then be recalled as a *single* unit at the *next higher level* of organization. It's why telephone numbers have area codes set apart, and a dash every two or three digits. Chunking is what makes possible the vertical hierarchy of structural complexity in language, from sound elements at the bottom to abstractions about life at the top. Language construction and comprehension requires a succession of increasingly abstract chunking operations. At each level, the chunking must occur as rapidly as possible and the resulting composite structures passed to higher levels as units to be recombined. Phonemes chunk into syllables, syllables into words, words into phrases, phrases into sentences, enabling meaning and retention by creating hierarchical structure.

In the absence of chunking opportunities, however, the word is taken by default as the principal unit of language, and students try to make sentences by stringing foreign lexical items together in English syntactic patterns. The assumption is still prevalent that if enough words are learned (serial processing), they will eventually become more than their sum and will result in proficiency (magical integration). A frequent complaint of students: "I know lists of

vocabulary words, but I can't make sentences." In the absence of chunking opportunities, the student's only recourse is memorization. Rote memorization will have two implications: first, non-native features will be stripped off; second, the student will encounter a ceiling proficiency barrier—both syntactic and phonological—which he will not be able to pass for lack of sufficiently developed syntactic infrastructure and linguistic categories.

Two things free up working memory for new learning: chunking and procedural memory. Binding structures together in packets and committing sequences to automatic skill opens the bottleneck and frees new workspace. Stanislas Dehaene's recent work (2015) on the cerebral representation of linguistic structures shows that sequences of images, sounds, or words are stored, or coded, at various levels of detail, from sounds and lexical items at the lowest level, all the way up to categories and abstract structures at the highest, in *nested tree structures*. Nested tree structures, which might be thought of as hierarchical chunking, essential to our understanding of language, make possible the architecture of syntax in a language learner; they are what transforms the following horizontal series of lexical items into a vertical hierarchy of structured meaning: *Gifted car factory workers.*

Despite the growing understanding of how the brain makes grammar and syntax by chunking and tree structures, our language classes make only random and desultory use of exercises and activities which would facilitate the process. The primary means of enabling this construction is the now unfashionable structural drill, seldom used and often even forbidden because it is not "task-related."

Another legacy of the scholastic method is modeling with written text, appropriate for some subjects, but not for foreign languages. In many of our initial acquisition courses—even those with avowed priorities of oral proficiency—the initial exposure of students to new vocabulary and structures currently takes place *via* written text. But different perceptual mechanisms have different dashboard capacity: oral patterns and written patterns are learned differently, using different brain systems in different parts of the brain. They are stored differently, activated differently, and retrieved differently. The native instructor is often not aware that the written symbols do not contain or convey the same information to the student as they do to her. This is a mistaken assumption about linguistic level. A literate native speaker of a foreign language may have nearly equal proficiencies in reading and phonological output, but it's not the case for a learner, whose native phonemic patterns and categories provide significant interference to the perception of non-native distinctions and the acquisition of quasi-native pronunciation. The mother-tongue reading process highjacks the operation, turning the written symbols into its own native phonemes rather than into target language phonemes. Modeling with written text "hard-wires" defective pronunciation which may be nearly impossible to correct later. MacWhinney (2009) warns against the danger of written modeling (L1 means native language, L2 the language being learned):

For the adult L2 learner and the older child, the situation is much different. For them, learning begins with massive transfer of L1 articulatory patterns to L2. This transfer is at first successful in the sense that it allows for a reasonable level of communication. However, it is eventually counter-

productive, since it embeds L1 phonology into the emergent L2 lexicon. In effect, the learner treats new words in L2 as if they were composed of strings of L1 articulatory units. This method of learning leads to short term gains at the expense of long-term difficulties in correcting erroneous phonological transfer. Older children acquiring a second language can rely on their greater neuronal flexibility to quickly escape these negative transfer effects. In doing so, they are relying on the same types of adolescent motor abilities that allow adolescents to become proficient acrobats, gymnasts, dancers, and golfers. Adults have a reduced ability to rewire motor productions on this basic level. However, even the most difficult cases of negative transfer in adulthood can be corrected through careful training and rehearsal. To do this, adults must rely on resonance, selective attention, and learning strategies to reinvigorate a motor learning process that runs much more naturally in children and adolescents.

The instructor's recourse to writing is well-intended, but counter-productive: in an attempt to prolong the student's two-second phonological loop of working memory, the teacher deprives him of the phonological development process and anchors his pronunciation on a bad model. Some language courses may have outcome objectives which are focused on reading comprehension and written text recognition, but for courses in which oral proficiency is an outcome objective, written text must be used judiciously and appropriately until the relation between L2 symbol and sound is solidly acquired, and not just at the letter level. When a student can sight-read a sentence of foreign written text with good pronunciation, rhythm, intonation, and inflection, *then and only then* should written text be used to model or reinforce spoken performance. Until the music (the phonological system) has been fully internalized and assimilated, reading and speaking should be carefully quarantined. Macwhinney's work also implies that an initial acquisition language course should be front-loaded with phonology, avoiding the rush to converse, until the music is internalized.

The Social Dimensions of Learning

Humans evolved to be members of groups, mainly for reasons of security. As a group is being formed, there are rules for membership. The rules may involve all kinds of ritual behavior, language, and dress. Once the group is built, it has a social mind. This is what culture is: social mind. Gaining membership in the group requires emulating certain signal behaviors and reproducing certain verbal and non-verbal passwords of loyalty. Protecting the integrity of the group involves being able to detect deception by spotting concealed intentions and simulated loyalties. These communication skills are vital to the success of any mission involving foreign communication. It follows that it is the entire foreign speaker and his community which should be our object of study, rather than the formal structure of the language. On one hand, the development of the student's ability to perceive the entirely different structure and dimensions of that foreign world, its speakers, and its speech, and eventually be able to navigate them successfully, depends on the refinement of his perceptual faculties. He must learn to think differently. As Heuer (1999) puts it,

To see the options faced by foreign leaders as these leaders see them, one must understand their values and assumptions and even their misperceptions and misunderstandings. Without such insight, interpreting foreign leaders' decisions or forecasting future decisions is often nothing more than partially informed speculation. Too frequently, foreign behavior appears "irrational" or

"not in their own best interest." Such conclusions often indicate analysts have projected American values and conceptual frameworks onto the foreign leaders and societies, rather than understanding the logic of the situation as it appears to them.

If he is not exposed to these frequencies in language class (since the intelligence of human behavior is specific to language and region), he will remain culturally autistic. On the other hand, our student has evolved as a social being to emulate other people—to try to detect their motives and intentions, to be liked by them, to fit into their community. Human relations are therefore a deep source of learning power for him, producing greater engagement of all his cognitive and psychological resources. Teaching mere language, a stripped-down version of communication, has therefore two significant repercussions. First, we are leaving the student's perceptual mechanisms undeveloped and we are not allowing the development of an *affective infrastructure* in which the formal language can anchor itself, take root, and grow. Second, considering the learner merely as a vessel to be filled, we are missing most of the power built into him by eons of evolution. Until we are engaging the brain's natural intuitive drive to decode individual motives and social intentions, we are not tapping the full learning power of our students.

Cognition and Personal Development

But thinking differently requires being different. While much of the adult's cognitive platform for second-language learning is different from that of the child's first-language acquisition, some fundamental sociobiological principles apply in both cases: "First, language learning is motivated by basic desires to communicate with, to become similar to, and to belong with valued people in one's environment, first family members and then others in the linguistic community." (Lambert, 1972) "The successful learner of a second language also has to identify with members of another linguistic-cultural group and be willing to take on very subtle aspects of their behavior, including their distinctive style of speech and their language. … Language related issues are at the heart of the social sciences and thus the acquisition of an additional language concerns a very broad spectrum of the learner's personal and social identity." (Dörnyei & Ryan, 2015) Given that this most ancient and powerful human process (social emulation *via* mirror neurons and the construction of an identity) was the principal driving force in the acquisition of the first language, it makes sense to enlist it in the acquisition of the second. Since a self is largely a social construction—the collaborative product of a cultural community—transforming a student into a speaker of a second language, who can understand and be understood by that community, who is trusted by them and taken into their confidence, requires his developing a native *persona*, which is the integration of much more than language. This requires radically different classroom techniques. Furthermore, it is the engagement of the complexity of these unexpected social dimensions which stimulates the brain to adapt to their complexity and drives it to learn.

Although plasticity tends to decrease with age, it does not stop; dynamic, activity-dependent cerebral changes continue throughout life. A well-known study of London taxi drivers (Woollett, 2009) showed that the drivers had greater grey matter volume in a region of the brain known to be essential for memory and navigation. The acquisition of this additional gray matter and skill among the cabbies

did not result from hearing lectures about the streets of London. It resulted from motivated attentiveness and neuro-motor practice.

Furthermore, plastic development is dependent on contextual adaptation to *novel* needs. We may be effectively *defeating* brain plasticity—and limiting our opportunities to harness much valuable learning horsepower—by using rigid and formulaic assessments (both aptitude tests and final exams) which classify our students as capable or incapable, by sticking to traditional and uniform learning methods for all, and by not considering deep and powerful alternative paths suggested by cognitive science which would catalyze plasticity. By a curious kind of circularity, aptitude testing predicts and perpetuates its own validity. In the case of language aptitude testing, as in the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB), the Modern Language Aptitude Test (MLAT), etc., the test conditions are strictly limited to the calculus of formal language (usually in written form) and the mechanisms of unmotivated memorization and correlation, devoid of human context (the assumption being that this will be the learning environment and methodology of the classroom) and without any of the evolutionary social motivations to acquire membership in a cultural community.

Instructors and students who know the scores tend to reproduce the predicted behavior within the given teaching methodology. Different teaching methods, adapted to different learning styles, combined with learning contexts which engage the learner's entire psyche and are oriented to the construction of a native persona, might produce different results for students designated as poor language learners. As Robinson (2013) points out, "1. Learning a language involves different abilities at different stages of development. The MLAT and other current aptitude tests don't measure these. 2. Learning a language takes place in many different situations and classroom contexts. The MLAT and other current aptitude tests are insensitive to these." Dörnyei and Ryan (2015) summarize correctly: "A major lesson for future developments in aptitude assessment is that a pedagogically relevant description of language aptitude needs to be more situationally sensitive, taking into account the specific demands of different learning processes and how they may be overcome by certain combinations of aptitude factors."

All of psychology is founded on the central premise of Individual Differences (ID), which provides the labels and categories for classifying personalities. To see the difficulties inherent in the model, try this fundamental multiple-choice question on Individual Differences:

Every man is, in certain respects,

a) like all other men.
b) like some other men.
c) like no other man.
d) all of the above.

Schumann (2015) warns against some core assumptions made by researchers in psychology: "One is the assumption that truth is found in the study of inter-individual variability among large numbers of subjects. Another is that causal effects are either singular or few in number and that they operate linearly. An additional assumption is that categories and their labels refer to clearly identifiable entities in

the world." Measurement tools tend to become part of the incentive structure of an educational institution. In other words, assessment drives instruction. Until we change the assessment which wags the methodology, we may have to live with the methodology. On the other hand, rather than institutionally enshrining a static set of metrics up front, the evaluation of the learning environment could be empirical, adaptive, and open for agile redesign through reference to study of the brain.

Cognitive research challenges the assumption that there is only a linear, serial-process causal connection between reward and motivation. The brain's reward system evolved to respond to prediction error, to show the learner which of his neural patterns provided the best models of the reality being learned and which of his choices would have the most successful outcome. Reducing a student's prediction error through more careful structuring and sequencing of lesson activities leads to greater reward, hence greater motivation, faster progress, and even better recall. Neuroscientific findings can often pinpoint the source of certain kinds of learning difficulties. This means that they can also, given precise information about the concept or skill to be targeted, prescribe remedial cognitive practice for the faculty which needs to be strengthened. Again, our difficulties in training may not lie in the nature of the brain itself, but rather in the conditions and manner in which we are requiring the brain to work. It's as if we were trying to operate this most powerful and complex structure in the known universe without an owner's manual. Students' brains may be idling in class, using the wrong fuels, the wrong gears, or the motors are off. Sequencing, tuning, and timing the class to the natural proclivities of the brain will turn it on and engage its horsepower. Different tactics may even bypass the false barriers warned by language aptitude assessments. All this requires a more systematic application of cognitive science and learning psychology.

Armchair War and Armchair Learning

Why did the *Training the Force* manual get it (mostly) right, and the academics get it (slightly) wrong? In a word, because our generals have read Sun Tzu (1963). The developmental history of Western thought shows a continual trend to emphasize abstract representational knowledge, i.e., factual information in static models about an external world—an armchair approach to war which was opposed by American generals from the Civil War until the Viet Nam War and then Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's emphasis on hard data, quantification, and computerization. In 1869, William Tecumseh Sherman, then Commanding General of the Army, warned the graduating class at the United States Military Academy against the "insidious and most dangerous mistake" that one could "sit in ease and comfort in his office chair and ... with figures and algebraic symbols, master the great game of war." (Sherman, 1869) Western dualistic philosophy postulates a live individual in a dead world composed of stuff. Eastern thought, by contrast, sees no internal and external worlds—the live individual and the live world are inseparable—and has always emphasized the development of the ability to do something well, which we might call "know-how."

A number of sedentary teaching postures—and causally related teaching outcomes—flow logically from the assumption of the transmission fallacy, because its paradigm focuses most of the importance of a lesson on the material substance to be delivered,

relegating the three crucial participants in the learning process (instructor, student, and administrator) to the respective roles of delivery person, receptacle, and delivery scheduler. The concept of constructivism, upheld by cognitive science, renders all three groups of participants in the learning process equally indispensable, opening the way to the development of an integrated curriculum. Abandonment of the transmission illusion and its preoccupation with material opens to us the fertile, dynamic, and complex human domain where cognitive science and learning psychology can inform learning. It is also probable that the complexity of the area will present opportunities, and even requirements, for the development of more *qualitative*—rather than quantitative—perspectives, measures, and assessments. The quality of what we do relates to important domains which we cannot yet quantify.

Implications and Challenges

This brief survey diagnoses a hereditarily fractured institutional model supported by the usual cultural resistance to change. We may be lacking the systematic and comprehensive (institutionalized) theory of instruction which Bruner refers to—a guidance of curriculum development, materials development, and teacher training based on principles of learning as formulated by educational psychology and cognitive science. The majority of participants in our training process—instructors, students, and administrators—have no background or professional formation in learning; our institutions and contractors do not train them; they have no access to the considerable body of research about how learning works; and they work in relative isolation. Our assessment processes are compartmentalized, too. There is often little or no feedback from assessment results to the people directly involved in the instruction, other than the number score. Bruner (1975) stipulates categorically: "Evaluation can only be of use when there is a full company on board, a full curriculum-building team consisting of the scholar, the curriculum maker, the teacher, the evaluation, and the students… Curriculum evaluation must, to be effective, contribute to a theory of instruction." Finally, learning technologies have the potential to play a role complementary to that of the teacher by assisting the presentation of material and the rehearsal of targeted learning activities, but only when those technologies are guided by cognitive research, and not when they drive the pedagogy by creating their own markets. Neuroscience should inform the development of adaptive technologies for learning. Our language institutions should promote knowledge exchange and collaboration among basic researchers, front-line practitioners and the private sector to critically evaluate the impact and development of new technologies. *Technology should not be wagging pedagogy*.

Military language instruction during the last decades has moved away from the limited presentation of grammar and the formal aspects of language towards more "content-based" and "communicative" courses. The next step is that language training curricula such as LREC (Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture) must move away from a pipeline collection of compartmentalized courses, topics, and activities treating language, regional studies, and culture separately, towards becoming an integrated interdisciplinary curriculum. We must build programs in which all the relevant language proficiencies, military skills, and regional knowledge are integrated, on the model of parallel processing. If functional skill is our real outcome objective and we

intend to assess functional skill at the end of the course, then we should allow the training of functional skill during the course.

It has already become a tired cliché that the current paradigm of war is different. Borders are porous. Fighters wear no uniforms but their ideologies. The identifying features of a foreign fighter are no longer his insignia but his psychological instances and intentions. These are recognizable only to an observer trained in language and culture. Philip Kapusta (2015) recently pointed out that the last time the U.S declared war was 74 years ago. Yet we are constantly engaged in missions falling short of war proclamation but critical enough to send people into danger. This gray zone, he says, is the current norm and probably the norm of the future. Yet our institutions are adapting their instructional cultures to the new paradigm very slowly. Effective operation in the gray zone requires that we train operators—whether linguists, analysts, warriors, or diplomats—in automatic, functional, linguistic skills, in cultural perceptions and human behavior, and in regional content—*all beginning on Day One of Initial Acquisition Language classes*. The learning sciences give us the ability to do this faster and more effectively, but only if we can conceive and build within our institutional cultures an interdisciplinary curriculum based on integrated, functional learning.

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

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MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS IN AFRICA'S CULTURALLY CHALLENGING ENVIRONMENTS

(AVOIDING THE SLOW CREEP TO IMPERIALISM)

CALEB SLAYTON

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense.

The unofficial and yet appropriate SOCAFRICA (Special Operations Command-Africa) motto in the West African environment could easily be, "we'll figure it out." The French have a similar saying, "on se débrouille" which means roughly, "we'll get by". The FLINTLOCK Exercise provides one such case study.[1] Between the December 2014 final planning conference for the FLINTLOCK Exercise and the February 2015 exercise start, the security situation in the region had dramatically shifted. In December, Chad had unrest along its Lake Chad border; in February the nation was at war. In December there was a possibility for eight total FLINTLOCK coalition aircraft on the Chadian military ramp. By 6 February there were zero. On se débrouille. Mid-way through the three-week exercise, austere landing zones were showing signs of wear due to the stress of repeated C-130 sorties; the dried and cracked tarmac began to transition to gravel-filled potholes. Arduous convoys and limited airdrops were the next best options for resupply…"We'll figure it out."

But isn't this the very reason why we exercise in this environment in the first place? Military

1. FLINTLOCK is a Special Operations Command-Africa (SOCAF) exercise with a counterterrorism focus. It is held once a year in West Africa and hosted by a different country, or group of countries, each iteration. The most recent iteration was held in Senegal with roughly 30 participant countries and observers.

exercises and operations need to be just as creative as the populations and informal economies that inhabit the same space. Creativity does not have to break the rules and it certainly need not dishonor or pushover the gracious hosts or regional partners. Any diplomat or operator will tell you, the environment requires a good defense against the political vices that the most heartless of international relations realists consider common operating procedures. Roughly 28 African and non-African nations contribute over 1000 troops to the annual FLINTLOCK Exercise.[2] In 2015, the exercise was held in Chad. All participants were learning the same lessons, experiencing the same successes and worthy challenges. Many more exercises and partnerships will return to Chad, it is worth studying this specific region and building on past experiences. Cultural lessons are sometimes the most difficult to apply.

Chad is unlike any of the other Sahelian countries, which include Senegal, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. Unlike the first three, being 90-95 percent Islamic, Chad's roughly 60 percent Islamic population is balanced by its Christian and Animist counterparts.[3] Chad's official languages include French and Arabic, the latter rarely used outside of religions functions in the rest of the Sahel. Chad had once been invaded by Libya in the 1980s and as recent as 2008 barely escaped a Sudan-sponsored rebel takeover. Today, the Chadian President, Idriss Deby, considers his country fine-tuned to warfare in the unique Sahel environment with significant troop contributions in Mali, the Central Africa Republic, and more recently, Northern Nigeria.

2. In the case of Senegal, the host in 2016, over 2000 personnel participated including the host nation contributions.
3. The Muslim 500: The World's 500 Most Influential Muslims of 2012", The Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Center http://themuslim500.com/ (2013).

Chad's current military might complements its burgeoning international relations influence, being one of the three non-permanent African members in the United Nations Security Council. Chad has one of the highest spending increases on military in Africa, thanks to the nation's oil revenues.[4] Chad has purchased both new ground and air equipment while also attempting to professionalize its ranks. On the development side, tall construction cranes and high rise building shells mark the future locations of ritzy hotels and business investments, if now threatened by low oil prices.

Few in Chad will argue against the security gains that the president has secured for its citizens. But as the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, an African think tank, concludes, when the money runs out, Chad is still fourth from the bottom in good governance measures along with social and economic progress; fourth to last in front of only Somalia, Central Africa Republic and Eritrea.[5] Chad embodies a fragile dichotomy: regional powerhouse and internal powder keg. Idriss Deby must balance his external terrorist threats against his own internal creations of patrimonialism and political anxiety.[6]

So how do you "figure it out" in what is possibly the most dictatorial, fragmented and patrimonial state in the Sahel? You can start with an official letter. If you're haggling your crate out of customs, you need a letter. Requesting an aircraft parking space adjustment, you need a

4. "Defense Spending – Arms and the African" , The Economist http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21633901-continents-armies-are-going-spending-spree-arms-and-african (accessed 20 Feb 2016).
5. "Mo Ibrahim Foundation Data Portal" http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/iiag/data-portal/ (accessed 1 Feb 2016)
6. Nickels, Benjamin P. and Margot Shorey, "Chad: A Precarious Counterterrorism Partner", Combatting Terrorism Center https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/chad-a-precarious-counterterrorism-partner (accessed 20 Feb 2016).

letter. Permission and access to any remotely sensitive area, which equates to much of the capital city, you need a letter. To by-pass dozens of security checkpoints in convoys traversing barely visible sand tracks across the Sahara, you need a letter (or a Chadian military escort).

Not just anyone can sign said letter. Very few commanders, to include military generals and agency directors, have the will or the power to make their letter anything more than a piece of paper. In a dictatorship, the dictator does not like freedom of movement, press or decisions — especially on items of significant military importance. Moving ground-attack Su-25s from one side of the military airport ramp to another is a matter of presidential authority. Just as powerful as a letter is the verbal command from the top. "Move the Su-25s" was Idriss Deby's order, nothing in print, and it was done. The verbal accord only goes as far as the receiving ears and lasts only as long as the next crisis or conflicting verbal order.

So what happens to the self-starters and the middle manager go-getters in this balance-of-power bids and self-preservation? I worked with the civilian airport manager whose job it was to direct the parking scheme of the entire International Airport ramp. He took risks. If the ramp was full and Ethiopian Airlines needed a spot, there was no option but to place it in the VIP area. When two exercise military aircraft showed up with nothing but an empty presidential space to spare, this manager dared to argue his reasoning with the Minister of Aviation. When a system is only barely merit-based, I would hope this rare managerial specimen has a political shield.

But there is more to the story. This is the same airfield manager who a few months earlier relayed to the tower that there was absolutely no overnight parking space for an incoming Russian cargo jet. The manager was caught by surprise when the police questioned him the next day for weapons smuggling and collusion with Boko Haram in Nigeria. Apparently, the Russian cargo plane was carrying sensitive military equipment onboard for a legal customer in Chad. However, due to the congested ramp space the control tower diverted the plane to the nearest airfield for an overnight in Kano, northern Nigeria. The timing could not have been worse. The unexpected Kano aircraft was boarded and suspected of weapons smuggling for the region's most heinous violent group.[7] I do not envy the airport manager's job. Yet he is always smiling. "It's the only way I can make it through the day," he says.

Despite the recent challenges, nothing, I am told, compared to Muamar Qadhafi's visits before his death in 2011. Summits with Qadhafi's entourage were mad frenzies for everyone from airport security to handling services to tower controllers. The dictator could arrive with as many as four large passenger planes shifting flight levels and positions at random before landing. No one was privy to his exact location until all of the aircraft doors were opened, forcing split second red-carpet adjustments. The abnormal flight patterns and air fleet size alone was enough to close the International Airport for safety and congestion reasons. The Chadian presidential guards, from the president's own Zaghawa ethnic group, would be out in force, pausing all human and vehicle traffic for hours.

7. "France says cargo plane detained in Nigeria has no weapons", http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-airplane-idUSKBN0JM1FC20141208 (accessed 20 Feb 2016)

It is all part of the risk when gainfully employed in one of the busiest military and para-military airport hubs in the Sahel. But it helps to be military. In fact, just simply wearing a military uniform with significant rank or a powerful title provides access to places the uniform alone really does not deserve. "No problem," I'm told by the security guard at the immigration bureau, the regional gendarme commander and the Minister of Foreign Affairs gate guard. "Just wear your uniform and you can enter anywhere no problem." There is one important thing to be said for wearing official garb. Whatever one's position, wearing the formal attire of your profession is expected. Especially for the military counterpart, Chadians respond more positively to military uniform than military personnel in civilian business casual which too often sacrifices respect for military anonymity.

One Lieutenant, Air Base head of intelligence and security, had a lot going for him. As he frequently reminded me, "rank doesn't matter; it's your job description." And in his mind, he has the power to preserve or put in peril the career progress of his fellow officers. I watched with a mix of suspense and grimace as he abused his uniform, rank, title and coveted classical Arabic credentials to barge his way into Colonels' and Generals' offices. He beckoned me to follow with an unapologetic boldness that by-passed the long visitor's line in the secretary's office. The Lieutenant was a go-getter with a horrible work ethic. He slept in his office and took what looked like the whole weight of Chad's security challenges on his own shoulders. He's a rare find in more ways than one. "You have to scare people into doing anything around here" he told me. He had his own way of navigating the patrimonial red-tape and stalling tactics.

It's patrimonial, job preservation and realism where every actor realizes his own needs and interests and navigates the social environment to ensure stability, livelihood, maybe promotion and definitely… access. Who you know in the presidential circle is crucial to any decision-making on one's behalf. Chadians boast of access, an uncle, a cousin or a neighbor on the inside. Access is advertised in stories, a picture on your desk or smartphone. It's patrimonialism… but is it corruption? "Of course this is a dictatorship" I am told by the ruling party's friends and opponents alike. Decisions are made at the top and translate to rapid responses at every other level. Depending on your access to the top, this works to your advantage or to your detriment.

The generalization is that corruption runs the Sahel, Chad included. The bureaucratic red-tape, impossible regulations and surprise fees are often the quoted evidence of said corruption. There is a way to navigate through this environment without being an accomplice yourself; the straight and narrow is so finely marked it is hard to know when you've wandered off. Not everyone can carry extra cash to pay off a slippery police officer. High school and University students know this first hand.

As the story goes, Chad had first passed a law forcing all motorcyclists and their passengers to wear helmets some time ago. In a puzzling twist of events, the same government concerned with motorcycle safety was quickly overcome with terrorist conspiracy. Having noted the potential for Boko Haram to hide weapons or IEDs in a helmet, Chad banned the use of helmets overnight. To enforce the summer 2014 law, the police were forcibly ripping the protective head-wear

from motorcyclists who were in full motion. Barely six months later, the IED scare was forgotten and Chad reverted again to the helmet law on the first of March, 2015. As the conspiracy goes, a few government officials monopolized the helmet industry and tripled the price of the helmets.[8]

Students and motorcycle taxi drivers lamented profusely at the "new" law. To enforce the law, police squads stationed themselves around congested traffic circles and in front of school buildings. Those found not wearing helmets were either fined or had their motorcycles confiscated. Within the same day, I witnessed two motorcycle riders, both with passengers, trapped in the middle of bumper-to-bumper traffic. They were easy prey for the police who in less than 15 seconds, had removed the riders and hoisted the bike onto a police truck. Within two weeks of the law, protests massed the street. On one occasion three students were killed along with one policeman.

So that is how you enforce a law in Chad. But one of the greatest challenges to civil-military relations and mutual respect is that the police too often ignore the very law they kill to enforce. The best way to enforce a law is to set the example. Patrimonial corruption and power exceptionalism, the arch nemesis of transparency, is where bribery breeds and thrives. Now it makes more sense to me why Chadians would tell me, "I like the president but not his family." The leader has done well for his people and somehow he keeps the blame on his own tribe and close associates as opposed to himself. As frustrated as this environment is to every outsider, assuming the worst in political and security encounters is not always to your benefit.

8. O'Grady, Siobhan, "Why are Chadian Youth Rioting Over a Motorcycle Helmet Law?", http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/11/why-are-chadian-youth-rioting-over-a-motorcycle-helmet-law/ (accessed 20 Feb 2016)

Rule one: when caught in a political, governmental or security altercation, first ask yourself, "Did I break the rules?" It doesn't matter that the rule was unwritten, unclear or amended anew the day before. The first reaction of offense and indignation in such situations does not help. If you broke the rules, apologize. You may get your camera back, your identity papers returned to you or access to the street you intended to pass through.

Rule two: give yourself time; time to explain, time to cool off, time to exercise humility. The rush technique is possibly the worst negotiation tactic.

Rule three: don't get too comfortable with access you do not deserve. Since rules are written, unwritten and "common law," it is difficult to differentiate between legitimate access by proper escort and illegitimate access gained through a generous escort. Outsiders are frequently shown grace to which they easily take deep advantage. On the other hand, when accustomed to undeserved favor, it's easy to become confused when the rules are put back where they belong and you find yourself on the wrong side of the law.

In addition, decades of "European superiority" have created a tired strain between local Chadians and outsiders. Many locals expect foreigners to be ignorant of local culture and harbor misconceptions themselves. A simple greeting in the local dialect, a smile and personal investment of time surprises the ignorant stereotype and reverses, with exponential opposite results, the negative misconception. Ignorance CAN be used to your advantage. An apology and sincere small talk, which can easily shatter this negative stereotype and generate a

welcome desire to assist the outsider, is sadly not often within Chadian expectations. Ignorance and misconception are usually labeled as weaknesses. But if dealt with in the proper manner in relation to both parties, they can be a strength.

Corruption, misconceptions, perceived laziness, patrimonialism and language barriers are all factors that challenge the morality of any outside investor or potential partner. It doesn't take much to revert to dominating or imperialistic tactics. In fact the temptation at times is overwhelming. A few thousand dollars to the right "chief" provides access to an outside investor. Familiarity to an environment breeds a contempt and ignorance all its own; ignorance to one's own contempt of local processes and culture. Everyone from the "Chinese construction manager" to the "military advisor" to the "technical operator" or "business investor" have at one time or another fought the temptation to grab the trowel, the gun or the iPad and complete the host nation project, military operation or business venture themselves. Impatience takes over and slowly a project meant for "sustainable development" or "long lasting security" becomes yet another short term investment…repeated a thousand times over.

In the Sahel, no one is trying to be an imperialist. The reality on the ground is that every day, would-be partners fight the temptation to ease into more comfortable strategies to capitalize on the complicated cultural environment. For many the temptation is too strong and it beats them. From my own observations, before they know it, their would-be partners accept assistance begrudgingly, whispering in frustrated tones behind their back; both sides slowly digging a trench of miscommunication and crossed-purposes. Access becomes the sole purpose of the outsider while regime preservation takes over as the main motivator for the host. They are the only two motives left to preserve the sensitive union, neither side fully realizing how it came to be. The road to neo-colonialism is slow and crafty.

Governments, aid workers, teachers and businessmen; they all arrive in this Chadian environment with good intentions. Every dictatorship is different. Chad's dictatorship morphs according to the price of oil, the instability along its borders and the proximity to local and international elections, including at the UN. Anyone operating in places like Chad needs more than grace and patience. Short term investments are easy targets of corruption. Military partnerships require long-term investments built on cultural and political acumen that can be found in local language fluency and daily, relational interactions. Without the latter, military engagements can unwittingly, and easily slip in to relationship dead-ends.

SOCAFRICA is doing well in this aspect so far. The temptation to impatience and a do-it-yourself attitude will be constant. But it will always possible to "figure it out" within the boundaries of mutual respect and sustainability.

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Caleb Slayton is an active duty officer in the United States Air Force educating NATO partner forces aligned to Africa on how to engage the political, social and religious environments of the African continent. He completed a Masters with Troy University in International Relations, a Masters in Middle East Security Studies from the Naval Post-Graduate School in Monterey along with a Defense Language Institute Arabic language degree. Maj Slayton writes on African security issues, religious dynamics, and military operational culture.

Caleb's additional background and experience include living ten years in East, West and the Horn of Africa, study immersions to Northern Cameroon and Tunisia and frequent personal travels and deployments to the rest of Africa and the Middle East. Caleb speaks Arabic, French and Portuguese.

THE COFFEE CULTURE OF ITALY: A GUIDE TO PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

SCOTT FENDER

As US DoD conflicts and missions worldwide continue to blur the line between physical borders, the value of properly utilizing human capital and the human domain has become drastically apparent. I have had the privilege of being stationed in Italy for the past two years where the phrase "It's not *what* you know, but *who* you know" has been the foundation of mission success, or failure.

This essay aims to explain the intricacies of Italian culture and the importance and power of the personal relationship through case studies of my own successes and failures. Additionally, this essay serves as a guidebook for navigating cultural interactions in Italy, of which coffee and social outings play a major role. Nothing can be accomplished in Italy if you don't know the right person and *anything* can be achieved if you do as long as you carry the proper *guest* mindset.

Italy has been, and continues to be, one of our most-important international partners in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). With the addition of operational interests in Libya, our daily interactions with Italian personnel will make or break our missions abroad. With both Italian geo-political interests and the very nature of their physical location in the world, very few DoD interests do not include Italy.

When pursing relationship building opportunities with Italians, many different tools are available. Be mindful of the costs associated with each both monetarily and temporally. Each comes with its own advantages and disadvantages. Sometimes much can be earned in a quick, intimate cup of coffee and much can be lost in a full four-course dinner. Italians will generally always appreciate the offer of a cup of coffee regardless of the duration or circumstance and to invite a friend or colleague to your home for dinner is the highest honor.

This paper strives to serve as a guidepost for personnel who will be interacting with Italian nationals in support of any mission abroad as their culture comes with certain peculiarities, the most important being the power of the personal relationship. All of my personal relationships have begun the same way: coffee.

The Merchants of Venice—Coffee Comes to Italy

The discovery of coffee has a rich and storied history based mainly in legend. The first shipments of coffee arrived in Venice along with great stories of its healing effects and ability to invigorate the mind and body. Coffee enjoyed a quiet, grass-roots consumption style through the 16th century relegated namely to street vendors and medicinal use. This drew the ire of the priesthood and became such a problem that Pope Clement VIII (1535-1605) forbade the use of coffee amongst Christians as certain priests denounced it as the invention of Satan. Later, the Pope grew curious of the beverage that had caused such fervor and requested to sample it. He proclaimed that it was "…so delicious that it would be a pity to let the infidels have exclusive use of it. We shall fool Satan by baptizing it, and making it a truly Christian beverage." (Ukers, 1922).

Although the written record suggests that coffee arrived in Italy as early as 1585, the first coffee house does not make a mention in history until 1683, but Italy holds the honor of giving the Western world the first true coffee house (Ukers, 1922). Not long after the introduction of the first coffee house, nearly every shop on the Piazza di San Marco in Venice had become a caffè. Interestingly, the first European adaptation of the word "caffè" retained the double "f" through transliteration from the Arabic (Ukers, 1922). It is still presented this way in modern day Italy, although it is grammatically incorrect in the modern Italian language.

There were a number of celebrated and famous coffee houses much discussed throughout history, most of which were located in Venice and Torino (Turin), and most of which can still be visited today. The coffee house became the "resort of all classes" (Ukers, 1922) hosting merchants, lawyers, workers and wanderers through all hours of the day, and accepting the leisure classes at night including ladies. The first caffès were simple, poorly illuminated rooms, that quickly filled to capacity with "…joyous throngs…and always above the buzz there were to be heard such choice bits of scandal as made worthwile a visit to the coffee house." (Ukers, 1922).

As caffès began to take their hold on Venetian society, they began to play a central role in the social fabric of the community. Aside from acting solely as entertainment, caffès became the social directory of their time. Anytime a new merchant or interested party arrived in Venice, the first stop was generally the famous Caffè Florian (the oldest caffè in Europe and the first open to women, it was the "hunting ground" for Casanova and it is still open today) for a healthy dose of gossip as well as information on the city. Upon departing, merchants would leave cards and itineraries so that friends and colleagues would know when they would be returning.

The caffè still enjoys the same social mooring in present day Italy as it did in Venice and Torino in the 17th and 18th centuries. While every corner now has a bar or a caffè, most residents have a bar they consider their own. It is where they stop every morning for coffee and chat, and where they watch the football games on the weekends. All goings on, necessary information and gossip can still be had at a corner caffè anywhere in Italy.

Today, modern day Italy still reflects its roots in ancient City-States. There are three distinct regions of Italy: the North, comprising Milan, Torino and Venice with Austrian and Germanic influence; the "Mezzogiorno," comprising Tuscany and Rome; and the South, comprising Naples and Sicily. Each region, and in some cases individual towns and villages, infuse their own customs and cultures into coffee, but they all closely resemble each other. For the purpose of this paper, Rome will be the primary focus of observation.

When In Rome, Do as the Romans Do

Often the first thing that one notices when walking the streets of Rome, or any Italian city, are the ubiquitous "Bar" and "Caffè" signs jutting out from every street corner and building as well as the tables and chairs littering the sidewalks of most Italian streets. These are the heart and soul of Italian coffee culture: "il Caffè" and "il Bar".

There are no regulatory differences between a caffè and a bar, but there are a few noticeable dissimilarities and commonalities. A caffè will usually have a full menu of food and drinks available as well as indoor seating to some degree. A bar will generally only serve coffee and a few traditional menu items such as prepared sandwiches with limited indoor seating. Generally, patrons stand at the bar and drink their coffee usually accompanied by a "Cornetto"—a traditional sweet Italian pastry that is a breakfast staple. In the morning, time and space are at a premium and most Italians consume their breakfast in a quick fashion, pay and move on with their day. Caffès are generally reserved for a more leisurely approach. With offering a full menu, the pace is usually quite slowed allowing ample time for socializing and eating.

The coffee itself differs wildly from what is considered the norm in American culture. In Italy, coffee is exactly that: coffee. No syrups, no chocolate sauce, no white chocolate mint mocha Frappuccinos. Coffee, in a cup, served hot. The only acceptable addition to a cup of Italian coffee is milk and sugar, and occasionally alcohol. Nearly every iteration of Italian coffee, each with its own name and appropriate time of day for consumption, contains only milk with sugar to taste added by the drinker after it has been prepared. There are no drive-thrus, no tall, grande or venti brewed coffees either.

Navigating the Coffee Menu
The backbone of Italian coffee culture is the espresso.

There are multiple connotations of a cup of coffee, and with a language barrier, mishaps can ensue. The traditional American "latte" is not available in Italy. A cappuccino is the closest to an American latte: a cup with one shot of espresso filled with steamed milk. This is only acceptable to drink at breakfast or before 11:00 a.m. as Italians believe that drinking it any later will ruin one's digestion for the remainder of the day.

A single espresso is always acceptable regardless of the time and is served in a ceramic demi-tasse cup, and a "doppio" or double is generally acceptable although no self-respecting Roman would be caught ordering one. A mocaccino is a shot of espresso served with a touch of steamed milk topped with chocolate shavings—an acceptable afternoon or early evening drink. A caffè corretto is a shot of espresso "corrected" with a healthy dose of Grappa, a traditional spirit distilled from wine grapes and stems left over after pressing. This is acceptable in the evening after dinner, as well as during the pre-dinner ritual of "Apertivo", light drinks and snacks prior to dinner proper. There are endless combinations of the three main ingredients, and each caffè and bar has its own specialty.

Coffee in Italy is an art. Each bar, and individual barista, takes great pride in their product. There are many variables that can affect the quality of a cup of coffee from the humidity, the temperature and the pressure of the water down to the type of cup the coffee is served in. No governmental regulations exist for the training and hiring of baristas. There are numerous "Barista Colleges", but most individual establishments train their own baristas. As with any cross-cultural experience, it is imperative to remember that you are a guest in someone's establishment and although the drink may not be exactly what you are used to or what you asked for, know that much preparation, tradition and pride goes into the cup set in front of you.

Consumption of coffee is relatively straight-forward, however as with many things in Italian culture, there are some pitfalls. Every cup of coffee is served on a saucer with a spoon if ordered "per qua" or dine-in. Sugar is readily available at the bar and the table, and it is the drinker's responsibility to sugar to taste. The pitfall here is how the sugar is added and stirred. One packet or less and do not stir, the spoon is moved back and forth in a paddling motion at the bottom of the cup. Generally, three sips is an acceptable drinking duration. If ordered "porta via" or "to the street", the coffee is provided in plastic cups with plastic or foil lids, plastic stir sticks and usually a carrier if more than two coffees are ordered. It is not uncommon to see people at all times of the day walking the streets with handfuls of plastic cups covered with foil lids and it is not uncommon to see a waiter from a corner caffè deliver an order of coffee to an office a block or more away.

The Bar and the Caffè: Options on the Economy
There are two distinct differences in ordering coffee when it comes to bars and caffès: "al bar" or "al tavolo". "Al bar" means "at the bar" and the price is different than if one ordered "al tavolo" or "at the table". Every establishment is required by law to provide a written menu showing the prices for both "al bar" and "al tavolo" and there is a

significant difference. The incentive being that it costs more to sit at a table rather than just have a quick coffee at the bar.

When ordering at a bar, there will be a "cassa" somewhere nearby, either attached to the bar or its own separate desk somewhere near the door. The "cassa" or "cash desk" is the cashier. Generally speaking, one stops first at the cassa, places their order, pays and receives a receipt. The next step is to take your place standing at the bar and to place your receipt on the bar for the barista to inspect, usually with some leftover change on top of the receipt as a tip, fifty cents or less is generally acceptable. The barman will then tear your ticket and leave it on the bar returning with your drink. An important aside, it is Italian law that all receipts be kept for purchases made at restaurant/bar establishments. If asked by a member of the "Guardia di Finanza"—essentially the finance police—to produce your receipt and you do not have one, you are liable for a fine, as is the establishment. While challenge and enforcement are rare, the law exists to curtail "off the books" commerce as Italy runs a primarily cash based economy and it is extremely easy to evade taxes this way.

If sitting "al tavolo", generally a server will be present at some point in time. Patrons will pay "coperto" or a cover charge for the privilege of sitting at a table. This covers the cost of linens, silverware and the table itself. Regardless of what is ordered, there will be a charge of one, two or up to four euro just to sit down depending on the establishment—it will be disclosed on the menu. There is one additional key consideration between choosing "al tavolo" or "al bar" besides the cost: time. Dining out is an event in Italy. Often times it encompasses the entire evening; dinner can last three or four hours without much effort on the part of the patron. This is not to be considered "slow service", but it is just another piece of the Italian culture. If pressed for time, choose the bar. If meeting a colleague to forge a relationship, it is always done at the table over coffee or a full three-course dinner.

Paying after a coffee or dinner "al tavolo" is considerably different than what most Americans are used to. You must ask for "il conto" or the check. This is not considered rude, it signifies to the server that you are through with your meal and wish to pay. Unlike establishments in the United States, restaurants and caffès do not seek a high nightly turnover. It is not uncommon for patrons to sit for hours at a table for the cost of a cup of coffee with no complaint from the establishment. One note of caution, Italy is primarily a cash based economy, and while most establishments accept credit cards, it is best to ask beforehand. Also, if you are identified as a tourist, or "American", it is likely that the credit card machine will miraculously break at the very moment you wish to pay. Perseverance generally wins out in this situation. Do not take this personally, the establishment is simply trying to make a few euro from your ignorance. If you show that you are indeed not ignorant, Italians will almost always apologize profusely and respect you standing your ground.

Public to Private: Forging Lasting Relationships

While there are many options for relationship building on the local economy in Italy, there is one additional tool that is not to be overlooked: a private residence. To be invited into someone's home for dinner or a cup of coffee is a sign of utmost respect. If invited for dinner a gift is appropriate, however there are some considerations. Even if you are an avid wine connoisseur and consider yourself an

amateur sommelier, do not bring Italian wine to an Italian's house unless you are absolutely sure it will be well received and it is a good bottle. Italians are very passionate about wine and it is a staple of their culture. They will always know more than you about Italian wine. A safer bet in this instance is a bottle of American wine on a first meeting or small American trinket from your home town or state. It is a great conversation starter and Italians love to talk about America, especially if they have served with the US military abroad or if they have been to the States. Italians love to discuss their experiences involving American culture and almost everyone has a tie to the US of some sort.

The mechanics of a dinner or coffee at the home of an Italian differ slightly than an outing at a restaurant, caffè or bar. Wine will be served along with an "apertivo" of some sort, usually small pizza type snacks, salame and prosciutto. A meal at a home is an all-night event, so pacing is important in both food and alcohol consumption.

The first course will always be a pasta dish of some sort. Usually just noodles of some type and a sauce. Wine will be served again. The second course is usually meat or fish (Italy is a predominately Catholic nation, so fish on Fridays is the norm) and vegetables, again with wine. Dessert is almost always served after the second course, usually a pastry-type dessert, and again with wine. A full three-course Italian dinner can last upwards of four hours at the home of a friend and there will always be plenty of food, with the hosts constantly filling your plate and saying "Mangia, mangia!" or "Eat, eat!"

The meal will end with coffee. Most Italian families do not have a full espresso machine in their kitchen, but with the advancement of coffee technology in single use pod systems, the traditional Italian alternative to the espresso maker—the Moka—has fallen out of favor recently. The moka is a small metal pot that brews espresso on the stovetop. If your hosts have a moka machine, it is likely a treasured possession passed down from their family and regardless of the taste of the coffee, it should be visibly enjoyed. The meal may end with an after dinner drink of grappa or a dessert wine. The host will never ask you to leave, so it is the responsibility of the guest to determine when the dinner is over, usually with much protest from the host to stay longer.

It is appropriate to ask the host about his or her family, work, what your experience in Italy has been like, places you have seen. Be prepared to talk about your family as well. Italians are very family-oriented and love to talk about kids, especially if you have children abroad. A good rule of thumb is to wait until the host begins to talk about business or the reason for the meeting first—and don't be offended if the "business" doesn't arise at all. Be wary of your alcohol consumption. While wine is a cornerstone of Italian culture, drunkenness is not looked upon favorably.

Anytime you engage in relationship building activities, whether on the local economy or especially at someone's house, be engaged. Do not be frustrated if business never arises. The single most important aspect of meeting mission success in Italy is the personal relationship. You might not discuss business at dinner, but the next time you call your colleague or ask a favor—if you put in the effort to forge the relationship—immediate action is nearly guaranteed.

The following sections of this essay will relate my own successes and failures in dealing with personal relationships in Italy. Namely what can be accomplished, and how quickly it can all come crumbling down.

It's W*ho* You Know

The culture of Italy differs from that of the United States greatly in many respects, however the most important aspect of dealings in Italian culture is the personal relationship. Rules and laws are for the masses and uninitiated. Paying full price at a restaurant, paying for a coffee before walking up to the bar, and a multitude of other "inconveniences" that stand in the way of mission success can be whisked away if you make the effort to forge the right relationship. This portion will draw on my personal experiences and observations of how relationship building has gone right, has gone wrong, and the power of knowing the right person.

The Keys to the Airport

My main duties generally take me out of the office in support of DoD flight operations arriving into Italy in the form of VIP visits for various government offices. One of the first stops upon checking in my first week was to the DV Lounge at the local Italian Air Force airport that we use for incoming flights. Coffee is such a large part of the culture that the reception terminal includes a full Italian style coffee bar manned full time by an active duty member of the Italian Air Force.

My mission here is to make sure that DoD aircraft and aircrews are serviced and all logistical accommodations are made for the same. I receive aircraft transporting local O-6 Task Force commanders to the President of the United States and everything in between. Whilst it is not door-kicking, it is an important duty in the grand scheme of US Foreign Policy abroad.

My success stories at the Airport begin with the Chief of Protocol. Upon our first meeting, I was immediately escorted to the coffee Bar and asked about my family, where I'd been, and my experiences in Italy thus far. This was rather new to me. I had only been in Italy for a week and already I was being thrust into forging a relationship with someone I had never met before, nor did I realize his importance at the time to my continued mission success. I just went with it. I enjoyed a coffee, humored his questions, asked him the same, and returned to work. I had yet to receive my first flight alone and I had no idea what the implications of a positive or negative relationship with this man would be. In short, I reserved judgment and I conferred respect.

As our relationship grew and I received flight after flight at the Airport, always arriving two hours prior and catching up with the officers and NCOs in the airport lounge over coffee, my job became easier. In the beginning, there were many administrative issues that had to be cleared up. Paperwork had to be done, meetings had to happen and a number of personnel had to be conferred with prior to landing. As I got to know everyone through coffee and cigarettes, these boundaries became fewer and fewer. No longer did I have to make notification two weeks prior. I no longer had to meet with the civilian authorities or the fire department. I no longer had to fill out an official request for support from the Italian Air Force. At the six-month mark of our relationship all I had to do was make a phone call with the date and time of the arrival and everything would be taken care of. As our

relationship continued to grow, problems that would arise would quickly be taken care of.

The most impressive power of my personal relationship with the Protocol Chief came in November of 2015. The airport we utilize is a split facility. In 2013 all airport operations turned over to the civilian sector with the military maintaining only their own apron. It has been a difficult and confusing transfer with US flight operations caught in the middle. The biggest fight has been over the cost of parking aircraft. If a civilian parking spot is used, fees must be paid to the airport authority. If a military spot is used, no fees are incurred.

This has historically been a point of contention as bills for US aircraft generally include a fee for parking, regardless of the spot used. I brought this to the attention of the Protocol Chief on an occasion in November of 2015. He simply said not to worry about it. Later that day I received a call from the *airport director* stating that all fees would be refunded and that no fees would be incurred for future flights. A bit of the weight of this power gets lost in the translation. It is extremely difficult to fight the bureaucracy in Italy. There is no sense of customer satisfaction here. A colleague of mine spent six months attempting to get internet access in his home. There are lines for everything and there is no social obligation for any person to do their job. It is much easier for most people to say "that's not my job" and point you in another direction. For this man to make all of it disappear and effectively take money out of the pockets of an Italian organization at the sole request of myself, an E-6 in the US Navy is absolutely stunning given the nature of how things work in this culture.

Because I had reserved judgment upon my first meeting of this man, showed humility and respect and understood that I was a *guest* in his house, he became personally offended that the civilian airport authority would *dare* to charge me landing fees. I continue to meet mission success day in and day out because I take the time to have a cup of coffee and ask a Lieutenant Colonel about his family.

Negative Ghostrider, the Pattern is Full

In November of 2015, our office was preparing to receive a rather high level Distinguished Visitor (DV). This DV came with multiple aircraft, a multitude of security and logistical concerns above our normal requirements and the movement also came with two advance agents to ensure a smooth reception. These two men were both pilots in the US Air Force and had made many advance preparation visits all over the world. There were a number of behaviors that I noticed that I assessed would cause issues when interacting with the host nation military at the airport.

One key difference between the US military and the Italian military is the way in which rank is viewed. In Italy, the military is a relatively flat organization. There is a definite rank structure, but in my observation all members are treated rather equally. The Chief of Protocol is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Italian Air Force yet he addresses me, an enlisted man, by my first name and expects the same in return. The two advance agents were officers, and I was treated as an enlisted man by them even though I was the subject matter expert on operations at the airport and I would be responsible for mission success or mission failure at the end of the day. This is not something that routinely bothered me, but it opened my eyes a bit to the differences in culture

and solidified the reality of the dynamics of personal relationships in Italy. Had the two US officers trusted me and my judgment, things could have gone much smoother.

The event in question began very early in the morning at the DV reception terminal. We had all arrived rather early as there was much to solidify prior to the DV arrival later in the day. The three of us, myself and the two US officers, were met by the Protocol Chief at the front door. I greeted him and introduced him to the other two men. He apologized as the DV coffee bar was undergoing construction and offered to take us to an alternate location to get a cup of coffee. I gave the advance team opportunity to accept, but they did not engage. I emphatically stated "of course!" and we were escorted across the base to their operations center where there was a lone coffee machine. The Chief of Protocol then began to reach into his flight suit, and pull out a handful of change to buy us all a cup of coffee. The two advance agents refused with a polite "no thank you" and when he insisted, they again declined. I happily accepted a cup of coffee and quietly mentioned to one of the advance agents to "have something, anything." They finally relented and opted for a tea, which is acceptable. This was strike one. The Chief of Protocol is the head of protocol for the squadron which receives the Pope, the President of the Italian Republic and any and all foreign heads of state and as such, has near limitless influence at the airfield. The two advance agents had failed to understand the importance of this relationship—although I had explained his importance earlier—and were completely oblivious to the fact that he was pulling his own money out of his pockets to get us coffee.

Strike two came approximately an hour later. As mentioned before, this particular DV came with multiple aircraft and given that the airport is relatively small, the parking arrangement required some discussion prior to arrival. The two advance agents began to dictate their requirements to the Italian Air Force. They failed to grasp the importance of the "guest mindset" and were unwilling to budge or consider alternatives for their requirements. No "outside the box" thinking was engaged on their part. They wrongly assumed that they would get what they wanted because they were important people. This is the only time I have ever seen a member of the Italian Air Force raise his voice when dealing with US personnel. After much heated discussion and intervention on my part, the details were worked out and both parties came to an amenable solution.

Unfortunately, upon arrival of the aircraft, there were issues. Even though we had worked out a plan, as often happens in Italy, the plan did not work out perfectly in execution. Strike three. At this time, the civilian airport authority began to engage with the problems the two large aircraft were causing. In my previous experiences with any issues stemming from the civilian authority, we would be taken care of. Unfortunately, my dear friend did not intervene and it became my problem. I credit this loss in political capital with the disrespectful way in which the two advance agents had interacted with the Chief of Protocol prior, namely the coffee incident that morning. Due to the two advance agents not accepting the coffee and exploiting a relationship building opportunity—and harboring a mindset of self-importance, the director of the airport was now screaming at me to move the airplanes and I had little help from my friends at the Italian Air Force. An entire relationship failure which resulted in near mission failure, borne in the

refusal of a cup of coffee based on the inability to effectively understand and operate with another culture. As senior officers of the US Military, especially working abroad, this is unacceptable.

We were able to work out a solution finally, and the rest of the visit went off without a hitch. The two advance agents left, no smarter than when they had arrived despite my best attempts over the week that they were left in my care. My relationship with the DV lounge and Protocol recovered as well, but it required some effort along with a gift on my part, a bottle of Jack Daniels—one of the most coveted of gifts from any American.

There was one silver-lining that embraces the core of cross-cultural competence: find a common ground. Once the Chief of Protocol had learned that the two advance agents were pilots in the USAF, as he was also a pilot and an instructor, friendly conversations came quick and fast. Ultimately, the two advance agents failed to treat the Chief of Protocol as an asset, and more importantly as a peer. Had they attempted to engage in friendly banter at the coffee machine that morning, a common ground would have been found much sooner and the process would not have cost me half a case of Jack Daniels spread throughout the Italian officers and NCOs.

Lessons Learned

I have learned a great many things at the hands of my Italian counterparts, both civilian and military. The following are a list of my key lessons learned and takeaways that will assist with any interaction with Italian nationals:

Time. Italians often operate on something that is equitable to "island time." Do not be surprised if meetings don't start as scheduled, are not held in the place previously planned for, or if a meeting pops up out of thin air and you were not able to attend simply because you weren't there at the time. Change your perception on the value of your time and its input. Often times, we value our time spent on what we can tangibly accomplish while spending it. Italy does not operate this way. The true value of your time is spending it amongst colleagues or forging relationships you hope to exploit. Italy lives and dies on the equity of personal capital, this means you will too.

Flexibility. In the United States we are used to things going a certain way, in a very linear fashion, and if the plan deviates we expect transparency. When interacting with Italian nationals, you must learn to let go. I have countless examples of how Italians have helped me meet mission success yet I have absolutely zero idea of how they accomplished it. I have become comfortable with the idea of presenting problems and not getting wrapped up in the details of how a plan will be executed. Your end solution will eventually be arrived at; however, it will likely happen in a way that you did not expect or see coming. Let go.

Patience. With flexibility comes patience. If patience is a virtue, then Italy is the test of a lifetime. Things do not move quickly here. When we first arrived, colleagues told us that if you were able to accomplish one thing out of ten per day, it was a successful day. Be it sending a letter, paying a traffic ticket at a tobacco store or just simply going to the supermarket, always pack your patience and embrace the local mantra of "a domani" which means "tomorrow."

Understanding. Italy is a modern nation built in an ancient world. Do not pass judgment, learn to work around the barriers here. In the summer of 2015 the international arrivals terminal at Fiumicino airport burned down. The cause was a short circuit of an espresso machine and the fire raged for four hours before it was noticed and contained. The entire terminal was gutted. Later at a press conference one correspondent asked why there was not an automatic sprinkler system installed. The airport official responded: "That kind of technology only exists in American Hollywood movies." This was 2015, and involved one of the busiest international airports in Europe. At the end of the day, this is not your country and Italian culture began centuries before Great Britain and a millennium before the traitorous idea of the United States was ever uttered in a Philadelphia Ale House. There is much to learn here if you embrace the idea of understanding and reserve judgment.

Personal Motivation. Italians generally distrust large organizations and bureaucracies. They instead place more value on the person and what he or she can accomplish. This translates the burden of success or failure directly on to the person or people involved. This is not a barrier, but instead an opportunity. Relationships can take you as far as you are willing to invest in them. If you are unsure of something, ask. I have never experienced a culture that is more adept at helping someone who is at least trying. If you bring motivation and a willingness to learn, you will be rewarded. If you bring ego, ethnocentrism and a poor attitude, you will fail.

Observation. This is absolutely key. The saying "when in Rome" exists for a reason. If you are ever at a loss for what to do, just watch your hosts, they will show you the way. Additionally, a word of caution. Everything in Italy comes at a cost. Be aware of what you are spending in regards to time, relationships and money in order to meet your required ends. A relationship is a two-way street and as stated before, Italians do not trust large institutions or bureaucracy. Expect to exercise your political capital and influence on US systems and bureaucracies in exchange for a counterpart's equal influence in their arena.

The Case for Cross Cultural Competence

I began forging my relationships on my own, based on a perceived need for them and how Italian culture operates. I have not yet completed my Bachelor's in SSDA, and only recently have I been exposed to the Cross Cultural Competence (3C) curriculum which forms the core of the degree—the "intel you can use" portion. This final section will draw on the academic argument of 3C through my own experiences.

While I am not a collector, my daily duties require me to utilize 3C in a "collector" mindset. I do not write reports, but I have the opportunity —and the burden—of making assessments utilizing the 3C framework to make judgments which I am immediately able to utilize and directly translate to mission success or failure—an immediate feedback loop.

Cultural Self-Awareness. This is by far the most important aspect of 3C and the one that has "saved my bacon" time and time again. You must realize that no matter what, you are an outsider viewing a culture through your biased lens formed by your native culture. I translate this into the "guest mindset", I have always been gracious and understanding and knowledgeable of my shortcomings. With regards

to Italy, I have been rewarded in my humility, setting my ego aside, the Italian military has always provided assistance to get me to mission success. The two USAF advance officers did not embrace this and we nearly paid with mission failure as they automatically thought they were the most important people in the room.

Perspective-Taking. This came with time, although it is equally important. As I interacted more with the ITAF at the airport, I began to understand their relationship dynamics and I quickly realized that I was not the only customer, and more often than not, my DV was the lowest ranking at the time. This forced me to take into consideration the mission needs of my hosts concurrently with my own. Utilizing perspective-taking I was not only able to assure my hosts that I was open to alternative strategies, but I began to actively look for them on my own, finding ways to alleviate my burden and help them meet mission success by staying out of the way and consuming the least of their resources. This directly translated to a greater trust between us as they realized that the US was not nearly as invested in "pomp and circumstance" as other third country visitors they received. Had this been taught to me and I didn't have to figure it out on my own, I could have achieved a higher trust relationship earlier on. The antagonists in my essay, the USAF advance agents, did not utilize this framework and it nearly cost us mission success. While receiving DVs is not generally a "life or death" situation, the results directly translate to the battlefield. I have no doubt that if our mission was "life or death", the costs would have been much higher.

I utilize the frame work of 3C in a unique, operational mission. However, I have deployed in support of Joint Task Forces and as a career intelligence analyst, the tenets of 3C are absolutely invaluable. While I use the framework in a very direct *1+1=2* operational sense with an immediate feel for what works and what doesn't, the *abstract* nature of the concepts is just as useful to the analyst who is far removed from the mission. However, there is no substitute for tactical level field knowledge of a culture with regards to ground truth. Leaders must make decisions based on an intimate first-hand knowledge of a culture and not be slaves to their own cultural biases, nor should they judge a source of cultural information by what he or she wears on their collar. Cross Cultural Competence is not bound by pay grades, but by mindsets and experience—humility plays an important role in both red and blue force interactions.

Conclusion

Coffee plays a central role in the culture of Italy. The most important aspect of coffee as it relates to interacting with Italians and meeting mission success is the fact that it acts as an arbiter and an excuse to forge personal relationships. In no other place is it so easy to create relationships, and in no other place is the personal relationship as important as it is when faced with a mission that has an Italian counterpart.

There are many tools available to begin the journey of a personal relationship: Lunch and dinner on the local economy, or hosted or attended at the home of a colleague. Coffee has a storied history with a heavy Italian influence and it is available almost everywhere you look. From the corner bar to a quick cup from a vending machine in the lobby of a random building, the possibilities are endless and available everywhere.

There is no single way to get things done in Italy. There are no manuals, there are no guidebooks, and there is no Standard Operating Procedure. Mission success relies entirely on who you know and who they know. Personal relationships are the only way to meet mission success and to remove barriers in Italian culture. Without them, you are just an outsider and treated as such.

However, it is extremely easy to meet new people and forge ahead, but be mindful: No matter how "Italian" you think you are, you are always a member of the out-group and you must always be on the lookout for someone trying to exploit your ignorance or position. You must constantly weigh the outcomes and be aware of what you are willing to give in order to get. If you keep an open mind, reserve passing judgment and act as if you are a guest wherever you go, there is no limit to what can be accomplished with our Italian counterparts either in Italy or a third country location in support of a common mission. So, the next time you run into an Italian, don't hesitate to ask "Prendi un caffè?" or "You take the coffee?" There is no limit to what can be accomplished over a simple coffee.

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A Montana native, Scott Fender enlisted in the US Navy in 2005. He has served at Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Naval Special Warfare, and is currently stationed at the Defense Attache' Office at the US Embassy in Italy.

He is currently enrolled in the Capstone course of the Norwich SSDA and intends to seek a commission in the Navy after he completes his Bachelor's in Strategic Studies and Defense Analysis.

He has been married to his wonderful wife Kinzie for four years--also a Montana native--and they have an 8 week old daughter born in Rome, Francesca. His hobbies include weightlifting, reading, spending time with his family, and enjoying all that Europe has to offer.

THE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL: A CASE STUDY

SEAN JOHNSON

Most of the viewpoints expressed in the following article are based on the author's fourteen years of experience in the U.S. Army including multiple deployments to Afghanistan and Central America. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense. The case study describes a deployment to eastern Afghanistan as a member of a U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets) detachment from August 2010 – April 2011.

The intended audience for the paper is both Security Risk Management and Social Performance professionals in the Resource Sector, but may also be of interest to those in the National Security Sector as the first often hires those with experience in the second. All names have been changed to respect the privacy of the individuals mentioned.

Resource Sector Multinational Corporations (MNCs) often find their operations, and profits, threatened by conflict.[1] As mature oil fields and mines cease to be commercially viable, explorers must find new sources to develop, and many of these new potential sources exist in geographical areas that lack exposure to any industrial development. In some of these areas, the lack of industrial development is due to the lack of human habitation; the environment is inhospitable. Other potential areas are inhabited by resilient culture groups who continue to flourish, as they have for millennia, without the effects of industrial development.

These communities could be described as composing a social frontier of sorts. The social frontier concept describes mainly rural, pastoral or agrarian, communities that have yet to experience the effects of globalization, modern technology and methods imported from the industrially developed world. By the inherent nature of the technology, globalization spreads from urban centers to areas more remote. Airports and ports feed the circulatory system of road and rail which transport the machines that have the potential to transform the landscape. As a matter of survival, frontier societies are usually sensitive and responsive to the environment. There is a relation between living at or close to the subsistence level and the level of awareness and sensitivity to the social and physical environment. Economically powerful, industrial entities like those of the extractive industries change the nature of the frontier status quo by their very presence, let alone sustained, decade-long operations. As an extractive operation's footprint grows, the fabric of the frontier social status quo can begin to change in ways it never has before. A lack of understanding and mutual engagement between the industrial entity and the local culture group can create uncertainty for both. Uncertainty contributes to a growing level of tension which, without consensus, often leads to conflict.

These frontier societies often pose a greater risk to stable and sustained operations than environmental conditions. Why else would oil and gas MNCs prefer to operate off-shore, where conditions are predictably hostile and dynamic, rather than cope with the uncertainty of working on-shore, where the cultural and social behavior of culture groups promote conditions that are unpredictably hostile? Though the natural sciences have developed the tools to measure and anticipate the behavior of the physical environment with startling accuracy and engineered the structures and machines to withstand tectonic forces, the same capacity has not been developed to explain human behavior as accurately.

Why is it so difficult to understand and manage the potential risk of human behavior? Are human behavior systems more complex than the variables found off-shore: deep-sea pressures, changing currents, heavy seas, and severe weather? On first glance, it would seem not. Humans organize themselves in ways various, predictable ways to establish acceptable forms of human behavior- they make collective decisions, exert authority, resolve conflicts, allocate resources, determine rules, punish taboos, etc. The evidence of this is in almost everything we do. However, while some rules are obvious and somewhat universal- severe consequences for stealing, murder, rape-

1. Davis, R. and Franks, D. The costs of conflict with local communities in the extractive industry The First International Seminar on Social Responsibility in Mining, 19-21 October 2011, Santiago, Chile.

others are not so obvious and require detailed local knowledge for an outsider to gain an understanding of how things actually work.[2]

For an example, how would the forms of acceptable behavior in American baseball appear through the eyes of an outsider? Some of the rules may seem obvious. One person with a stick has a certain number of times to try and hit a ball thrown by someone else depending on what the person standing behind the other person with the stick says. A rule book would explain this process. However, there are parts of the game that are not explained in the rule book. Sometimes the person throwing the ball throws the ball far away from the person with the stick, and the person with the stick just stands there. Other times the person throwing the ball will try to hit the person holding the stick with the ball. If that happens, the game stops and the two teams pretend to fight for a short period before the game resumes.[3]

The ability of an outside observer to understand the power hierarchy, norms, and taboos that govern the constituent individuals reflect the influence of more general cultural elements, such as kinship, alliance-building, exchange and others. The behavior that forms these elements seems to fall along a spectrum of formality, a more formal set of behaviors within these components makes available to an outsider accessible rules, most likely written and available, whereas a more informal set of behaviors does not.

Some organizations, institutions or activities have very clear and accessible structures and modes of behavior- corporations, universities, militaries, governments. For an outsider walking into almost any military command center, the command structure and the command policy will be available for review. Two things will be close to every command center entrance: photos of each individual in the chain of command and a bulletin board where important policy will be posted. These two items show both outsiders and constituent members who is in command, where the authority derives from and what acceptable behavior is.

However, even within very formal and rigid institutions, there are examples of informal norms that develop outside of the formal rules. Staying with the military analogy, a good example of this is from the movie *A Few Good Men*.[4] In the film, the plot revolves on whether or not two Marines were ordered, by the recognized authority, to carry out extralegal punishment which resulted in the unintended death of the non-conforming recipient of the punishment, another Marine. In the scene listed in the footnote, a young Marine is asked whether or not the extralegal punishment, a "Code Red," was a formalized, or written, method of punishment. The prosecuting attorney proves that a "Code Red" is not a formal punishment. However, the defense attorney's counter-argument proves that many normal behaviors are not formal, opening the possibility that a "Code Red" was a verbal tradition accepted by the organization as a way of maintaining standards of behavior.

2. Ch. 7- Human Society http://www.project2061.org/publications/sfaa/online/chap7.htm
3. Munger, M. "Munger on Sports, Norms, Rules, and the Code" http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2013/07/munger_on_sport.html

4. A Few Good Men: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fgIBG8q1Gjc

At the other end of the spectrum of formality, an outsider visiting a tribal village in a frontier environment may have a more difficult time gaining a clear understanding of who is in charge and what the rules are across cultural components. A frontier culture group may not need or be able to produce a formal structure; everyone is socialized in the same tradition, or literacy is not prevalent, so written rules are unnecessary. This hypothetical society may be informed mainly by various forms of tradition- oral, ritual, ceremonial- that convey a more nuanced and significant meaning to those familiar with the tradition. In contrast, an outsider may attach absolutely no significance to the same behavior. The outsider may have to spend a significant amount of time learning local customs, norms and also beliefs that undergird and motivate behavior through personal interactions and rational thought to gain a clearer understanding of how the society functions.

Recognition and Relevancy of Informal Institutions:

One of the difficulties in working in frontier environments is first recognizing that informal institutions exist and then understanding how those local institutions are structured. Unfortunately for those looking to identify key stakeholders in frontier societies, there is nowhere to see the official chain of command or a bulletin board where the village Chief displays grazing rights policy. However, an informal structure with its own hierarchy, a set of rules, and policy exists even if it is not apparent to the outsider.

Another potential mistake an outsider can make is to assume that a formal license from a national government holds any real meaning to a local community at the social frontier. By defining a community as a social frontier society, we recognize that often the formal institutions of the modern nation-state may hold little real legitimacy and influence on this socially different group. The national government may only be able and willing to impose their authority through the use of force. In addition to the formal license from a recognized governing authority, a local social license to operate[5] must be negotiated and maintained with all relevant stakeholders. This process may not be straightforward because neither party, either the local community or the outsider, is aware of how the negotiation process is to be handled. The following case study intends to highlight an example of how a semi-formal institution was utilized in order to avoid conflict. Explicitly the case study examines the institution, The Development Council; implicitly, and more importantly, the case study describes the potential value of a persistent day-to-day engagement.

Case Study- The Development Council

Dand Patan District sits on the far eastern border of Afghanistan and the Kurram Agency of Pakistan. The district is roughly in the shape of long, narrow rectangle with the 25-kilometer-long-axis running north-to-south and 8-kilometer short-axis running east-to-west. The major areas of habitation form an intersection of seasonal waterways or wadis running from both the northern and southern extremes of elevation. These tributaries feed into a central river which flows from west to east into Pakistan and divides the district into roughly equal portions, north and south. As the locals described themselves, four major tribal distinctions existed: the Moqbil, who constituted the majority of the southern portion, the Jaji, who resided in the north, the Mangel in the central west and the Darwisi, who had a pocket in the north surrounded by the Jaji. The Moqbils and the Jaji were largest

5. http://socialicense.com/index.html

tribes by number within the district boundaries, but not necessarily the most influential. The Mangel, represented by a small village in the central-western corner of the Dand Patan District, were the dominant tribe of the larger district to the west and were provincially influential. As an example of the Mangel Tribe's influence, the District Governor of Dand Patan was a Mangel.

Governance- The District Governor and Executive Shura

The executive governance of Afghanistan is roughly separated into three echelons: national, provincial and district. The provincial and district governors are political appointees. The president appoints the provincial governors who in turn appoint district governors. The District Governor and his small staff were tasked with local governance while the District Chief of Afghan National Police (ANP) was tasked with providing security and enforcing the law. The district governors are advised by and accountable to what is supposed to be a representative body of the district population, the Executive Shura. Legitimacy in the eyes of the rural population was one of the problems plaguing the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and among the chief complaints against the GIRoA was the lack of services provided by governmental authorities.

Historically, sustainable development projects were nominated and supervised by NATO coalition Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The PRTs were usually headquartered in the provincial capital and would make periodic survey trips among their respective areas of responsibilities to both nominate future projects and monitor on-going projects. Generally, PRTs focused their efforts on large infrastructure projects i.e. roads, bridges, district government buildings, hospitals, etc. The PRT's ability to properly manage development projects was significantly constrained due to the difficulty in visiting the remote sites in rural Afghanistan for both the lack of security and the natural terrain.

VSO Doctrine- Security, Development, Governance

The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)[6] was created as the vehicle to overcome the bureaucratic impediments between the source of funding and the execution of local projects. The CERP was to be one of three fundamental parts of a program called Village Stability Operations (VSO) which nested within a larger overall strategy to counter the growing influence of the insurgency in rural Afghanistan. From a 2012 RAND report on VSO:

> *…Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP) program remains largely as it began in early 2010: a bottom-up counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy that seeks to establish security and stability bubbles (or "white space") around rural villages with an eye toward permanently shaping an area to support local governance and development. VSO/ALP focuses on a bottom-up effort that*

6. http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/atp1_06x2.pdf

> *connects Afghan villages to the central government through an integrated approach to security, governance, and development. This is an important distinction from past efforts that seemed to concentrate mostly on short-term security gains rather than addressing deeper political, ethnic, tribal, and socioeconomic issues necessary to sustain these gains in the long run. At the heart of VSO is a 12-man US Army Special Forces team that embeds in or adjacent to a local village.*[7]

As part of the VSO strategy, authority for development funding would be devolved to the district and village level through CERP. As part of the DoD accounting strategy, every VSO team must nominate a Project Purchasing Officer (PPO) and a Pay Agent (PA) before entering their respective Area of Operations. No one person can hold both responsibilities at the same time. The PPO is responsible for determining, within regulations, what the funds can be spent on; the PA is responsible for handling the currency and executing the physical exchange. As the PPO for the team, I was responsible for nominating, funding and supervising sustainable development projects through a $50,000/month CERP budget.

"Okay, now I know what I can't fund. What projects should I fund and how?"

In Afghanistan, US Army Special Forces teams operate on an eight-month rotation cycle. The team we were relieving was the first SF team to conduct Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Dand Patan and one of the first six locations in the Afghan theater. At the district level, my PPO predecessor had begun the nomination process for CERP funded development projects in the Executive Shura and had found that the effect was counter-productive to the goal of promoting effective governance. The Executive Shura had denigrated into 30 or 40 Pashtun elders whose primary objective was to curry favor with the District Governor to secure a portion of development funding for personal gain. Being a member of the Executive Shura was not a paid position. Those who constituted the body could be roughly generalized as patriarchs over the age of 40 who owned land and had both the financial resources and the time available to travel the distance to the district center and exert influence over the often raucous, hours-long debate. Any topic not associated with development funding was paid lip-service, and the reputation of Executive Shura was quickly deteriorating in the view of much of the local populace.

In response, local villagers, who would like to apply for a development project, would try to circumvent the Executive Shura and approach the PPO personally to hand over the standard application form. It was quickly apparent that within the first few weeks of a new team's arrival locals could ascertain who on the team was responsible for development funds and this person would usually have a crowd form around him within moments of arriving at the District Center. After having been inundated with proposals, realizing that the system was inherently flawed and could not continue as is, the previous PPO had been reluctant to attempt to distribute any further development funding.

However, the former PPO had found one Jaji elder, Haji Ayoub, who had proven effective in executing very small-scale development projects, namely the refurbishment of existing water wells. For the local population of mountainous Dand Patan, two principle development objectives were seen as the top priority: access to clean drinking water and erosion control. Therefore, the majority of project requests related

7. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2012/RAND_WR936.pdf

to either a water well or retaining wall. The arable land of Dand Patan consisted of irrigated plots in, or directly adjacent to, a natural *wadi* or wash and retaining walls were built to maintain the integrity of the fields during the seasonal flooding. With $5,000 USD for materials, a two-week schedule and by using local villagers for labor, Haji Ayoub could refurbish 10 or more existing well sites. Because of his reputation as former mujahideen during the Soviet occupation and his experience working as a construction foreman overseas in the Gulf States, Haji Ayoub possessed a personal level of security and freedom of movement amongst the Moqbil, Mangel and Darwisi tribes which enabled him to visit the various work sites. If a particular village did not have the expertise to carry out the work, Haji Ayoub would either personally supervise or arrange for another local foreman to oversee the project. Before meeting Haji Ayoub, my predecessor had found that other elders from the Executive Shura would submit to him project proposals for a similar well project at five times the cost and double the schedule. Because of previous project failures with various other members of the Executive Shura, during our team transition, the former PPO recommended that I work only with Haji Ayoub.

Well conditions before the refurbishment project:

Well conditions after refurbishment project:

After my first meeting with Haji Ayoub and the former PPO, I realized that continuing the current administration of development funding would not be a possibility. Haji Ayoub informed the former PPO and I that he had been arrested and forcefully interrogated, at the direction of the District Governor, on charges of corruption and embezzlement of the development funds used for the water well refurbishment projects. The out-going PPO was livid at the news as various members of the different tribes had reported their appreciation for Haji Ayoub's work and were becoming increasingly more cooperative with other coalition efforts. In response, Haji Ayoub was in the preliminary stages of organizing a protest of rural villagers in front of the District Center- a collection of government buildings inside a walled compound- to counter-accuse the District Governor of the same crimes using his patronage powers through the Executive Shura.

Realizing that tensions were escalating weeks before the parliamentary elections were to be held, I asked Haji Ayoub what his recommendations were to help calm the situation. He explained that although he respected the District Governor, who was of the Mangel tribe, he thought that the institutional structure of the district-level government was systemically flawed and unsustainable. Every tribe wanted a portion of the development funding and any one individual managing the funds, whether Haji Ayoub or the District Governor, would instantly become the target of corruption charges by those who felt their interests were not being represented. The additional responsibility of administering the distribution of development funding was destroying the reputation, legitimacy and ability to govern of the District Governor and his advisory council, the Executive Shura. The solution, in Haji Ayoub's opinion, was the Development Council, and he could not understand was why the organization was not being utilized.

District Development Council

As I had never heard of the program, I asked him to describe it to me. He explained that the GIRoA Ministry of the Interior (MOI) had developed a program specifically designed for the administration and distribution of development funding. MOI representatives had come to the provincial and district level from Kabul and explained the new program. Each tribe was to elect a qualified representative to a district-level Development Council. Those elected would then travel to Kabul for two weeks of training in the duties and responsibilities of being a member of the Development Council program. Haji Ayoub had been elected and had attended the national-level training for the Jaji tribe of Dand Patan District. There were also three other elected members of the Dand Patan Development Council who attended the training and represented the remaining district tribes- Moqbil, Mangel, and Darwisi. At the district level, the members of the Development Council were responsible for the following:

- Collect a standardized project proposal form from district applicants
- Prioritize projects and submit a development plan to District Governor for approval
- Submit development plan to the Provincial Development Council for funding
- Receive and distribute funds to designated project supervisors
- Monitor project progress and assure quality of work
- Submit progress reports
- Repeat the cycle

Unfortunately, like many government programs in Afghanistan, the Development Council had never materialized as an institution at the district level. The Council members were to receive a place to meet and conduct Council business at the District Center, which the District Governor provided. They were also to receive a small budget and personal stipend for expenses, neither of which ever occurred. Initially, the Development Council regularly met at the District Center and performed their duties as they had been trained. However, after the submitting several development plans to the provincial level government and receiving no funding in return, the other three members of the Dand Patan Development Council ceased to appear at the District Center. Haji Ayoub had continued to operate in his role as a member of the Development Council, collecting project proposals at the District Council office, at his own personal expense; he lived in relatively close proximity to the District Center and could walk to the office within an hour.

Recognizing that the Development Council represented a possible way to distribute CERP development funding without concentrating too much authority in one individual, I asked Haji Ayoub to see if the other members of the Development Council could be persuaded to meet at the Council office during the next scheduled meeting of the Executive Shura. Haji Ayoub said that he could make the meeting happen. A week later, I met Wan Aziz, of the Moqbil tribe, and Mohammad Noor, of the Darwisi tribe, in the Council office while the District Governor and Executive Shura met in a different building. Their initial reactions to me were very different. Mohammad Noor was welcoming and engaged in the conversation while Wan Aziz was remote and dismissive. Haji Ayoub explained that Wan Aziz was the overall leader of the local Mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation, was very well respected and was called by the honorific of "Commandant" by members of every tribe. Muhammad Noor had served as the unofficial district governor directly following the collapse of the Taliban regime nine years earlier and had become familiar with working with coalition forces. There was a fourth member of the Council who had attended the training, a Mangel named Haji Mir, who declined to attend due to threats against his family if he continued to participate. Though the Mangel tribe would not have a representative member of the Council if Haji Mir did not participate, every tribe had some form of representation as the District Governor was a Mangel and was to have the ultimate approval authority.

Over the next few weeks, the Development Council and I met a few more times at the District Center to outline how the Development Council would function as a vehicle to distribute CERP funding and, more importantly, begin local development projects. As the PPO, I had very strict guidelines and the ultimate responsibility for what types of projects and activities the funds were to be used for. However, recognizing that I was about half of the average age of the Council members and an outsider, I emphasized to the Council that I intended to assume the role of disbursing agent only and leave the management of the projects to them if the system proved effective. The Council members would receive a small portion of each project under their supervision for their expenses incurred providing quality assurance and to maintain a functioning office at the District Center to receive applicants. Ultimately, the responsibility for the success and failure of the projects was in their hands as the District Government's representatives. I had only two preconditions at this early stage: (1) the

council members must provide photographic evidence of each of the projects' progress and (2) coalition forces must have freedom of movement (freedom from attack) within the district to ensure that the work was being completed. The second precondition would be harder for the Development Council to provide. Once we had agreed on how the Council was to function, we would go as a group to the District Governor's office to explain the plan and ask for his approval to begin work.

Each Council member was to have a role within the organization and hierarchy would need to be established. Haji Ayoub and Mohammad Noor naturally deferred to Wan Aziz and asked that he be made chief executive. Wan Aziz's primary responsibility would be to liaise with the District Governor, ensure that his intent was being met and maintaining a consistent presence at the District Center. Haji Ayoub would act as Wan Aziz's deputy and Mohammad Noor would serve as the Secretary/Treasurer. Both would be primarily responsible for the field work- disbursing funds, visiting project sites, and quality assurance. All three would be responsible for their respective tribes' interests and would be held accountable through the District Governor and Executive Shura by way of a weekly report. We agreed that the development funding should go for the purchase of necessary materials as a general rule with labor to be provided by the villagers who would receive benefit from the project. All of the projects in the Council's initial phase of the five-year plan were small in scale and could be accomplished locally without the need for heavy equipment and outside expertise. The Council was adamant that the project supervision must remain in local control as a recent large-scale project under the administration of an outside contractor had produced disastrous results.

The coalition bureaucracy required the PRT, responsible for major projects, to hire Afghan contractors from a pre-approved list. Most of the contractors on the list either had some political connection with the governing elite in Kabul or had the education and ability to navigate the approval process. The PRT had approved a major vehicle-bearing bridge project which would link the southern portion of the district to both the District Center and the only paved road leading to the provincial capital of Gardez. After two years of work supervised by an outside contractor who refused to hire locally, the bridge was completely destroyed by the first seasonal flooding after completion. Locally, the failed project was seen as an example of the corruption of the central government, the inefficacy of coalition efforts and a wasted opportunity. The nomination and approval process was beginning again at the PRT (provincial) level to attempt a similar project, only this time with a more modest objective. A footbridge had been proposed. An explicitly stated goal of the VSO program was to build institutional capacity at the district and village level so I readily agreed that projects should be administered locally.

Having agreed to the general structure of the newly re-formed Development Council, the members prepared to present their plan to the District Governor directly after the next meeting of the Executive Shura. Haji Ayoub initially refused to attend due to his recent treatment while in police custody and was still contemplating whether or not to organize a protest against the District Governor. Out of

naivety, I persuaded Haji Ayoub to participate in the meeting as I wanted all of the Council members to be present.

The meeting happened to coincide with the end of the month of Ramadan when the participants were at their most irritable. For two reasons, I suggested that Council members explain the proposed process to the District Governor while I recorded the conversation on a tape recorder. The first, having to work through an interpreter, in this case, a US citizen of Pashtun descent, there is usually an unnaturally slow rhythm to any discussion, and this was to be a lengthy dialogue. Second, I wanted to deemphasize the role of coalition forces as the source of funding. The initial meeting was contentious.

Wan Aziz initially led the meeting with the District Governor and the Council plan was put forward. The District Governor agreed that the current situation was not sustainable and was open to the idea of the Development Council as long as his authority was respected. At about the 30-minute mark, the meeting began to deteriorate, and Haji Ayoub and the District Governor began to accuse each other of embezzlement. The meeting was effectively over when the District Governor, a man in his late fifties and in a fit of rage, came out from behind his desk and physically attacked Haji Ayoub, a man in his early fifties. The District Governor's bodyguard and kin, a man in his twenties and the only armed person in the room, attempted to hit Haji Ayoub with the butt of his rifle. The other two members of the council, also in their fifties, and I tried to restrain the belligerents gently while Haji Ayoub retreated up the side of the couch he was sitting on and ended up standing on top with his back against a wall. My interpreter, who had recently witnessed the effects of a suicide bomber first-hand, ran out of the room screaming "They're killing each other!" in fear for his life. Shortly after and fearing the worst, my teammates came bursting into the office in full combat gear and rifles up to find everyone had already settled down in their respective seats.

At first, I thought the meeting was a complete disaster. However, shortly after my teammates had left the room after offering medical assistance, which was declined, Wan Aziz and Mohammad Noor began laughing about the whole situation. Soon after, the District Governor joined in, and Haji Ayoub even managed a chuckle. With the help of one of our local interpreters who had a more stoic disposition, the meeting concluded with the agreement that nothing else could be accomplished on that day and to meet after the Eid celebration to finalize the details of the Council. That finalizing meeting did occur as did many more after. It was agreed that Haji Ayoub would avoid direct confrontation with the District Governor as long as the Development Council was allowed to function, and the Development Council ended up performing better than I could have imagined. Initially, the District Governor and members of the Executive Shura would ask my team captain for small "favors" in the form of development funds, but we were resolute that all requests must go through the Development Council. The same treatment was applied to the local villagers we met while conducting our other operations; they were directed to the members of the Development Council. Within a matter of weeks, I was rarely approached again about development projects.

That meeting occurred at the end of September 2010, and I left the country the beginning of April 2011. In the intervening six months, our team was able to fund dozens of small development projects totaling

over $250,000 USD with ever increasing efficiency through the Council. The Council also helped us facilitate and distribute humanitarian assistance support from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), arrange medical treatment events and train villagers on new construction methods and techniques. For example, the Development Council arranged for a national-level training team to come to Dand Patan to deliver and train on the use of gabion baskets in the construction of retaining walls. One of the most effective programs the Council supervised was a contract for heavy equipment arranged through a U.S. Army Civil Affairs team and the PRT. The equipment consisted of a front-end loader, a backhoe, a grader, a crane and a couple of dump trucks all of which were paired with experienced operators. The equipment was assigned to and based at the District Center for a six-month contract instead of for a particular project and was extremely effective under the guidance of the Council in improving roads, supporting building projects and general infrastructure improvement. In the more remote areas of the district and as a pre-condition for their availability, the equipment was guarded against insurgent attack by the local villagers who formed the Afghan Local Police.

As the previously unconnected and uncooperative portions of the district began to see the early stages of effective governance through the District Center and its' representatives, a district identity started to emerge, and the security benefits were noticeable. Very shortly after the Council was formed, a severe attack against coalition forces occurred in the southern portion of the district and all scheduled projects were postponed until the village elders would vouch for safe coalition passage. No other coordinated attacks occurred during my time in Dand Patan District. Even in the most remote areas, all emplaced Improvised Explosive Devices were being reported to the police. By the end of six months, the change in the demeanor of the local population was startling. While on patrol in the villages which had been aloof or semi-hostile, my team would routinely be asked to stop and eat with the village elders to discuss current events and plans for the future while the rest of the community would gather around in a festive mood.

Lessons-Learned

Comprehensive and persistent engagement is the key to understanding informal institutions and, in turn, building rapport. When an outsider begins to understand the local context and attempts to participate within a pre-existing institutional structure, locals recognize the effort and a grudging, but honest acceptance of the outside influence can begin to emerge.

Full representation and transparency in decision-making should be strived for. A myriad of interests and social structures may surround an operation. Not every group or individual will feel that their interests are being accounted for. Also, opportunists will try to abuse and exploit the system for short-term personal gain. Every effort must be made to provide some form of representation to every group and individual. For groups, it may be through a regularly elected official, for individuals it may be through a grievance structure. If the decisions of the institution are made public and accessible, the perception of corruption can begin to be lessened.

Institutional integrity is essential. Well-established institutions endure longer than individuals do. By emphasizing the importance of protecting the integrity of the institution over individual benefit, the organization can begin to build its own momentum and gravitas as an enduring concept and a way to solve problems.

As much as possible, avoid compromise. In moments of crisis, an outsider may find it expedient to operate outside a recognized, or recently established, local institution to accomplish a goal. However, the destabilizing influence of undermining an existing institution or destroying a newly developed one will usually cost more in the long-term than any temporary gain. Institutional credibility is made in little steps and lost in great leaps.

Both long-term vision and short-term execution are necessary. Providing a vision to strive for is essential in sustainable development. This can come in the form of 1, 3, 5 and 10-year plans for larger scale, capital intensive projects. These plans should be both enduring and flexible with a periodic review. But do not neglect the near-term. Executing multiple small-scale, safe-to-fail projects are critical for local buy-in, especially in the beginning.

Finally, when you are an outsider, recognize you are an outsider. It is important to acknowledge and respect local customs and participate enthusiastically when invited to do so, but severe affectation of local habits and garb will not earn you respect. It will probably only make you look ridiculous.

About the Author

SEAN JOHNSON



Sean Johnson was born and raised in South Florida. He joined the U.S. Army in 2001 as an infantryman, serving 12-months in Paktika Province, Afghanistan beginning in 2004. After completing his first enlistment upon his return from Afghanistan, Sean separated from the military and began studying Construction Management at Florida International University in Miami where he was hired by KM-Plaza Construction Services. With KM-Plaza, Sean worked as an Assistant Project Manager on two new construction condominium projects on Miami Beach, The Carillon Ph. II and The W Hotel. In May of 2007, he was selected to attend the U.S. Army Special Forces Qualification Course graduating in January of 2009. With 20th Special Forces Group, Sean has deployed to Afghanistan in 2010, El Salvador in 2012, and Honduras in 2014 for six to eight-month rotations. In 2013, he completed his B.S. in Strategic Studies and Defense Analysis at Norwich University. In the fall of 2016, after a scheduled 6-month rotation to the Arabian Peninsula, Sean plans on entering his 1st year of law school at American University in Washington, D.C.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LRC LEARNING WORKSHOP

ROBERT GREENE SANDS

McCaw was a better soldier than ever. And it had nothing to do with holding his ground in a firefight. He was a frontline ambassador for the US, trying to make a positive change in a country wracked with problems. For McCaw, it all started with dialogue. "And it's hard to have a conversation with someone," he says, "if you don't know anything about them."

Fifty people filed in to the main conference room at National Foreign Language Center near the College Park campus of the University of Maryland as the March 2nd 8AM hour approached. The topic of the day was a one-day workshop on exploring language, region and culture learning. Entitled Fundamentals of LRC Learning suitably enough, the relevance of this workshop and the concepts and applications illustrated are germane to government agencies such as the Department of Defense, Department of State, US AID and organizations like non-governmental organizations (NGO). The workshop endured a cancellation of its original date in January due to the blizzard that propagated havoc in the National Capital Region. Still, with the attendance kept small to facilitate active audience participation, the room was mostly full. Robert Greene Sands kicked off the workshop by welcoming the audience to what the sponsor, hosts and facilitators hoped

to be an engaging and useful exchange of ideas and an exploration of the utility of ongoing LRC programs. The workshop strived to advance a new perspective of how to integrate critical sets of knowledge, skills and abilities that promulgates success in cross-culturally and linguistically complex situations, activities and events that are and will continue to be the bane of security, development and aid missions and operations in regions such as Africa, South America, southeast Asia and elsewhere.

Summary

The workshop featured one-hour sessions on fundamental components of an LRC program. Workshop personnel presented on areas such as defining the components of LRC, exploring the state of the current LRC landscape, LRC curriculum development, the use of learning management systems and the development of blended LRC learning, and LRC assessment. Participants had opportunity in each session to ask questions, offer up thoughts and/or provide examples of their own LRC experiences in building an LRC program.

In brief, the concept of LRC learning features synergizing traditionally segmented approaches of language learning, developing cultural awareness and gaining regional expertise to better navigate cross-cultural complexity through understanding human behavior while effectively communicating across cultural and social barriers and divides. Knowledge and skills that fall under the LRC umbrella are language, culture and region-general knowledge (CG and RG) and their application to culture and region-specific application), cross-cultural competence (3C), and cross-cultural communication (CCC). This suite of knowledge and skills allows a transfer of capability to any culturally complex environments. The intent and success of braiding such a learning approach depends on capturing the essence of recent disruptive innovation and technology in higher education and also advances in online learning in business and bringing that to bear on LRC learning events, from sustainment to Initial Acquisition Training (IAT). LRC requires a cadre of faculty to facilitate instruction. It also requires a blended learning supported by a learning management system (LMS), which allows the capacity of instruction to match the span of disciplines and approaches while maintaining the critical relationship of instructor/student and student/student. The LMS can readily open the aperture on student performance analytics, offering a more robust suite of evaluations while automatizing the evaluation process. Appraising the efficacy of learning and the development of pedagogically-sound instruction means stepping beyond the use of current language assessment programs; these assessment efforts have been the only measures applied to any DoD language programs which fall significantly short of showing an indication of learning in region and culture. Capturing the performance, not proficiency, which is relevant to learning outcomes, can ultimately provide a sense of capability seeded by LRC learning to respond to novel and unforeseen behavior.

This workshop offered a distillation of publications and presentations on the concept and application of LRC learning authored by workshop facilitators that have been featured in this journal as well as other relevant venues. It also showcased LRC products and processes from recent and ongoing learning courses, giving participants an insight into just what was going on under the LRC hood. The workshop introduced a new perspective of languaculture-general that probes the

space between languages where culture heavily influences expression and meaning. And finally, the assessment of an LRC learning program was explored and a model introduced that would be customizable to organization and LRC need. Providing a DoD-wide LRC learning assessment was considered to be a direction not beneficial to the goal of measuring performance. Difficulty in trying to capture proficiency in culture and region turns on the lack of efficient and meaningful measures while existing language assessments may not accurately reflect operational use of language or fit to a development program where performance becomes a reflection of overall LRC behavioral capability.

Presenters & Affiliations

The Fundamentals of LRC Learning Workshop featured five presenters who represented a cross-section of discipline and featured both an academic and military organizational perspective. Each represented a deep knowledge of language and culture learning and had extensive experience with the managing, development and delivery of LRC programs. The following are the names and affiliation of presenters and the title of their presentation.

Mrs. Gail McGinn, Keynote
President, McGinn Consulting LLC
Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
"Beyond the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap"

Dr. Robert R. Greene Sands - Workshop Director
Director and Senior Fellow, Institute for the Study of Culture and Language at Norwich University
President of RGSands, LLC
"Language, Region & Culture: The power of synchronicity, synergy & the importance of foundations"

Mr. Pieter DeVisser
President, Languaculture Consulting, LLC
Research Fellow, ISCL at Norwich University
Former Defense Language Institute LNO with Joint Base Lewis McChord
"Curriculum Development and LMS Delivery"

Dr. Allison Greene-Sands
Deputy Chief of Staff, Office of Secretary of Defense, Sexual Assault and Prevention Program Office
Research Fellow, ISCL at Norwich University
Former Associate Director of Culture, DLNSEO
"Got Languaculture? Infusing "Languaculture General" Concepts in LRC Instruction"

SFC Kevin E. Glymph
Operations NCOIC
HHB I Corps, Joint Base Lewis/McChord
"LRC experience from the Field"

Dr. Robert R. Greene Sands & Mr. Pieter DeVisser

"Assessing LRC Performance: Not like threading a camel through the eye of a needle"

The Workshop

The learning objectives for the workshop were as follows:

1. Promote understanding of the concepts and definitions of common LRC components – language, regional expertise and cultural capabilities;
2. Clarify the role of mission to determine the breadth/depth of LRC necessary;
3. Explain the importance of blended learning in LRC and the role of LMS as gatekeeper; there is no such thing as an omnipotent LRC instructor;
4. Describe the role of assessment in developing LRC learning goals;
5. Explore the management of an LRC program.

Early on in the second session, an alternative learning objective was provided:

You can teach language, or you can teach elements of "culture", you can even teach region – culture-specific on steroids – BUT, the emphasis on one over the other produces an incomplete and perhaps contrary path or end-state vis-à-vis the desired or necessary requirements. So, the goal must be to develop, whenever possible, foundational coordinated learning programs that incorporate both language and culture (general and specific) and cross-cultural capabilities and skills that truly align with organizational requirements and that can be assessed to benefit the organization and the learner.

Application of Learning Technology to Workshop Participants

To provide application of learning technology to the participants who may never have used or taught through learning management systems, as part of the learning goals advertised, the workshop was set up as a course in Moodle, the learning management system of Norwich University of Applied Research Institutes (NUARI). Participants registered through Moodle, paid their registration fees via Pay Pal and were enrolled in the workshop course. Once registered, the participants became part of a learning cohort and Moodle then served as a "workshop central" where "students" were kept apprised of administrative needs, such as agenda changes, directions, and downloading parking passes through the in-course messaging system. We also posted a series of articles that pertained to LRC and the goals of the workshop and suggested participants peruse through them prior to the workshop as an introduction to the concept and content. The ability to be able to communicate to the workshop cohort was critical when the blizzard hit the National Capital Region (NCR); participants were kept appraised of the weather, cancellation and rescheduling through the Moodle tool.

Proceedings

The following section provides an overview of workshop sessions. The full slide presentations of the workshop presentations can be found at the following link: www.isclworkshops.com

Gail McGinn – Beyond the Transformation Roadmap (Keynote)

Introduction - Over the last decade, the DoD has struggled with the development and sustainability of language and culture learning outside of the traditional language learning for professional and military linguists. That much is certain. The initial and formative document that paved the way for the last decade of LRC development in the DoD was the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (DTLR). Published in 2005, the roadmap laid out both a vision and steps for the development of a LRC program. Foreign languages had been an important consideration since WWII and a concise and focused program, primarily producing military linguists for intelligence work had developed at Defense Language Institute in Monterey, CA and a smaller program at Defense Language Institute (DLI)-East in Washington, DC.

Keynote - Mrs McGinn's keynote address, Beyond the Roadmap, was in part a look back at the context and assumptions of the DLTR as in large measure, a response to 9/11 and the operations in Afghanistan and later 2003 in the invasion of Iraq. Mrs. McGinn was Deputy Undersecretary of Plans and Programs, the same office responsible for the DLTR publication. Arab languages spoken and taught in the DoD were immediately recognized as language shortcomings following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As missions continued post 9/11, it became evident that Arab languages were crucial to general purpose forces (GPF) communicating with a host of actors in rapport building, developing partnerships and in general, working in and with coalitions in counterinsurgencies in locations including Afghanistan and Iraq. Other anticipatory missions of DoD engagement in post roadmap publication were humanitarian operations, stability operations, and in 2005, nation-building. In essence, the label expeditionary was to apply to several populations and the types of missions involved within DoD and pre-deployment training in softer skills and knowledge that involved language and region became immediate and critical force multipliers.

Mrs. McGinn shared what was missing from the DLTR from the perch of a decade of hindsight. Given an array of variables and the multiple contexts surrounding the genesis of the DLTR, it is now apparent the roadmap was not as inclusive it could have been in folding in region and culture. Culture was mentioned just once in the brief roadmap and region was a confluence of knowledge that was arranged in levels of expertise that had little connection to the learning process that was needed to provide the expertise. And region and culture were not linked in any appreciable way with the language learning assumptions of the DLTR. To Mrs. McGinn, roadmap authors, and those who benefited from the DLTR assumed that language instruction would provide region and culture learning. The roadmap also demonstrated a lack of understanding and application of theory to learning development in region and culture. The kind of knowledge and skills necessary for the intimate social and cultural encounters with a host of foreign actors could not be provided "just-in-time."

Mrs. McGinn asked a decade later, has this deficiency been addressed and rectified in how the DoD now prepares their military and civilian personnel for the 21st century DoD mission? To answer this question, Mrs. McGinn introduced the concept of cultural diplomacy - "…. a course of actions, which are based on and utilize the exchange of ideas,

values, traditions and other aspects of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation or promote national interests…" - as perhaps a perspective to consider when it comes to considering the types of language, region and culture skills and knowledge needed by DoD personnel that deploy and fill assignments in culturally complex environments and arenas. Mrs. McGinn cited Nancy McEldowney's 2015 publication on US diplomacy in an "untethered world" as an understanding of the range of knowledge and skills necessary to successful diplomacy:

Our diplomats must be thoroughly fluent, not just in foreign languages but also in the issues that matter most to those we're dealing with. Questions of social development such as education, literacy, and poverty; environmental degradation; post-conflict stabilization; women's and minority empowerment; corruption, rule of law, and market-oriented policies that create the conditions for job creation—these are the issues driving the world, so we must be positioned to drive them.

Cultural diplomacy then becomes not just the purview of diplomats but an approach of utility to private, public or civil sectors of society.

It is clear to Mrs. McGinn (as it is now to those in and outside of the DoD) that language, region and culture are critical assets to develop, but as she also pointed out, the "learning curve" on LRC is steep. Said McEldowney,

"This type of advanced regional, substantive, and linguistic expertise is acquired not in weeks or months, but rather over years of sustained and focused effort. It entails a significant investment of individual effort as well as government resources. But the long-term dividends—grasping underlying trends and shaping them as, and often before, they unfold—will recoup the cost many times over."

Mrs. McGinn sketched what should be involved in an approach that would consider the extent of a cultural diplomat. Language perhaps is the most straightforward of the three to gain competency and the easiest, you learn it, although time consuming. Language learning can be tailored to mission and function, and along a range of social complexity, from performing road blocks to medical relief missions. The concept of region may be locked to locale, but encompasses topics generally considered tied to expertise, such as law, politics, economics, law and others. However, like learning a language and the need to for a selection of a particular language to acquire, learning regional expertise depends on a selection of an area to study. As an expeditionary force, preparation for specific language and perhaps dialect and location may limit ability to support missions elsewhere if needed. Mrs. McGinn sees culture as more nuanced and considers the need to understand informal as well as formal rules of society that govern behavior as well as helping identify the right kinds of questions to ask to better understand the context and people in a foreign culture.

Referring to a NATO study on adaptability in coalition teamwork, Mrs. McGinn leveraged their findings to support the concept of a global citizen as a model that provides promise for identifying attributes for organizations such as the DoD. Knowing the intersection of LRC learning is critical, recognition of what needs to be familiar where being an expert is necessary, and knowing the role history plays in cultural and regional issues are all important to Mrs. McGinn's model

of global citizen. Without saying, respect and honor of behavior of other cultures is important as well. Mrs. McGinn left to the workshop to help answer the questions of how to prepare DoD personnel to be Global Citizens.

Robert Greene Sands - Language, Region & Culture: The power of synchronicity, synergy & the importance of foundations

Introduction - The first presentation of the workshop introduced the concept of LRC learning. Dr. Robert Greene Sands began his presentation with the fundamental concepts of LRC, referring to three proverbs, that of Carl Jung and synchronicity, immortalized by Sting, the parable of Gomer the Goose and synergy and cross-cultural proverbs relating to the importance of foundations. LRC learning programs can be framed through the meaningfulness of apparent coincidence of intent and direction, the increase in the effectiveness of an outcome bringing disparate elements together in a consistent manner, and the grounding of theoretically-sound academic-tested LRC concepts in the development of learning goals and objectives. Even though the DoD community of language learning professionals and educators advocate that culture, and perhaps some region is part of the learning process, the "coincidence" of creating a braided LRC learning event was realized when disciplines involved in each saw meaningfulness in a more intimate association and synergy was realized when the association of approaches provided an accelerant of learning across LRC.

The Presentation – Sands identified the learning goals provided to workshop participants as specific signposts of an LRC program:

- The concepts and definitions of common LRC components – language, regional expertise and cultural capabilities;
- The role of mission to determine the breadth/depth of LRC necessary;
- The importance of blended learning in LRC and the role of Learning Management System (LMS) as gatekeeper - There is no such thing as an omnipotent LRC instructor;
- The role of assessment in developing LRC learning goals;
- Managing an LRC program.

However, the underlying message of the workshop was according to Sands:

You can teach language, or you can teach elements of "culture", you can even teach region – culture-specific on steroids – BUT…the emphasis on one over the other produces an incomplete and perhaps contrary path or end-state vis-à-vis the desired or necessary requirements, so…the goal must be to develop, whenever possible, foundational coordinated learning programs that incorporate both language and culture (general and specific) and cross-cultural capabilities and skills that truly align with organizational requirements and that can be assessed to benefit the organization and learner.

The contemporary global environment selects for knowledge and skills that can promote a more thorough understanding of individual and group behavior and then interacting with that behavior to better influence outcomes. Sands suggested that this regional and cultural complexity is more akin to clashes of cultures, than civilizations and that a continued preoccupation with the idea of borders and

boundaries instead of belief and value systems will bias understanding. "The tip of the security iceberg now is kinetic; the rest is relational. Nobody ever shot themselves to human understanding."

The concept of the human domain is the most recent attempt in the DoD at defining a "space" where cultural complexity is engaged. Although a somewhat clunky attempt at capturing a military need to draw boundaries and borders around geographical places, and collect and define groups, the human domain, "the sum total of actors and their psychological, social and cultural behavior" at least envisions an approach that is not within the traditional purview of the military. Biases that US military and other US agencies and organizations that act to filter understanding of the human domain are several:

- Nation-states and languages have borders;
- Our perspective of "culture" is replicated by others;
- We live our life in one culture;
- There is mostly a one-to-one correlation between language and culture;
- The world is international and transnational, with an emphasis still placed on the nation-state and borders;
- Language reflects behavioral commonality of speakers.

The black and white binary perspective that tends to color an "American" worldview has difficulty in translation to what Sands refers to as the grayness of the human domain.

What is needed to prepare for all hues that are represented in that domain, and the current and future mission demands, is the transferability of LRC knowledge and skills. DoD missions are not exclusive of traditional military efforts, see Security Force Assistance (SFA), Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) as examples of contemporary and future missions. US involvement overseas varies from location to location where singular deployments and assignments produce as much variability within them then across locations.

Sands pointed out the recognition of the importance of LRC has been amply captured by USG and DoD leadership, but recognition does not mean that effective policy and programs have followed. The DLTR provided the initial foundation for LRC; since its publication, there has been uneven and inconsistent progress across a number of fronts in standardizing concepts based on theoretical appropriateness. There have been uneven attempts in writing policy and strategy that produces a baseline to build, deliver and fund effective learning programs, while there has been an inability of the DoD to move on advances made through disruptive innovation in learning technology; all necessary for LRC learning. The concept of "regional expertise" was also offered in this presentation (and again in more detail during the final workshop presentation) as an illustration of a concept not based on theory or application.

Language learning in higher education reflects a similar movement of synergizing LRC in pedagogy and faces the same institutional barriers and impediments. But critical to sinking LRC deep into instruction and application to experience is the insistent that the "student" must also reflect on the worldview and bias that is inherent and often times unconscious in cross-cultural interactions. Sands cites a 2007 Modern

Language Association (MSA) report that proposes a more transformational effort in language programs to bring the concept of LRC more into the fold, where it also "… teaches differences in meaning, mentality, and worldview as expressed in American English and in the target language …. to challenge students' imaginations and to help them consider alternative ways of seeing, feeling, and understanding things."

Sands then moved into outlining the foundation of an LRC program. LRC must be flexible to organizational need and customizable to organizational learning philosophy. It should motivate students to prepare to work in cross-cultural reality through institutionally-organized cohorts and be able to feed across the process an appropriate assessment program. In effect, every language course becomes an LRC course, every culture & region course incorporates across the LRC spectrum. Sands introduced the concept of SIPDA, where LRC programs should consider scale, intent, and purpose, and innovation in design and assessment.

More specifically, LRC development should reflect a theoretically-informed and defined suite of knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) and a foundation built on the answers to the questions of what is meant by language, region and culture. It should consider and include disruptive technology and approach to learning. LRC learning cannot be done in the classrooms of yesterday. Effective learning, it has been found at JBLM, should coordinate and integrate LRC concepts in same learning events when possible and realize all three concepts play on the other two ALL THE TIME. Finally, there is no such thing as the omniscient LRC instructor, the success of LRC rests on the engagement of a multidisciplinary perspective in development and delivery.

Sands also explored universal LRC constructs. Several disciplines play a role in LRC learning: linguistics, anthropology, human geography, sociology, cross-cultural communication and the behavioral sciences and in concepts and skills that are peripheral in traditional LRC lanes, such as languaculture and working with interpreters. Language is one pillar, but questions of which language, which dialect, who are the speakers, and how much has that language changed and adapted to 21st century global migration are critical caveats. Then there is region and culture as the remaining pillars and the application of cross-cultural competence as sets of skills that mediate bias, allow entrance into others' perspectives, and promote experiential learning away from the "classroom."

Culture/region general learning consists of universal sets of knowledge, or components, that apply to most cultures, groups and places and offers some sense of regularity no matter the group or the location. If culture is considered patterns of meaningful behaviors, then elements such as kinship, identity, religion, exchange, law and order, and others become a means of framing expectations of behavior. Likewise, how groups of people impact geography and how geography and environment impact and influence behavior are critical to understand, as no group exists in a social or natural vacuum. Culture specific and region specific sets of knowledge then become an expression of those general sets of knowledge specific to a group of people and/or a geographical location. Cross-cultural competence (3C) is a set of four competencies that prime the individual to be able to "…

navigate in complex interpersonal situations, express or interpret ideas/concepts across cultures, and make sense of foreign social and cultural behavior." Thinking differently is the application of 3C to "…. manage the unintended consequences of human cognition – bias – and its operation when considering those who are culturally different." A fifth competence, cross-cultural interaction, offers an understanding of communication knowledge and skills that considers the influence of culture on a variety of universal communication channels. Examples of this competence as suggested were languaculture and working with interpreters.

Sands emphasized that collecting LRC into learning was not just adding on elements to a language course, but reinventing the intent and development of the curriculum, the delivery and instruction of an LRC learning program, and how LRC can be assessed to reflect learning and reinvigorating the curriculum over time. Sands concluded by saying that language learning offers the time and means to facilitate effective LRC instruction. One 10-week initial language acquisition course offers enough contact hours for 2-3 college credited courses and the current 24-week language program for the Special Forces Qualifying Course provides 780 contact hours, enough for at least a full semester of college courses.

Pieter DeVisser – Curriculum Development and LMS Delivery

Introduction - Pieter DeVisser presented on the development of LRC curriculum. DeVisser was a primary architect of the JBLM LRC program and an applied linguist who supported JBLM through his position as a Defense Language Institute liaison and also a program trainer for the Command Language Program Management Course (CLPM). DeVisser also has graduate work in blended instructional design. .

Presentation - The need to develop a General Purpose Force (GPF)/ Initial Acquisition Training (IAT) language course offered JBLM Language and Culture Center (LCC) the opportunity to pilot a more robust LRC course for command use. An initial 10-week Korean course was the first pilot attempt with the goal of obtaining a 0+ to 1 ILR score and culture-general and 3C were provided as additional but limited curricular pieces and lacking synthesis with language instruction. In each iteration after this pilot, more robust culture-general and 3C elements were built and provided through a blended learning experience featuring an LMS. DeVisser's presentation covered the full process from LRC requirement to course delivery.

DeVisser outlined a two-stage LRC learning process utilized at JBLM: 1) envisioning the need/requirement and creating a Period of Instruction (POI), 2) developing a relevant curriculum and then delivering and assessing the content through a learning mechanism. At JBLM, the initial focus was on exploring with the unit commander the need for a language course and not just language for language sake, but a collaborative effort between the JBLM LCC to hone in on actual requirements for mission success that includes the breadth of LRC. The process was viewed as a learning cycle and included the following questions and stages: What is the Requirement Statement? What is the desired End-state (what are the associated "can do" statements? What will learners be expected to do? What's the real-world scenario that the soldiers will be engaged in (what is the cross/intercultural context that

will drive application of learned material)? Based on those questions and responses, the next stages involved building to the answers, constructing the POI, Materials, & Assessment Mechanisms (The real-world scenario(s) act as backdrop for the course, briefing, or other materials), and teaching the POI, then refining the POI based on course and student experience). DeVisser went on to explain that since the courses were often designed to prepare students for joint exercises with partner nations, four functional areas/domains were identified to build target language/culture POI around: Rapport Building, Logistical, Security, and Medical. Inherent in these four domains were such activities as Scheduling Training Exercises, Contingency Operations, Key Account Management, Localization (software, etc.) and Medical liaising.

From the beginning of envisioning the LRC courses, the decision was made to move beyond the application of just culture-specific knowledge to language acquisition and instead an LRC approach was adopted that focused on 3C and culture-general knowledge as a frame to help make sense of the culture (s) of the target language and culture-specific examples. Thus, as Sands covered in his introduction, an LRC foundation was utilized and framed the POI and curricular content: language, culture-general and specific knowledge, cross-cultural competence and cross-cultural interactional skills. Two of the four skill-based cross-cultural competencies were emphasized throughout the course: cultural self-awareness and perspective-taking. As Devisser explained, the underlying premise to the LRC was the ability to utilize the length of language learning and with efficient and meaningful use of the 10-week instructional period, to provide besides language, transferable knowledge and skills that would be useful beyond the completion of the joint exercise.

The course consisted of a number of distance-learning culture-general modules covering universal domains or components such as kinship/family, exchange, religion, identity, and others. In addition to language homework and assignments, in-class introduction/discussion of cross-cultural competence, cross-cultural communication and negotiations was provided and both objective tests and qualitative essays were given and evaluated throughout the 10 weeks. Culture-specific knowledge was presented in both language and culture instruction and cross-cultural communication skills were assessed through periodic situational language in action sequences. Alignment between language and CG/3C was done through a synergy of in-class and distance-learning instruction and assessment.

A LMS operated to centralize the course delivery and assessment while allowing the inclusion of multiple faculty as facilitators of the learning experience. DeVisser explained how the non-linguistic elements, curriculum complete with readings and videos were “loaded” into the LMS and then how they were delivered to the students and assessed. Objective tests were given during the week and essays were assigned weekly and then graded and follow-on topics were given.

As indicated by DeVisser, there have been 6 iterations of the GPF 10-week LRC IAT course over the last three years. Course assessment was based on the Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) and not on the Defense Language Aptitude Proficiency (DLPT) exam and proficiency scores were pegged to 1 if not 1+ in languages taught.

DeVisser concluded his presentation with some general benefits of utilizing an LMS as JBM did. The LMS provided extensive data mining through detailed reports and analysis to help assess efficacy of learning. The LMS was cost effective as it reduced manual grading by 2/3, reduced time spent creating quiz/homework questions reduced by at least 1/3, reduced travel costs due to increased distance learning options, and for JBLM, the LMS allowed facilitated, virtual courses with personnel in Hawaii, California, Oklahoma, Arkansas, while allowing 24/7 access to materials and activities.

Allison Greene-Sands – Got Languaculture? Infusing "Languaculture General" Concepts in LRC Instruction

Introduction - Dr. Allison Greene-Sands explored the often defined artificial space between language and culture.

Presentation - Greene-Sands opened her presentation with a description of her experience recruiting foreign women collegiate basketball players in Africa. Greene-Sands recounted how she could converse in French and Portuguese but had difficulty in communicating effectively in the former French and Portuguese colonies in Africa where the language, but more the cultural influence on language, prompted disconnects in meaning. This difficulty was attributed to her not fully understanding the "languaculture" of Mozambique, Mali, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This disconnect was first defined as linguaculture by Friedrich:

A domain of experience that fuses and intermingles the vocabulary, many semantic aspects of grammar, and the verbal aspects of culture; both grammar and culture have underlying structure while they are constantly being used and constructed by actual people on the ground. I will refer to this unitary but, at other levels, internally differentiated domain or whole as linguaculture, or, concretely, Greek linguaculture, rural southern Vermont linguaculture, and so on."

To increase perspective and provide two more in-depth examples, Greene-Sands played a 10-minute video clip that explored the reasons for this disconnect through narrative. Examples in the narrative include Robert Greene Sands's experience with languaculture in varying regions in the US, and further exploration of Greene-Sands' experience in foreign recruiting. The video also introduced Michael Agar's conceptualization of languaculture as the rubric for the fit between linguistic forms and meanings that we understand to be shared within groups, but not necessarily across them. Greene-Sands further offered elaboration of the concept as a matter of discourse and meaning, according to Agar, "The langua in languaculture is about discourse, not just about words and sentences. And the culture in languaculture is about meanings that include, but go well beyond, what the dictionary and the grammar offer. [Languaculture] is the necessary tie between language and culture." Adriana Diaz provides even a simpler definition, "linguistically mediated cultural meaning and behaviors in interaction."

The importance of languaculture, per Greene-Sands, is the importance of context to determining meaning that is implicit in the linguistic interaction. Languaculture shapes consciousness and influences ways of seeing and acting, thinking and feeling. Understanding the context and meaning of different languacultures can mitigate procedural

ethnocentrism, the belief that one's own way of communicating is natural and normal vs. another approach. In many DoD missions, understanding the languaculture can facilitate rapport and trust-building through familiarity, which is essential to building and sustaining relationships and partnerships.

Languaculture has been a difficult concept to promote as critical in language instruction because of the bias of language pedagogy. Considering the totality of language as existing within a circle, Greene-Sands referenced Lantolf's critique of conceptual and instructional bias, "…the circle compelled us to think of language as only what exists inside its boundaries. What is outside-the-circle is something other than language; for example, culture… Little wonder that language learning, teaching and assessment have been understood as something apart from the learning, teaching and assessment of culture."

Greene-Sands introduced "rich points" (RP) as a means to help identify learning moments between one's source languaculture, or Languaculture 1 (LCI), and the target languaculture of learning, or Languaculture 2 (LC2). RPs are those surprises, moments of incomprehension, and departures from an outsider's expectations, that signal a difference between LC1 and LC2. They exist in part because people take for granted the many different cultures and identities they are "members" of – national, ethnic, religious, geographical, class, gender, age, and much more – when in reality, there is no monolithic cultural affiliation. When a RP occurs, some of our invisible cultural jackets become apparent to others and ourselves. RPs are signposts or flashpoints, depending on how those points are navigated, that signify there is a deeper layer of meaning attached to them, and further investigation is necessary. The manifestation of RPs emerges from the fact that every statement implicitly refers to various elements that are taken for granted in a certain culture and do not match the elements of another culture (cultural implicitness). As such, said Greene-Sands, learning a target languaculture is driven by RPs.

In keeping with the theme of knowledge and skill transferability proposed by Robert Greene Sands, and Lantolf's assertion, Greene-Sands introduced the notion of languaculture-general (LCG) as a means to explore understanding in the translational zone where meaning can be derived between the speaker's languaculture and that of the listener. LCG is "a set of concepts that are transferable across all LRC instruction that augment the student's ability to communicate effectively in the target language, as well as in varying applications of the target language in other cultural contexts." Languacultural learning involves the awareness of local, cultural and/or regional influences in dialect, accent, nonverbal behavior and communication, along with an understanding of the variation included in discourse through such patterns as pace and turn-taking, among others. LCG also involves the knowledge of the kinds of verbal "vehicles" that convey a deeper meaning in discourse. Greene-Sands identified several of these LCG vehicles:

- Nuance: Expression or appreciation of subtle shades of meaning, feeling, or tone
- Insinuation: An artful, indirect, often derogatory hint
- Allusion: Indirect reference

- Slang: A kind of language occurring chiefly in casual and playful speech, made up typically of coinages and figures of speech that are deliberately used in place of standard terms for added raciness, humor, irreverence, or other effect
- Jargon/Argot: Language peculiar to a group
- Satire: Irony, sarcasm, or caustic wit used to attack or expose human foolishness or vice
- Sarcasm: Mocking, contemptuous, or ironic language intended to convey contempt or ridicule
- Puns: The humorous use of a word or phrase so as to emphasize or suggest its different meanings or applications, or the use of words that are alike or nearly alike in sound but different in meaning; a play on words
- Parody: A literary or artistic work that uses imitation, as of the characteristic style of an author or a work, for comic effect or ridicule
- Secret/Hidden Meaning: Words that mean something other than their literal translation
- Proverbs: A short saying embodying, especially with bold imagery, some commonplace fact or experience; folk wisdom
- Colloquialisms: A word, phrase, or expression characteristic of ordinary or familiar conversation rather than formal speech or writing
- Idiom: Specialized expressions indigenous to a particular field, subject, trade, or subculture [dialect, lexicon, patois, vernacular]
- Slur: An insinuation or allegation about a person or group that is likely to insult them or damage their reputation

Each of these concepts can elicit RPs and offer opportunity to explore culture-specific knowledge about the LC2. Further, LCG provides a framework through which transferable knowledge and understanding of languacultural elements can be applied regardless of context. Coupled with CG, 3C and CCC, LCG advances windows to cultural understanding and effective communication to promote and augment successful cross-cultural interactions.

Sgt Kevin Glymph – LRC Experiences from the Field

Sgt Glymph provided a thoughtful reflection of his twenty-year career in the US Army and the importance of LRC in many of his professional and personal experiences. Fluent in Chinese and Arabic, Glymph spent the latter part of his career as a military linguist and recounted how valuable LRC knowledge and skills were to the success of his missions. More poignant was Sgt Glymph's narrative of how speaking a language and being intimate with the culture allowed entrance into social environments and access to experiences that would have been difficult if not impossible without his LRC learning.

Robert Greene Sands and Pieter DeVisser - Assessing LRC Performance: Not like threading a camel through the eye of a needle

Introduction - The final presentation examined LRC assessment. In keeping with the previous presentation on LC, the proverb of a camel passing through a needle was presented to indicate the difficulty of assessing LRC or even assessing region and culture in a learning context. The proverb states: It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to gain eternal life. (Matthew 19:24; Mark 10:25; Luke 18:25). Said Robert Greene Sands, by comparison, it

seems far easier to thread a needle with a camel than develop an LRC assessment.

Presentation - Sands suggested that the DoD language and culture landscape a decade downstream from the DLTR is still effected by a host of variables that contribute to a lack of an effective department-wide LRC learning strategy. The continued uneven approach to developing sound strategy and policy is shortsighted and will have ramifications on the program for years to come. The last decade of LRC experience in operational environments proved to be great "test beds" to consider the necessary LRC knowledge and skills that will influence heavily the success for contemporary and future missions overall. However, this "experience" has not been translated into such critical programs as LRC learning development and barriers to this transfer are several. It seems one of the primary impediments is uneven and/or lack of "standardization" across and within LREC elements. Sands pointed out the lack of standardization and its effect to include:

- No consensus on functional definitions of language/dialect, culture (specific and/or regional, general, operational), to develop curricula;
- No consistent HQ-level articulation of operational requirements to guide instructional design;
- Current funding for language and a little bit of culture lacks an overarching DoD strategy and plan - no articulation and coordination of Departmental and Service efforts
- Services and individual units/organizations have or are building their own approaches to LREC learning which creates its own set of institutional barriers that stand in the way of synchronizing efforts across the Department and benefiting from common synergy.

Sands suggests that part of the problem is the creation of an overarching concept of Language, Regional Expertise and Culture (capabilities) or LREC that has no theoretical or learning foundation and is more or less a catchy attempt to corral related but also divergent KSAs, programs, billets and budgets – "acronymizing" the complexity of the individual elements in order to make it more palatable, more like a single consumable that can simply be "purchased off the shelf." LREC is not taught as a single program but is attempted in language and other learning venues without commonly accepted definitions, learning objectives and assessment programs. Sands acknowledges that many accept the importance of LRC in learning endeavors and efforts, but implementation is seriously hampered by the conceptual programmatic constraints of the "packaging."

There are some inherent flaws in the current approach to LREC concepts, which ripple throughout learning development and assessment. For example, the concept of regional proficiency and expertise as currently promulgated makes developing learning objectives or assessment program difficult to construct and then standardize across the Department, let alone singular organizations. In addition, the relevancy of regional expertise and proficiency is only relevant to certain segments of the DoD. Another problem area is that there is no agreement on concept, utility or meaning of "culture." Thus, featuring it as a central tenet of LREC carries with it the same kind of inconsistencies noted in the use of regional expertise.

LRC assessments under development in the DoD such as the Regional Proficiency Assessment Tool (RPAT) and the 3C Assessment Battery under development through the Army Research Institute Sands suggested are not useful for assessing LRC learning, in capturing performance and development. The RPAT was designed as more of a human relations tool and the 3C Assessment Battery is not linked to learning programs but a standalone assessment tool that in part is powered by self-reports.

Sands identified a series of questions to consider when developing assessment efforts:

- What does it mean to assess capability?
- For culture assessments, how do you measure gain in a short period of time?
- DoD LRC assessments are applied outside of learning events (training and/or professional military education), so the question of when are they given and why are problematic and as well, is there any synchronization across one or more of LRC areas?
- Do assessments come with gap analysis and learning programs? Do they lead to learning goals and objectives or are they based on learning goals and objectives?
- Are they guided/self-paced?
- Are facilitators trained/authorities on subject matter?
- What do we want to get out of and LRC assessment?

Assessment goals must be considered and factored into the learning process. Sands posed several questions to contemplate assessment outcomes:

- An understanding of several capabilities? A biographical sketch?
- Something useful to an organization but based on a more generic model? – customizable?
- An understanding of what has been learned and can be expressed?
- A Department-wide "score" with relevance to a focus or mission but may not be the needs of an organization?

Also to ponder are the types of assessment to utilize in a learning event. Assessment measures can be divided into two broad categories: direct and indirect.

Direct measures concentrate on what students have learned or failed to learn, tied to discrete and expert-generated learning objectives. This information can highlight strengths. Through weaknesses, faculty can explore causes, over which they have control, and develop solutions. Direct measures are "tangible, visible, self-explanatory, and compelling evidence of exactly what students have and have not learned."

Sands then introduced indirect measures that can "reveal characteristics associated with learning, but imply that learning has occurred…. [and] evidence consists of proxy signs that students are probably learning." Indirect measures consist of:

- Mid-Semester course evaluations
- Evaluations of course assignments or units

- Course-level surveys
- Course evaluations that can be aggregated for the entire department/program
- Semester-end course evaluations
- Percent of class time spent in active earning
- Honors, awards, and scholarships earned by students and alumni
- Number of student hours spent on homework

A third category consists of add-on assessments that occur outside of course requirements. These include portfolios, surveys, focus groups, a published test such as NSSE (National Survey of Student Engagement), or pre- and post-program standardized tests (not including licensure tests). Add on assessment also features proficiency tests like the DLPT and the OPI.

It is clear that developing an assessment for LRC will need to include various measure identified above. Additionally, questions to ask and goals to formulate for such an assessment will need to be anchored to organizational learning outcomes and provided through measures that reflect value to the organization and student. To Sands, it is clear that any kind of LRC assessment should be embedded in an actual learning event. Assessment goals need to be established while learning goals and objectives are developed. In effect, assessment of the learning event will be one of performance and inferred capability and less on proficiency.

Advantages of course-embedded assessment is that these use course work assignments and tests, which can be a more efficient use of time and minimize the feeling that outcomes assessment is an additional task. Sands also pointed additional advantages. Coursework that students complete is relevant to the learning goals being assessed; this increases the likelihood that they will put forth their best effort; grades based on explicit criteria related to clear learning goals. The course work is created by faculty, who are experts in their discipline and thus, have a vested interest in maintaining the standards of their profession in the next generation. Learning objectives are written to capture measurable responses and the results are relevant to faculty, who want to improve student learning.

Pieter DeVisser continued the presentation and explored the performance as assessment. For a military use, the Supervisor/Commander will have an idea of the knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA) that should be introduced and developed, or can be aided in identifying them for the assessment. Some questions the commander should ask are to judge the effectiveness of the assessment and overall learning event:

- Has the soldier been provided proper content through an effective learning event?
- What has the soldier been exposed to, considered/reflected and assessed across a spectrum of instruments in language, region and culture?
- Is there a measure (s) of performance that effectively captures LREC? Grades, scenario language proficiency only?

DeVisser next provided a look at the existing LRC assessment measures used currently for DoD proficiency, such as the DLPT and the OPI, and included an overview of each assessment and its utility in an LRC course. A more detailed discussion of this review is found in Sands and DeVisser (2015).

The OPI is a OPI - "live", subjective, communicative assessment of global functional speaking ability. It is a standardized procedure using ILR scale for assessment of global, functional speaking ability. It is used across DoD for academic placement, student assessment, program evaluation, professional certification, hiring and promotional qualification. The DLPT is a computer-based test, usually multiple-choice with automated grading. It is a standardized procedure using ILR scale for the global assessment of reading and listening only. It is normed for military intelligence linguists along global domains of potential operational relevance (politics, society, economy, etc.). The DLPT may not consider DoD mission/strategy changes since the Vietnam era or before. It is focused on Intelligence collection, rather than analysis and interpretation, for which CG and 3C are crucial. DLPT does not consider authentic linguistic production in the target language and it is not communicative in nature.

DeVisser then led a lively discussion with workshop participants on the utility of these scores reflecting the assessment of the elements of culture, region and 3C in a LRC context. There was also discussion of the utility of either test to measure language needs in a more operational and cross-cultural and interactive setting. For now, the OPI is probably the best indicator of just language performance and proficiency in an LRC program, but its utility to LRC overall is as just one of three measures.

Sands then introduced the concept of 3C/C&R-general assessment. General questions include: can you identify behaviors? Can you mitigate cultural bias? Can you engage empathy?

To accomplish this and other "culture" goals, CG/3C knowledge (to include 3C procedural knowledge) is presented in modules at class beginning. This provides a foundation to then base the acquisition of CS knowledge throughout the course and CG/3C knowledge comprehension is also aligned with to the language curriculum. Assessment is through general and procedural knowledge and part through culture-specific (self and other) and is accomplished through reflection/essay (rubrics), objective knowledge checks and discussion boards (rubrics) on LMS. Assessment is based on percentage score of all work done.

A third element of the assessment program considers cross-cultural interaction. Modules on 3C and negotiations that include situational judgment tests and a scenario-based Language-in Action (LIA) series provides the knowledge and skills that are then assessed through test scores and performance on the LIA scenarios that are given periodically through the course. Heritage Language NCOs (09 Limas) and language instructors evaluate the cross-cultural and linguistic performance through a series of checklists. Assessment for this element consists of test scores derived from modules and evaluation of performance that is also scored on a percentage.

DeVisser laid out the three separate measures/scores in the JBLM model and formed around knowledge and skills:

- Language – performance score (a calculation of OPI with LIA scores)
- Culture-general/specific/3C declarative and procedural knowledge acquisition as an expression of performance– based on a series of knowledge checks and essays in class and DL
- Cross-cultural communication interaction – procedural knowledge and skill assessment – based on procedural knowledge, SJTs, and Language in Action (LIA)

Measures are then translated to a range from 0-3 (in whole numbers). In IAT, language will consistently grade out at the low end of the 0-3 scale. The other two measures will fall along a 1, 2 or 3 or low, moderate, high scoring. This signals a departure from overreliance on language-only ILR ratings. An example of scoring would be as follow. Scores would then represent an assessment of performance and provide an indication of one's potential abilities, assessed at a specific moment in time, prior to the engagement for which training was conducted.

- Language ≅ 1S/1L (official OPI results would also be provided)
- Culture ≅ 2
- Cross-cultural Interaction ≅ 1

As the model is developed and is validated the assessment would also include the assessment date(s), along with a rate-of-estimated-atrophy (presuming non-use and no additional training) and a list of recommended sustainment resources (to be developed), would be provided as part of the assessment.

Workshop Summary

The workshop provided participants many facets of LRC learning. It presented an introduction to the fundamentals of LRC learning and offered a theoretical foundation for LRC. The workshop detailed a view of an actual LRC course and an LRC element, languaculture, which is not usually associated with traditional language learning. The workshop shared experiential views from the field of the need for an LRC program and how best to assess LRC components. The workshop did not intend to define a one-size-fits all LRC approach, but highlighted considerations that could help the conceptualization and implementation of an LRC learning program.

The LRC concept is a powerful means to provide critical KSAs that are meaningful for contemporary and future missions for the student and organization. Currently, there are learning programs that involve some or many LRC elements such as the USMC Region, Culture, Language Familiarization (RCLF) program or the culture-general and cross-cultural communication courses the USAF offers through the Community College of the Air Force (CCAF). Other efforts are now under development, such as a Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) LREC initiative, but these have yet to be fully developed and launched as a course. No one can deny the needs to infuse LRC learning into existing language programs, and no one should deny the need to offer a more efficient and progressive learning approach and technology to aid how LRC is promoted in learning programs. Parochialism of discipline and approach still hamstrings how we

prepare DoD military and civilian populations for the cross-cultural complexity that is now perhaps the most prominent mission feature encountered by an expeditionary force whose primary mission maybe building partnerships for US national security.